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This thesis offers an analysis of George Eliot’s aesthetics and ethics fi'om the 
interdisciplinary perspective of literature and theology. I examine the role that 
religious motifs play in Eliot’s “ethics of art,” and argue that the motifs of 
incarnation, revelation, and transcendence are central to Eliot’s aesthetic aim of 
extending her reader’s sympathies. Eliot’s ethics of art is designed to help her reader 
transcend his or her inlierent egoism, and to improve tlie way her reader understands 
his or her own self in relation to the world and to others. An exploration of the 
religious motifs of incarnation, revelation, and transcendence explains how Eliot 
achieved tins aim without resorting to didacticism or preaching. In order to 
demonstrate this, the thesis offers a reading of Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda in 
which I employ three concepts that are present in tlie eaiiy philosophical wiitings of 
Mildiail Balditin; non-alibi in being, excess of seeing, and selEother relations. Tlie 
motif of incarnation is central to each of these concepts and forms a bridge between 
Balditin’s aesthetics and etliics. In applying these concepts to a reading of 
Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda^ I demonstrate the way in which Eliot’s “ethics of 
art” relies on theological motifs.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Tliis thesis is an exercise in interdisciplinarity. It brings the disciplines of English 
literature and theology into dialogue, and attempts a fresh reading of George Eliot’s 
Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda in light of insights derived fiom both. I argue that an 
interdisciplinary approach that brings together literary theory, literary criticism, and 
theology, is necessary for two reasons. First, Eliot herself was interested in religious and 
theological concerns both on a personal and on a professional level. Second, Eliot 
explores theological themes, engages with religious groups, and employs theological 
motifs as part of her ethics and aesthetics. In this thesis I aim to explore the role that 
theological motifs play in Eliot’s aim of extending her reader’s sympathies. This 
aesthetic aim is expressed in the literary criticism that she wrote, in letters about her own 
art, and within her novels, and I attempt to show that it has a sti'ong ethical component. 
Eliot herself does not use the word ‘ethics’ in connection with her aesthetics of 
sympathy. However, a close reading of her aesthetics of sympathy demonsti ates that it 
does have ethical implications; her aesthetics have as a goal a change in the way the 
reader relates to those amongst whom he or she lives. It is tliis change in the way that 
one relates to the other, or specifically to one’s neighbour, that is, I suggest, distinctly 
ethical.
The tlieological motifs that interest us especially are incarnation, revelation, and 
tianscendence, and I argue that they help us to understand two things. Firstly, how Eliot 
moves her characters towaids altmisni within the novels; and, secondly, how she 
understands the dynamic relationship between her reader and her texts.
1
Eliot’s aim of extending her reader’s sympathies needs to be unpacked: it is 
neither naïve nor simple. A number of presuppositions about the nature and status of the 
author, reader, and text must be explored if we are fully to understand Eliot’s aesthetic 
of sympathy. We cannot neglect tlie role of the reader because Eliot explicitly addresses 
the reader. However, we need to question what she understands the reader’s role to be, 
and why there is a need for the reader to have his or her sympathies extended. As I shall 
show, Eliot’s moral vision is that as individuals we are either more or less egoists or 
altruists, and her aim is to move her reader towards altmism. Our egoism works itself 
out not only in our actions, but also in the very way in which we think about our self, the 
world ar ound us, and our- interaction with the world, particularly in the way we relate to 
other people. This means that an extension of the reader’s sympathies is necessary 
because of the two-fold problem of egoism and a limited perspective on the world. Eliot 
presupposes certain things about human beings: every human being has a limited 
perspective on the world; this perspective, though limited, is unique. So the need to 
extend our sympathies implies a lack of some sort. It implies a lack of sympathy, an 
inlierent selfisliness, and an inability to see things from another’s point of view. 
Therefore, Eliot’s aim of extending her reader’s sympathies is to meet a need in her 
readers. Egoism and its corresponding limited perspective on the world require a two­
fold solution. Readers need a right perspective on the world, and a right perspective on 
the other. Eliot’s hope is that literature and art can change the reader’s perspective. 
Extension of sympathies involves a new understanding of the self, a new way of looldng 
at the world, and a new understanding of the other. As we shall see, it is within this 
dynamic of extending the reader’s sympathies that the theological motifs operate. To
extend one’s sympatliies is to change the way that we look at the world, and the way that 
we relate to others.
The motifs of incarnation, revelation, and ti anscendence work in the intia-textual 
and extra-textual dimensions of Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda^ and foim a bridge 
between Eliot’s aesthetics and ethics. The Oxford English Dictionary defines motif as a 
“constituent feature of a composition,” or as an object “forming a distinct element of a 
design.” I argue that the motifs of incarnation, revelation, and transcendence are 
constituent features of Middlemarch and Daniel Deroiida^ and form a distinct element of 
the design of these texts. Since it is difficult to separate Eliot’s ‘aesthetics’ and her 
‘ethics’ I employ the teim intra-textual to refer to her aesthetics and extra-textual to refer 
to the ethical dmiension of her wiitings. ^ Equally, intia-textual refers to the way 
characters relate to other characters in the novel, and extra-textual to the way the text 
provokes a response from the reader. I will use intra-textual and exti'a-textual to express 
the dynamism between aesthetics and ethics that occui's as the reader reads.
On an intia-textual level the motif of incarnation functions in the way that 
characters are seen to be embodied in time and space, how they must act fiom witlün 
that location, and how they are sympathetic to their neighbour in specific situations as 
opposed to humanity in general. The motif of incarnation also works on an intia-textual 
level in the way that the characters have to search for a vocation. On an exti'a-textual 
level, the motif of incaination is operative in the way that Eliot first has the reader 
become embodied in the narratives of Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda. Eliot then
* Ganett Stewart uses the term extra-textual, but not intra-textual, in Dear Reader: The Conscripted 
Audience in Nineteenth-Ceittwy British Fiction (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 313.
elicits a response to this act of reading, beyond the confines of the text and beyond the 
time of reading. Eliot employs the motif of revelation at an intra-textual level in the 
sense that the characters are challenged or shocked by knowledge that comes from the 
other, from beyond the self, and causes a change within the self. On an extra-textual 
level the motif of revelation functions as a moment when the reader gains knowledge 
from the other in the text of Middlemarch or Daniel Deronda. The motif of 
transcendence works on an intia-textual level in the way in which characters move 
beyond egoism, towards altmism. It is important to note at this point that I do not claim 
here that Eliot understands tianscendence to mean Ûiat which goes beyond the human in 
the sense of entering the realm of metaphysics. Rather, she understands tianscendence to 
mean the exceeding of our limited perspective on the world and that of the others 
amongst whom we live. This said, it is essential to note that Eliot nowhere encourages 
us to seek to escape our responsibilities to others. Transcendence does not entail the 
leaving of others behind. Rather, tianscendence occuis in the recognition of the claims 
of the other, and the willingness to act ethically toward them.^ On an extra-textual level, 
the result of reading Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda should be that we are more 
sympathetic to the otliers amongst whom we live.
In this thesis, I argue that an appreciation of Eliot’s aesthetics and ethics is 
limited, even hindered, by a lack of understanding of the Christian theological motifs of
 ^In chapter three I discuss the work o f Martha Nussbaum. She discusses the ability o f nanative fiction to 
effect a change in the reader. Nussbaum’s writings engage with the notion o f  transcendence in various 
ways. Transcendence for Nussbaum is similar to this idea o f transcending our limited perspective on the 
world. She rejects any notion o f transcendence that refers to anything beyond the human. For further 
discussions o f the concept o f transcendence in Nussbaum’s work see Gregory L. Jones, “The Love Which 
Love’s Knowledge Knows Not: Nussbaum’s Evasion o f Christianity,” The Thomist 56.2 April 1992: 323- 
337, and Fergus Kerr, “Transcending humanity: Nussbaum’s versions,” Immortal Longings: Versions o f  
Transcending Humanity (London: SPCK, 1997), 1-22.
incaination, revelation, and tianscendence, which appear in her novels. More 
specifically, I shall argue that during the act of reading Middlemarch and Daniel 
Deronda these theological nuances prompt the reader to respond to the etliics which 
Eliot’s aesthetics lay before him or her; it is only possible to respond to Eliot’s 
aestlietics and read ediically when we understand these theological motifs. Uuougli the 
reader’s acknowledgement and response to these theological motifs of incarnation, 
revelation, and transcendence, an ethically responsible reading of Eliot’s novels 
becomes possible. In order to understand fully the role of theological motifs in Eliot’s 
aesthetics and ethics, I use an approach that is sensitive to the novels’ generic form, to 
the aim of extending her reader’s sympathies, and to current literary theories that discuss 
the roles of author, reader, and text in the process of forming an interpretation. I also 
argue in tliis thesis tliat the Russian literary critic, Mikhail Balditin, provides a 
fi'amework for articulating Eliot’s aesthetic of sympathy.^
With all this in mind, I will now look at Eliot’s personal and professional interest 
in religion. This will help us to explain further why an interdisciplinary approach to the 
reading of Eliot’s novels is appropriate, and will also provide us with a basis for looking
 ^Mikliail Bakhtin (1895-1975) is the author o f a number o f writings which are difficult to categorise or 
describe. He wrote on specific authors (Rabelais and Dostoevsky), wrote in various styles including 
monographs and essays, and wiote on concepts such as carnival, dialogism, polyphony, heteroglossia, and 
chronotope. His interests were in philosophy, aesthetics, literature, and linguistics. Alexandar Mihailovic, 
in Corporeal Words: Mikhail Bakhtin’s Theology o f  Discourse (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern 
University Press, 1997), says that Bakhtin is interested in philosophy, literary theory, textual criticism, 
politics, and theology (91). Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, in Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation o f  a 
Prosaics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), write: “[Baklitin] has been described as structuralist 
and poststructuralist, Maixist and post-Marxist, speech act theorist, sociolinguist, liberal, pluralist, mystic, 
vitalist, Christian, and materialist” (4). His biography is proving to be as enigmatic as his writings. Caryl 
Emerson, in The First Hundred Years o f  Mikhail Bakhtin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 
writes: “[Balditin] wrote very few personal letters [ . . . ]  he avoided the telephone and was made acutely 
uncomfortable by formal interviews; he left no diaiy or written memoirs whereby others could piece 
together his life” {ix). For biogi aphical infonnation, see Creation o f  a Prosaics, xiii-xv, and 3.
later in more detail at the role that the motifs of incarnation, revelation, and 
transcendence play in her work.
Eliot's personal and professional interest in religion
The first reason for an interdisciplinary approach to reading Eliot’s novels is her 
personal and professional interest in religion and theology. Eliot was always profoundly 
interested in religion, in both her personal and her professional life. On a personal, 
biogi'aphical level we Icnow that Eliot, or more specifically, Maiy Ann Evans, gi'ew up 
in an Aiglican home, but adopted a more evangelical faith in early adulthood.^ TIte 
George Eliot Letters is an excellent primary source which reveals the hold that 
Evangelical Clnistianity had on the yomig Mary Ann Evans. In particular, the reader is 
directed to those letters addressed to and received firom Maria Lewis, Martha Jackson, 
and Elizabeth Evans, her paternal aunt. Rosemarie Bodenheimer, in The Real Life o f 
Mary) Ann Evans: George Eliot, Her Letters, and Her Fiction, says that Mary Ann’s 
letters to her aimt and uncle are “carefully religious in tone and content” (37).^ A good 
example is the letter dated 5 December 1840. It contains no less than six biblical
 ^Mary Anne Evans was baptised in the parish church of Chilvers Coton, Warwickshire, on 29 November 
1819, and took the Anglican Communion for the first time on Christmas Day 1836, For further details see 
Rosemary Ashton, George Eliot: A Life (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1996), 24, and Kathryn Hughes, 
George Eliot: The Last Victorian (London: Fourth Estate, 1998), 21.
For detailed biographies, 1 refer the reader to the following additional studies: J. W. Cross, George Eliot's 
Life as Related in Her Letters and Journals, Gordon S. Haight, George Eliot: A Biography (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1968), Frederick Karl, George Eliot: Voice o f  a Centuiy (London: Flamingo, 
1996), Ruby V. Redinger, The Emergent Self QAew York: Knopf, 1975), Jennifer Uglow, George Eliot 
(London: Virago, 1987). Primary sources can be found in Gordon S. Haight ed., The George Eliot Letters, 
9 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954-78), and Margaret Hams and Judith Johnston eds.. The 
Journals o f  George Eliot (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). All subsequent references to 
Eliot’s letters and journals will be from these editions.
 ^Rosemarie Bodenheimer, The Real Life o f  M aiy Ann Evans: George Eliot, Her Letters, and Fiction 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).
allusions to passages in 1 Samuel, James, John, and Isaiah, plus a “confession” of Mary
Ann’s “besetting sin,” i.e., her “ever struggling ambition.”  ^ In a letter to François
D’Albert Durade, 6 December 1859, Eliot (now Marian Lewes) writes:
I hardly ever spoke to you of the strong hold Evangelical Christianity had on me 
from the age of fifteen to two and twenty and of the abundant intercour se I had 
with earnest people of various religious sects/
This retrospective letter gives an autobiographical witness to tire importance that
Clnistianity had on the young Mary Ann Evans.
However, a close reading of these letters to her aunt and friends reveals tensions,
and hints that the young Mary Ann Evans was not comfortable with her faith. In her
early twenties, due to growing scepticism and doubt about the supernatural aspect of
Christianity, Mary Ami moved away fiom traditional belief in Clnistianity.^ A decisive
event occurred on 2 January 1842, when Mary Ann refused to accompany her fatlier and
" GEL 1, 73-4.
’ GEL 3, 230-2.
 ^There are many accounts of Eliot’s personal religious development. The following list is a guide to the 
reader: Kathleen Adams, “George Eliot and Religion,” George Eliot Fellowship Review 9 (1978): 26-29, 
Rosemary Ashton, George Eliot: A Life, Rosemarie Bodenheimer, The Real Life o f  M aiy Ann Evans, 
Gordon S. Haight, George Eliot: A Biography, and Kathryn Hughes, George Eliot: The Last Victorian. 
The following critical studies also offer comments on Eliot’s religious development: Mary Wilson 
Carpenter, George Eliot and the Landscape o f  Time: Narrative Form and Protestant Apocalyptic Histoiy; 
Elizabeth Jay, The Religion o f  the Heart: Anglican Evangelicalism and the Nineteenth-Centuiy Novel; U. 
C. Knoepflmacher, Religious Humanism and the Victorian Novel; Kerry McSweeney, Middlemarch; 
Bernard Paris, Experiments in Life: George E liot’s Quest fo r  Values; Joseph Wiesenfarth, George E liot’s  
Mythmaking; and Basil Willey, Nineteenth-Centuiy Studies: Coleridge to Matthew Arnold.
Peter C. Hodgson, in Theology in the Fiction o f  George Eliot, has a chapter on “George Eliot’s Religious 
Pilgrimage,” including Evangelical Christianity (4-5), and the Religion o f Humanity (6-13). Hodgson also 
says that recent biographies offer very little on the subject o f religion. He writes: “William S. Peterson 
notes this deficit in his review o f Ashton in The New York Times, 27 July 1997. He refers to Eliot’s life­
long search for some larger meaning in the cosmos, and suggests that it would be helpful if  the next 
biographer would tell us not only about ‘Eliot the beleaguered woman’ but also about ‘Eliot the 
beleaguered religious skeptic’” (176). Both the biographies and the critical studies tend to focus on Eliot’s 
religious life and thought up until the period o f  the ‘Holy War,’ and then maintain silence on the topic.
Maria Lewis to church/ This prompted the so-called ‘Holy War’ with her father and 
close friends.
Rosemarie Bodenheimer, in The Real Life o f Maiy Ann Evans, argues that it is 
from this experience of the ‘Holy War’ that Eliot developed her notion of sympathy. 
Bodenlieimer linlcs Eliot’s aesthetic of sympathy to Clnistian ethics, suggesting that 
sympathy stems from the idea of charity. She analyses Eliot’s letter to Sara Hennell in 
which Eliot quotes fiom chapter fouiteen of Paul’s letter to the Romans, in which he 
urges those strong in the faith not to undermine tire faith of their weaker brothers or 
sisters. Bodenlieimer suggests that, paradoxically, it is from Cluistiamty itself that Eliot 
draws her doctrine of sympathy. She says that in her fiction Eliot tells the story of a 
wide mind having to confront and live among narrow-mindedness, rather than telling of 
the loss of religious faith. Bodenheimer argues that Eliot’s doctrine of sympathy was a 
result of
what she imagmed as her own transgr'essions and can be initially understood as 
the instincts of remorse and repah, rather tlian as the adopted beliefs of an 
agnostic humanist or the self-establishing ideologies of a Victorian liberal 
intellectual. (266)
In this thesis I argue that sympathy is crucial to Eliot’s aesthetics, and that in turn her 
aesthetics do rely on theological motifs, despite her rejection of Christianity.
Eliot scholars agree that sympathy is a vital component of Eliot’s work. They do 
not, however, agree on the soui'ces of Eliot’s interest in sympathy. Unlike Bodenlieimer 
who argues that Eliot draws her doctrine of sympathy from Clnistianity, charity, and
® GEL 1, 124.
For further discussions o f Victorian novels concerning religious faith see Margaret Maison, Search 
Your Soul, Eustace: A Suiyey o f  the Religious Novel in the Victorian Age (London: Sheed & Ward, 1961), 
and Robert Lee Wolff, Gains and Losses: Novels o f  Faith and Doubt in Victorian England (London: J.
Paul’s caution that the strong are not to lead the weak astray, Neil Roberts argues m
George Eliot: Her Beliefs and Her Art that Eliot first learnt the importance of sympathy
from Wordsworth, before she found it confirmed in Comte and Feuerbach (23)/^
Suzanne Graver, in George Eliot and Community: A Study in Social Theory and
Fictional Form, offers a usefrrl summary of the issues involved:
The doctrine [of sympathy] has been defined in various ways, depending on 
whether scholars look to nineteenth-century fiction, poetry, or prose for its 
expression. Thomas A. Noble locates the “doctrine of sympathy” in the criticism 
George Eliot wrote during the 1850s and in her early novels, and ascribes to it a 
simple credo: “A t has a moral purpose; the purpose is to widen human 
sympathy; this purpose can be achieved only by giving a true picture of life.” 
Isobel Armstr ong derives and defines the doctrine fiom reviews of poetry written 
between 1830 and 1870, identifying it as a “great cohesive force” that enlarges 
and binds together individual sensibilities. George Levine discusses the “anti­
romantic and anti-heroic” form the “aesthetics of sympathy” takes in prose 
fiction, in which sympathy is invoked “for the imperfect since imperfection is 
the condition of this world.” (264)^^
This is a useful summary in that it shows the diversity and similarities between the
theories, hr chapter tliree we will see that Eliot is concerned about sympathy in the
reviews and essays she wrote; she is concerned to argue that art does have a moral
purpose, and that moral purpose is to widen hiunan sympathy. We shall see that for
Eliot, sympathy is “anti-romantic” and “anti-heroic” in that she does write about
imperfect people. In the discussion of Eliot’s aesthetics we will see that a number of key
points emerge, and that there is continuity in aesthetic thinking in Eliot’s reviews,
letters, and early fiction, hr this thesis I want to show that religious motifs are a part of
MuiTay, 1977).
‘ * Neil Roberts, George Eliot: Her Beliefs and Her Art (London; Elek, 1975).
Suzanne Graver, George Eliot and Community: A Study in Social Theory and Fictional Form  
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
Eliot’s aesthetics of sympathy, not just that she developed sympathy from the idea of 
Cliristian charity.
We cannot know for sure why Mary Am rejected Clnistianity. One reason 
proposed for her rejection of Clnistianity is her friendship with the Brays and Hermells, 
her neighboiu's at Rose Hill.^  ^ Mary Aim had brought Charles Hennell’s An Inquiry 
concerning the Origin o f Christianity (1838), which was wiitten at the request of his 
sister Caroline. Caroline Hennell had maiiied Charles Bray in 1836, and was shocked by 
his lack of faith. She asked her broüier to investigate, and although he began with the 
aim of defending Clnistianity, the result was that his own faith was also challenged. 
Bodenlieimer sunnnarises his conclusions: “the life of Clnist was in no way miraculous 
and that Clnistianity was not a divine revelation but a natural religion” (61). A second 
reason proposed for Eliot’s rejection of Christianity is her growing belief that religion 
and morals could be separated. Even before meeting the Brays and Heimells, she had 
begun to tlnnlc that one could be a moral person without a religious belief. On 30 March 
1840, Mary Aim Evans wrote to Maria Lewis; “I was considerably shaken by the 
impression that religion was not a requisite to moral excellence.” '^^  Neil Roberts, in 
George Eliot: Her Beliefs and Her Art, says: “One of the most important reasons for her 
dissatisfaction with Cliristianity was that it proposed a fundamentally selfish reason for 
moral action” (27). Mary Aim’s friendship with the Brays, her growing belief that
Neil Roberts points out that Gordon Haight, in George Eliot: A Biography, writes that attributing the 
change in Mary Ann’s views solely to the Brays’ influence is an oversimplification (Roberts 22, Haight, 
39). Rosemary Ashton says that Cara Bray also witnessed to the fact that Mary Ann had changed her 
beliefs prior to meeting the Brays (Ashton, A Life, 39-40).
This comment is made in response to Bulwer Lytton’s Devereux (1829). See GEL 1, 45.
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religion and morality could be separate, and her own self-doubts about her faith, resulted
in her rejection of Clnistianity.
Eliot’s view of Clnistianity during and innuediately following the ‘Holy War’ is
expressed in two letters. A letter to her father, dated 28 Febmary 1842, talks of
“admir[ing] and cherish[ing] what I believe to be the moral teacliing of Jesus himself,”
and a letter to Francis Watts, a minister called in to try and persuade Mary Ann of the
truth of Clnistianity, dated 3 August 1842, says:
It seems to me that the awful anticipations entailed by a reception of all the 
dogmas m the New Testament operate unfavom*ably on moral beauty by 
disturbing that spontaneity, that choice of the good for its own sake, that answers 
to my ideal.
Mary Ami dislikes the idea that a person would choose what is right or good only in 
response to the fear of eternal punishment. Eliot expresses the same dissatisfaction with 
Clnistianity in her critiques of Young and Dr Cumming, which I will discuss below. In 
tliese essays, as in tlie letters above, Eliot is dissatisfied with the idea that Clnistianity 
proposes selfish reasons for doing good. Thus, her personal and professional criticisms 
are aimed at the same target.
One result of Mary Ami’s fiieiidsliip with the Brays and the Hemiells was that 
she was connnissioned to translate David Freidrich Strauss’s Das Leben Jesu: kntisch 
bearbeitet. Upon the marriage of Charles Hennell and Rufa Brabant in November 1843, 
the task of translation was passed to Mary Ain.^^ I will examine Eliot’s relation to 
Strauss, along witli her relation to Spinoza, Feuerbach, and Comte in chapter two.
GEL 1, 128-30 and 143-4 respectively.
The translation was begun by Rufa (Elizabeth Rebecca) Brabant, daughter o f Dr. Brabant, who had 
visited Charles Hennell after the publication of the Inquiiy. Dr. Brabant was Eliot’s one-time mentor.
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Similarly, tlii'ougli her friendship with Charles Bray, Eliot met Jolm Chapman witli
whom she was to work on the Westminster Review.
Despite a period of antagonism to Clnistianity, however, Mary Ann, later
Marian, retained an emotional attachment to fomis of Clnistian belief, even when she
could no longer give Christianity her intellectual assent. All personal comiections with
organised Clnistianity were severed, but Marian retained a deep interest in religious and
theological matters. This is evident in a number of Marian Lewes’s letters. A study of
the letters in clnonological order suggests a move from antagonism towards Clnistianity
to a search for common ground, and reveals that Eliot’s articles on Young and Cumming
were written at the height of her antagonistic period.
Marian Lewes’s interest in religious and theological matters is expressed in
letters to François D’Albert-Durade, Barbara Bodichon, Bessie Rayner Parkes, and
Haniet Beecher Stowe. I will give some textual analysis of these letters. Marian
Lewes’s letter to D’Albert Durade, dated 6 December 1859, speaks of the “antagonism”
she felt towards Christianity, shortly after the ‘Holy War.’ But in this retrospective
letter, she expresses altered opinions:
Ten years of experience have wrought gieat changes in that inward self: I have 
no longer any antagonism towards any faith in which himian s o i t o w  and human 
longing for purity have expressed themselves; on the contr ary, I have a sympathy 
witli it that predominates over all argumentative tendencies. I have not retmiied 
to dogmatic Clnistianity -  to the acceptance of any set of doctrines as a creed, 
and a superhuman revelation of the Unseen -  but I see in it the highest 
expression of the religious sentiment that has yet found its place in the history of 
mankhid, and I have the profoundest interest in the inward life of sincere 
Clnistians in all ages. Many tilings that I should have argued against ten years 
ago, I now feel myself too ignorant and too limited in moral sensibility to speak 
of with confident disapprobation: on many points where I used to delight in
On 16 November 1865, Eliot records in her journal that she is reading the Bible. See Journals o f  
George Eliot, 126.
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expressing intellectual difference, I now delight in feeling an emotional 
agreement/®
In the years between 1842 and 1859, Eliot’s antagonism towards Christianity has all but 
vanished. Agumentative tendencies, disapprobation, and intellectual difference have 
been replaced by sympathy and emotional agreement. In a letter to Barbara Bodichon, 
dated 26 November 1862, Marian Lewes says, twenty years after the ‘Holy War,’ that 
she is not interested in robbing a man of Iris religious beliefs. She is convinced of the 
efficacy of all sincere faith and aware of the “spiritual blight that comes with No-faith,” 
and has lost any “negative propagandisrn” towards Clrristianity. She says she has little 
sympathy with Free-thinkers, and has lost interest in “mere antagonism” to religious 
doctrines. She wants to know the “lasting meaning that lies in all religious doctrine.” ®^ 
hi this letter there is a clear move away from explicit antagonism towards Clnistianity. 
Marian Lewes wrote to Bessie Rayner Parkes on 6 February 1864, outlining her support 
of the latter’s decision to embrace Catholicism.^^ hr a letter to Haniet Beecher Stowe, 
Marian expressed a lack of interest in Pantheism.^^ Evans writes that she has 
“sympathy” rather than “antagonism” or “argumentative tendencies” towards religious 
faith.^ ® She is looking for a religion that springs from “sympathy with that which of all
GEL 3, 230-32. Similarly, in a letter to Sara Hennell, 17 January 1858, Marian Lewes says that she has 
“long ceased to feel any sympathy with mere antagonism and destmction” towards religion {GEL 2 ,421).
Barbara Bodichon {née Leigh Smith) was Eliot’s closest female friend. The women met through their 
mutual friend, Bessie Rayner Parkes, in June 1852. It was Barbara’s recognition o f  Eliot’s authorship o f  
Adam Bede tliat cemented their friendship. See GEL 3 ,56  and 63. For further details on Bodichon see 
Oxford Reader’s  Companion to George Eliot, ed. John Rignall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
31-3. For a biogiaphy of Bodichon, see Pam Hirsch, Barbara Leigh Smith Bodichon, 1827-1891: feminist, 
artist and rebel (London: Cliatto & Windus, 1998).
GEL 4, 64-5.
GELA, 131.
GEL 5, 31.
J. R. Watson, in "God and the Novelists: George Eliot,” says that although Eliot came to reject 
traditional Christianity, she never lost her respect for it (279). See The Expositoiy Times 110.9 (June 
1999): 279-283.
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things is most certainly Imown to us, the difficulty of the human lot.” '^^  From this close
reading of Eliot’s letters we see her continued interest in religious matters/^
Similarly, Felicia Bonaparte, in The Triptych and Cross: The Central Myths o f
George Eliot's Poetic Imagination, writes:
In Eliot’s letters one can trace a distinct progression in her attitude and 
understanding of religion, from tlie militant atheism tliat followed her apostasy, 
to the inevitable mellowing of her maturity, and to a substantial reassessment in 
the light of coiitmuous inteipretation. (54)^^
This “progression” often gets overlooked. Eliot’s attitude to religion was fluid. We have
seen from Eliot’s letters that her personal interest in religion follows a trajectory of
Evangelical fei-voiu, to antagonism, tlnough to sympathy with religious thought. This
deep interest in religious and theological matters, evident from her letters, also appears
within the novels. From Scenes o f Clerical Life through to Daniel Deronda, Eliot is a
novelist concerned with spiritual questions and the practical applications tliereof. In
chapter two I explore some of the ways in which literary critics have examined religious
themes and figures in Eliot’s fiction. However, I argue that the role that theological
Harriet Beecher Stowe (1811-96). Ellen Argiyos reminds us, in "Without Any Check o f  Proud 
Reseiye Sympathy and its Limits in George Eliot's Novels (New York: Peter Lang, 1999) that Eliot and 
Stowe were friends, colleagues, and rivals, corresponding with one another between 1869 and 1880 (41- 
2). Argyros also directs the reader to Marlene Springer, “Stowe and Eliot: An Epistolary Friendship,” 
Biography: An Interdisciplinaiy Quarterly 9.1 (Winter 1986): 59-81, and Robyn R. Warhol, “Toward a 
Theory o f the Engaging Narrator: Earnest Interventions in Gaskell, Stowe, and Eliot,” PMLA 101.5 
(October 1986): 811-818.
Peter Hodgson, in Theology) in the Fiction o f  George Eliot, cites a letter that supports the argument that 
Eliot had an ongoing interest in Christianity. Catharine T. Herford wrote to The Guardian, 2 July 1980, in 
response to letters questioning the propriety o f placing a memorial to George Eliot in Westminster Abbey 
on the hundredth anniversary o f  her death. The letter records that Harford’s mother remembers Eliot 
attending Rosslyn Hill (Unitarian) Chapel “more Sundays than not,” and finding there a “spiritual home.” 
This behaviour is not consistent with an ongoing antagonism toward Christianity. See Hodgson, 178. 
Valerie Dodd also refers to this letter in George Eliot: An Intellectual Life (London: Macmillan, 1990),
86 .
Felicia Bonaparte, The Triptych and the Cross: The Central Myths o f George E lio t’s  Poetic Imagination 
(New York: New York University Press, 1979).
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motifs play in Eliot’s ethics and aesthetics has been overlooked, specifically in the area 
of the author, reader, and text relationship. I now look at Eliot’s professional 
engagement with religion, winch occuixed during the height of her antagonism towards 
Christianity.
On a professional level, Marian Evans engaged critically with Christian thought 
in her work as translator, editor, and reviewer. Her tr anslations of German theology and 
critiques of Christian preachers and poets coincided widi the height of her antagonism 
towards Clnistianity. Marian Evans translated two German texts; Strauss’s Das Leben 
Jesu: hàtisch bearbeitet, and Ludwig Feuerbach’s Das Wesen Christentumf She also 
translated Benedict Spinoza’s Ethics and Tractatus Theologico-Politicus}^ Marian 
Evans engaged with these thinlcers and was influenced by their work (although, as we 
shall see in chapter two, it is important not to overstate their influence). As a reviewer 
for and editor of the Westminster Review, Eliot retained her professional interest in 
religious and theological texts. Two of her articles are of particular note. “Evangelical 
Teaching: Dr Cumming” (1855) and “Worldliness and Other-Worldliness: Tlie Poet 
Young” (1857) are withering critiques of the Cliristian thought, teaching, and sentiment 
that are expressed in these authors’ w orks.These reviews were written at the height of
Strauss’s Das Leben Jesu was published 1835-6, and the translation was published in June 1846 by 
John Chapman. Feuerbach’s Wesen Christentum was published 1841, and the translation was 
published in July 1854 by Chapman.
Eliot began work on a translation o f Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus in 1843. She translated 
Spinoza’s Ethics between 8 November 1854 and February 1856. George Henry Lewes, her partner from 
July 1854 until his death in 1878, was also interested in Spinoza. He wrote an article on Spinoza’s life and 
work for the Westminster Review  in 1843, which was also published as a pamphlet. See Ashton, A Life,
71, 130, and 391.
“Evangelical Teaching; Dr Cumming,” and “Worldliness and Other-Worldliness: The Poet Young,” are 
included in Essays o f  George Eliot, ed, Thomas Finney (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), 158- 
189 and 335-385 respectively. David Lodge, in the Introduction to Scenes o f  Clerical Life 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), describes “Evangelical Teaching” as a “withering critique” of 
Christianity, 8.
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Eliot’s antagonism towards Cliristianity. Despite her published attacks on Chiistianity, 
however, Clnistian thought continued to have a certain hold on her. This lifelong 
interest, personal and professional, in fonns of Clnistian belief also finds expression in 
her fiction. It is not simply that Eliot was antagonistic or sympathetic to Clnistianity, but 
that sympathy itself, as well as her ethics and aesthetics, is infused witli Christian 
imagery.
E lio t’s novels
The second reason for an interdisciplinary approach to Eliot’s novels is that 
Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda contain many examples of the theological motifs of 
incarnation, revelation, and transcendence. Peter C. Hodgson, in Theology in the Fiction 
of George Eliot, writes that Eliot “was a deeply religious thinlcer, despite having 
abandoned orthodox forms of Clnistian belief, and religious themes and frgurns appear 
in all her novels” (zx). I explore these theological motifs in detail in chapters five and 
six, where it becomes more apparent that this thesis aims to fill two gaps in Eliot 
scholarship. The first is that little has been written about Eliot’s novels from an 
interdisciplmary perspective, and the second is that theological motifs in Eliot’s fiction 
have been misunderstood or ignored.
Literature and theology
The interdisciplinary nature of this research project means that it is situated hr and 
informed by two research contexts. The first is contemporary critical discussion of 
literature and theology. Today, ‘Literature and Theology’ is not a clearly defined
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academic discipline. Literatm*e and theology, independently of one another, are two vast 
disciplines. A student of ‘Literature and Theology’ does not simply study two university 
disciplines or simply study them alongside one another. ‘Literature and Theology’ is 
more than the sum of its parts, because not only does it have to deal with the issues that 
each separate discipline has to deal with, but the set of questions multiply as the 
disciplines confient and challenge one another. It is, as David Jasper writes, an “almost 
inexhaustibly fertile” field of study.^ ® It is further complicated by scholars who work 
within the discipline sliifting their position. For example, David Jasper, in the second 
edition of The Study o f Literature and Religion: An Introduction, says that the fir st 
edition contains some of his preoccupations in the field of literatur e and religion dming 
the mid-1980s, and he is not particularly mindful to defend or update them (xzv). He 
says that he is more “theologically ‘radical’” in 1991 than he was in 1985 (xv), and that 
“most ‘theology’, as such, bores me to tears.” He cautions the reader: “Everything that is 
written here, then, should be read, as it were, under erasure” (xviii). I will look here at 
how recent scholarship views interdisciplinary study in ‘Literature and Theology,’ and 
how this scholarship affects a reading of Eliot’s novels.
David Jasper, in “How Can We Read the Bible?” writes that he “vigorously 
oppose[s]” the presupposition that “‘literatuie and religion’ is a natuially harmonious 
study” (20).^’ His work counters the idea that there is a natural harmony between the 
two academic disciplines, and instead emphasises some of the differences between
David Jasper, Preface to the first edition o f The Study o f  Literature and Religion: An Introduction 
(London: Macmillan, 1989). Jasper is the director o f the Centre for the Study of Literature and Theology 
at the University o f Glasgow. In the following paragraph I quote fiom the Preface to the second edition of 
this text.
David Jasper, “How Can We Read the Bible?” English Literature, Theology, and the Curriculum, ed.
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literature and theology. He wants to challenge the assumption tliat this basic harmony 
exists. He wants, rather, to explore the “deep, painful, creative tension” between 
literature and theology (11), Terry Wright, in Theology and Literature, takes this one 
stage further and says that “the assumptions of one discipline are often the heresies of 
another” (1).^  ^ I will look at some of the heresies and sources of this creative tension 
below.
In the first chapter of Theology and Literature, subtitled ‘A Creative Tension,’
Terry Wright says; “this tension between theology and literature is not altogether new.”
He includes Samuel Jolmson, T. S. Eliot, and Helen Gardner as being among those who
are against merging or confusing the two disciplines (9).^^  Wright focuses on the rise of
English as an academic subject, and discusses how literatiu'e was “quite seriously being
offered as a replacement religion, filling the vacuum of values created by the decline of
Orfhodox Clnistianity” (5).^ "^  He writes:
All it seems safe to say is that there is, in the modern period at least, a tension 
between the two subjects, a tension which has been exacerbated by the decline of 
belief in Clnistianity and the rise of literature as the provider of a new canon, a 
new set of scriptures enslnining an alternative set of liberal-humanist values. (5)
This succinct paragraph illuminates a number of areas of tension between the two
academic disciplines. At the very least there is a tension between Clnistian and liberal-
Liam Gearon (London; Cassell, 1999), 9-26.
Teiry Wright, Theology» and Literature (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).
Paul S. Fiddes also lists Johnson and Gardner, along with C. S. Lewis, in Freedom and Limit: A 
Dialogue Between Literature and Christian Doctrine (London: Macmillan, 1991), 27.
In Literaiy Theory: An Introduction, Terry Eagleton says that one explanation for the gi owth of English 
studies in the nineteenth century is the failure of religion. He quotes from the inaugural lecture of George 
Gordon, Merton Professor o f English Literature at Oxford: ‘“England is sick, and [ . . . ]  English literature 
must save it. The Churches (as I understand) having failed, and social remedies being slow, English 
literature has now a triple function; still, I suppose to delight and instruct us, but also, and above all, to 
save our souls and heal the State’” (20). The lecture was 9 May 1923. See also G. S. Gordon, The 
Discipline o f  Letters, 07id Other Essays (Oxford, 1946), 12-13, and Chris Baldick, The Social Mission of
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humanist values. It is more than a clash between two academic disciplines; it is a clash
between two world views, Christian and post-Clmstian, or Christian and Humanist/post-
Hmnanist. This has repercussions for the study of literatuie.
If English depaitments teach literary criticism and literary theories that never
challenge liberal-humanist values, then there is often no place for a detailed analysis of
religious, spiritual, or theological ideas, themes, or motifs. Christopher Southgate, in
“Reconsidering Phlebas: Faith in the Life and Work of T. S. Eliot,” wiites:
The ethos of much literary criticism in recent years has been that religious belief 
is at best a mere cuiiosity, an individual idiosyncrasy, at worst an outworn way 
in which an establisliment dominates tlie hearts and minds of a people. (222)^^
Similarly, David Jasper wiites that “the vast majority of people teaching English
literatuie appear to profess a profound lack of interest in religion except as a curious
archaic left-over indulged in by the few.”^^  Jasper is aware that there is a “widespread
practice in academic departments of literature to dismiss the ‘religious’ and ‘theological’
as dangerously narrow and evangelistic (in practice, sadly, all too often true).” A
Clnistian literaiy critic might wish to read and challenge literary theories advocating
Marxist, psychoanalytic, feminist, lesbian, gay, or ‘queer’ theoiy, or new historicist
theories in light of what the Trinitarian God says about humankind’s relationship to Him
and to one another. However, critics and theorists with allegiance to liberal-humanist
values might say that such cultural or religious imperialism is what they wish to prevent.
They would resist any imposition of a meta-naiTative on all tliese areas. The imposition
of the kind of truth claims that theology can make, could be seen as a heresy
English Criticism, 1848-1932 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 105.
Christopher Southgate, "Reconsidering Phlebas: Faith in the Life and Work o f T. S. Eliot,” English 
Litei'ature, Theology», and the Curriculum, 221-228.
Jasper, "How Can We Read the Bible?” 21.
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to scholars and critics who ai'gne for the death of the author, or the role of the reader in 
foiining an interprétation of a text. In my reading of Eliot, I wish to suggest that 
Clnistian tlieology provides a more adequate discoui'se to appreciate Eliot’s aesthetic 
aim than current literary theory.
These tensions between literatuie and tlieology directly affect our reading of 
Eliot’s novels. Criticism that has a strong liberal-humanist bias tends to read Eliot in 
ways that overlook the religious elements in her work, and we will see how this has 
affected criticism of Eliot in chapter two. As already indicated, there is no evidence to 
suggest that Eliot tliouglit of herself as a theologian or saw her novels as an alternative 
theology. Indeed, in a letter to her publisher Jolm Blackwood, George Hemy Lewes 
wiites tliat the stories in Scenes o f Clerical Life have a human rather than theological 
aspect.^  ^ Marian Lewes later resisted the invitation extended by Frederick Hanison to 
write a novel as a vehicle to propagate Positivist thouglit. However, despite her move 
away from orthodox Cliristianity, Clnistian theological motifs are present in 
Middlemarch md Daniel Deronda, and they form part of Eliot’s aesthetics of sympathy.
Against this backgiound, I discuss two areas of scholarship in literature and 
theology that directly affect the way we read Eliot’s novels. The first is a discussion of 
the influence of Protestant theology on the novel. The second is literature’s exploration 
of theological themes.
G. H. Lewes wrote to John Blackwood on 6 November 1856 about the proposed series, "The Scenes o f  
Clerical Life,” and said: “It will consist o f tales and sketches illustrative o f the actual life o f  our country 
clergy about a quarter o f a century ago; but solely in its humaji and not at all in its theological aspect; the 
object being . . .  [to represent] the clergy like any other class with the humours, sorrows, and troubles o f  
other men. [ . . . ]  the tone throughout will be sympathetic and not at all antagonistic.” {GEL 2, 269-70)
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Theology and the novel
Literary scholarship is divided over the extent to which the novel has connections with 
more explicitly theological geni*es. In particular, there is tension with respect to whether 
the novel should be regarded as a ‘religious’ or ‘secular’ genre. In this section I explore 
the work of critics who discuss the influence of Puritan theology on the foim of the 
novel. In the course of this discussion I will focus on how critics view the novels of 
Daniel Defoe and Samuel Richardson.
Catherine Fox, in an essay entitled “‘Telling the old, old stoiy’: God and the 
novelist as creators,” suggests that the new degree of characterisation in storytelling 
from the sixteenth century onwards can be ti'aced to the Puritan habits of self- 
examination and the keeping of spiritual journals. Fox suggests that the modern novel is 
a literary descendent of spiritual autobiography (101).^  ^ Valentine Curmingham also 
discusses the relation betweerr Puritan theology and the novel. In Eveiywhere Spoken 
Against: Dissent in the Victorian Novel, he argues that the Puritan background provided 
Defoe with a “programme” for the English novel. He highlights “the diary-keeping 
habit” and “the practice of daily self-scrutiny before God,” arguing that these became 
some of the novel’s most recognisable features. He also highlights “the everyday,” “the 
domestic circumstance,” and “the ordinary life of ordinary people” (9).^  ^ Similarly, 
Teny Wright, in Theology and Literature, writes about Defoe. He argues: “Calvinist 
introspection [. . .] contributed to a massive orrtpouring of autobiography in the second
Catherine Fox, ‘“Telling the old, old story’: God and the novelists as creators,” The Novel, Spiiituality 
and Modern Culture: Eight Novelists Write about their Craft and their Context, ed. Paul S. Fiddes 
(Cardiff: University o f Wales Press, 2000), 99-112.
Valentine Cunningham, Eveiywhere Spoken Against: Dissent in the Victorian Novel (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1975).
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half of the seventeenth century, providing a clear model for the new literary fonn of the
novel to follow.” Wright argues that Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe and Moll Flanders can
be see an “pseudo-autobiographies” because of their concern with sin, soul-searching,
and conversion (114). Ian Watt, in The Rise of the Novel, also discusses Robinson
Crusoe in relation to the confessional autobiography, and links its nanative stmcture to
the introspective tendency of Pmitanism in general (75).'^ ° However, Watt collapses this
argument upon itself: having argued for the role of Calvinist theology m the
development of the form, he then argues that a degree of secularisation was essential for
the contmuation of the form. He writes:
It would seem, then, that Defoe’s importance in the history of the novel is 
directly connected wMi the way his narrative strirctur'e embodied the struggle 
between Puritanism and die tendency to secularisation which was rooted in 
material progress. At the same time it is also apparent that the secular and 
economic viewpoint is the dominant partner, and that it is this which explains 
why it is Defoe, rather than Bunyari, who is usually considered to be the first key 
figiu’e in the rise of tire novel. (83)
Watt concludes that a rneasm-e of secularisation was an indisperrsable condition for the
rise of the new genr e. The chapter entitled “Robinson Crusoe, Individualism, and the
Novel” ends somewhat awkwardly. He writes: “we can say of [Defoe], as of later
novelists in tire same tradition, such as Samuel Richardson, George Eliot, or D. H.
Lawrence, that they have inlieiited of Puritanism everything except its religious faith”
(85). I miderstand this to mean that Watt is arguing for the influence of Puritanism on
the form, rather than the content, of the novel."^ ^
Ian Watt, The Rise o f the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson, and Fielding (London: Chatto & 
Win dus, 1974).
Margaret Anne Doody, in The True Stoiy o f  the Novel, is critical o f theories o f the novel that 
overemphasise the importance o f  Protestant Theology on the ‘rise’ o f  the novel. In her own work she 
argues that Catholic Theology and a pre-modem economic setting could also provide the necessary
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Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa, or The History o f a Young Lady (1747-48) is 
another novel that is associated with spiritual autobiogi’aphy."^  ^ Strictly spealdng, as an 
epistolary novel, it does not have the same formal structure as a spiritual autobiography. 
It is not an autobiography, since it is stmctured by the arrangement of letters between 
two pairs of con-espondents.'^  ^ However, despite this formal difference, there are 
elements in the novel that show the influence of spiritual autobiography. Clarissa 
Hariowe sees marriage as a spiritual choice, and desires to follow her conscience in 
matters of marriage. Similar ly, she keeps a strict account of her daily activities. Towards 
the end of the novel, her death scenes are treated in a hagiographie maimer. Fox, 
Cunningham, and Wright suggest that the novel has intimate connections with other 
theologically informed genres. In reading Defoe’s Moll Flanders and Robinson Crusoe, 
and Richardson’s Clarissa, we see that traces of these theological genres remain in the 
novel.
Casuistry is another strand of theological thinking that can be seen to have an 
effect on the development of the novel. Josephine Donovan, in Women and the Rise o f 
the Novel, 1405-1726, articulates the role that this tlieological method played in the rise
conditions for the ‘rise’ o f the novel. She writes: ‘‘British and American critics o f  Protestant descent or 
under the influence o f Protestant history have often “explained” the development o f  the Novel in 
connection with the rise o f Protestantism and o f the new capitalist bourgeosie. [ . . . ]  The English-speaking 
critics’ penchant for looking at English Puritans and merchants for the origins o f  the Novel, however, 
indicates a very parochial view o f the genre and history. [ . . . ]  A consideration o f Spanish [novels]. . .  
alone would lead to an admission that Catholicism and a pre-modern economic setting could also give rise 
to the Novel” (1-2).
For forther discussions o f this see John Dussinger, “Conscience and the Pattern o f Christian Perfection 
in Clai'issa," PMLA 81 (1966): 236-245, G. A. Stair, Defoe and Spiritual Autobiogi'aphy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1965), and Cynthia Griffin Wolff, Samuel Richardson and the Eighteenth 
Centwy Puritan Character (Hamden, CT.: Archon, 1972).
For further infonnation see Patricia Meyer Spacks, Imagining a Self: Autobiogi'aphy and Novel in 
Eighteenth-Centwy England {Coxnhxxége, Mass.: Haivard University Press, 1976).
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of the novel .She argues that women fiction wiiters of the period 1405-1726 “seized on
the theological method of casuistry to particularise their arguments in defense of
women.” She offers this definition of casuistry:
Emerging in the late Middle Ages, casuistry is a method whereby general rules 
are adapted, modified, or interrogated tluough the investigation of a particular 
case that problematizes the rule. The term casuistiy got its bad reputation from 
the fact that to acconnnodate particular cases the rules often became so riddled 
with exceptions that they were no longer mles; moral relativism was the result, 
(x)
The theological method of casuistry was employed by women in the development of the 
novel because of its emphasis on taking particulars into account. Donovan says that 
casuistry enabled women novelists to present particularised cases which interrogated 
misogynist generalisation concerning women. She continues to explain more of 
casuistry:
“Circumstances Alter Cases” [. . .] was a byword of casuistry. It claims that a 
case is not to be judged in the abstract but always relative to its particular 
circumstance. Circumstantial details can change the purport of any given case 
and tlius an understanding of them is necessary for fair ethical and aesthetic 
judgement to talce place. Paying attention to tire particularities of any 
individual’s situation necessarily challenged and enlarged ideological norms and 
abstractions, allowing for a more complex appreciation of individual behaviour-.
(Xf)
Donovan connects the method of casuistry with the novel’s presentation of an 
individual’s life:
The novel emerged in part out of the theological method of casuistry, where 
generalized rrrles are adapted or refracted by individualized cases that challenge 
a general principle. A focus on the details of a case, on the circmnstances of a 
life, is hfirerently subversive to doctrine, for no mle can be stretched to 
accommodate all the par-ticularities of an individual case. (5)
Josephine Donovan, Women and the Rise o f  the Novel, 1405-1726 (London: Macmillan, 1999). From 
the title o f this book, it is clear that Donovan believes the novel was a genre o f literature before the 
eighteenth century. Her work is about the role that women played in the rise o f the novel.
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Donovan says that it is only the novel that allows for “the nuanced exploration of 
circumstances that is necessary for this kind of moral reasoning.” She says that the novel 
is “the only form in which casuistical reasoning can be fully enacted.” In the course of 
her book, Donovan dr aws not just on the theological method of casuistry, but also on the 
writing of Bakhtin. Indeed, she draws parallels between casuistical thinking and 
Bakhtin’s writings. She argues that the novel can be considered to be “subversive,” 
because of its “emphasis on individual and particularized circumstances” (5). She 
writes:
The novel provides, in effect, an ethical defense of the individual against 
tyrarmical nonns. Its antiauthoritarian “Galilean perception . . , denies . . . 
absolutism,” according to Bakhtin (DI, 366), valorizing instead the irreducible 
uniqueness of the individual and her or his situation. (6)
In chapter four* I will analyse in detail Bakhtin’s understanding of the “irTeducible
uniqueness of the individual and her or his situation,” and the role that the theological
motif of incarnation plays in his understanding of the human being. Bakhtin’s
understanding of the human being and Iris or her ‘non-alibi in being,’ as is articulated in
his early philosophical essays, relies on incarnation more than it does on casuistry.
Donovan argues that Bakhtin “conceives the novel in ethical terms as the site
where the particulars of experience refuse to be dornhiated or objectified by what he
calls theoretism^' (6). She continues:
As opposed to theoretism, Baklitin proposed an ethical and aesthetic response he 
termed a prosaics. Unlike a poetics, which smce Aristotle has been conceived as 
a largely formalist and purely aesthetic theory, a prosaics integrates the ethical 
with the aesthetic, focusing on the moral thernatics of a literaiy work, rather than 
on its formal aesthetic properties. (6)
Donovan suggests that the novel is the gerne that best allows for the expression of
particularised individual cases (xz). Tlris is, says Donovan, as Bakhtin contended,
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“subversive of ‘theoretistic’ authorian dogma.” In chapter four we will see that 
Bakhtin’s philosophy of the act is the reverse of Kant’s categorical imperative, where 
we would act the same in all situations and circumstances. For Balditin there is no 
abstract or categorical norm that we would all follow. He rejects all such ‘theoretism’ 
and, as we shall see, writes about an incarnated philosophy.
In the next section we will see that the novel itself, even when moved away from 
these explicitly theological genres, continued to challenge and confront theological 
issues in its exploration of theological and religious themes.
Literature's exploration o f  theological themes
Anotlier way in which I wish to discuss the creative tension between literature and 
theology is to consider the different critical reactions to literary exploration of 
theological themes. Literature that explores religious, sphitiral, and theological themes 
ranges across the centuries. From the Old English texts “The Seafarer” and “The 
Wanderer,” the Middle English texts “Pearl,” “Patience,” “Cleamiess,” and “Piers 
Plowman,” Edrnrmd Spenser’s The Faerie Queene, Jolm Donne’s Soitgs and Sonnets, 
Jolm Milton’s Paradise Lost, Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa, or The History o f a Young 
Lady, Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner,” the novels of 
Tliomas Hardy and D. H. Lawrence, and the plays of Samuel Beckett, tlirough to 
contemporary fiction like Jill Paton Walsh’s Knowledge o f Angels, Michael Arditti’s 
The Celibate and Easter, J. M. Coetzee’s Disgi'ace, and Ian McEwan’s Atonement, the 
canon and/or coimter-canon of English literatur*e resormds with examples of literary 
texts that explore, for example, the themes of sin, temptation, grace, redemption,
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atonement, the natui'e of fallen humankind, fate, confession, guilt, spirituality and
sexuality, and the natur e of passion as suffering and intense love. Some of tlrese themes
are explored in Eliot’s fiction. For example, temptation is a theme explored through the
situations that Lydgate, Bulstrode, Mary Garth, and Dorothea face in Middlemarch, and
that Gwendolen faces in Daniel Deronda. Redemption is a theme explored in the fates
of Lydgate, Rosamond, Will Ladislaw, and Dorothea in Middlemarch, and though
Gwendolen, Hans, and Mirah in Daniel Deronda.
It is not literature’s exploration of theological themes, se, that is problematic.
However, there are tensions between liberal-humanist literary theory and criticism, and
Chistian theology. The Clnistian position that God has spoken thoughout history
though the prophets, and liis trutli is revealed ultimately in and though his Son, Jesus
Chist, is incompatible witli theories of deconstmction and post-modernism. In some
works of literary criticism that define themselves as ‘Marxist,’ ‘psychoanalytical,’ or
‘feminist,’ theological themes are ignored, marginalised, or denigrated, I will explore
the history of criticism of religious and theological themes in Eliot’s fiction in section
one of chapter two. A second problem is that Chistian apologists might read Chistian
themes into fiction. As Paul S. Fiddes, in Freedom and Limit: A Dialogue between
Literature and Christian Doctrine, writes:
In searching for a relationship between theology and literature, we must beware 
of denigrating the arts, by treating tliem as a happy hunting ground for mere 
‘shadows’ of Chistian truths. All too often Chistian apologists have attempted 
to turn the gieat secular writers into ciypto-Cliristians, witnessing to Chistian 
themes unawares and even verifying Chistian truth though this witness, as a 
kind of natui al theology of literature. (32-3)
We will see in the next chapter some of the ways that theologians have interpreted
Eliot’s novels. I am not arguing that Eliot is really a spokesperson for Clnistianity and a
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Clnistian witness, despite her own religious convictions; however, there are Christian 
motifs in her works and they have not been given adequate critical expression.
David Jasper writes that for most teachers of literature ‘religion and literature’ 
suggests: “either a ‘Christian’ reading of the literary canon, or a ‘Cliristianizing’ of 
authors who would deeply resist such a move.” He says: “One still encounters endless 
projects to establish ‘Clirist figures’ in literature, or versions of doctrines of atonement 
embedded in fiction and d r a m a . 1 do not want to argue that tire way that Eliot fits into 
the debate between literature and theology is tlrrouglr the use of Clnist figur es or types, 
though work of this type has been done (again we will look at this in chapter two).'*  ^I do 
not look at incarnation, revelation, and transcendence in Eliot as though they are 
religious themes, and ignore the wider context and genre. I look at how religious motifs 
operate thematically and structurally and form a bridge between her aesthetics and 
ethics. Specifically problematic is the critical attention that is paid to themes of 
theological exploration, when this is at the expense of the larger issue of textuality. 
‘Textuality’ is, as Martha Nussbaum points out in Love's Knowledge: Essays in 
Philosophy and Literature, the complex relationships of one text with other texts 
(170)."^  ^A reading of tlieological themes in literary texts that ignores the wider issue of 
textuality is madequate and problematic, as we shall see in oui' review of Eliot 
scholarship in chapter two.
See “How Can We Read the Bible?” 20. Jasper also cites the following examples: David Anderson, The 
Passion o f  Man in Gospel and Literature, Roy W. Battenhouse, Shakespearean Tragedy: Its A rt and 
Christian Premises, and F. W. Dillistone, The Novelist and the Passion Stoiy (“How Can We Read?” 26).
For example, in “George Eliot’s Wesleyan Madonna,” Elsie B. Holmes argues that Dinah is “a 
Methodist Madonna who is a composite o f Dante’s Virgin Mary, the Roman Catholic’s Mother o f God, 
the Protestant’s Mother o f  Jesus, Feuerbach’s feminine principle, and the mid-nineteenth centuiy ideal 
woman” (59). George Eliot Fellowship Review  18 (1987): 52-59.
Martha C. Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990).
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Thus, in this section I have inti'oduced the first research context that informs this 
tliesis. We have seen that the fact that the novel as genre has been associated with 
theological writings such as Puritan autobiographies, provides one reason for examining 
Eliot’s novels fi'om an interdisciplinary perspective. Eliot is a literai-y descendent of 
writers like Defoe and Richardson, whose novels had explicit connections to theological 
genres. We have also seen that novels in general, and Eliot’s in particular, continue to 
engage with religious and theological issues on a thematic level. In the next section I 
introduce the second research context that infomis this thesis, namely Eliot scholarship.
Eliot scholarship
Uie second gap in Eliot scholarship wliich tins thesis ahns to fill is to assess the ways in 
wliich recent literary criticism of Eliot’s work ignores or misunderstands the theological 
in her work, and the way in which the theological motifs of incarnation, revelation, and 
transcendence are tied to her aesthetics and etliics. We need to take seriously the role of 
the reader, and to be sensitive to Eliot’s aesthetic of challenging and changing the 
reader, and the role that theological motifs play in tins process.
Eliot and religion
Peter C. Hodgson, in Theology in the Fiction o f George Eliot, argues that in Eliot’s
novels:
[R]eligious figures, roles, beliefs, and practices are treated with both an 
understanding and a sympatliy rare in modem literatui'e. Yet the recent critical 
studies of George Eliot virtually ignore her engagement with religious issues or 
find various deconstmctive devices to explain it away. The critics simply assume
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that she was a nonbeliever who used religion to achieve certain aesthetic, 
psychological, political, or moral effects. (1)
It is not just that Eliot treats religious ideas and people with sympathy (we shall see her
sympathetic treatment of Dissent and Evangelicalism in chapter two), but that religious
motifs stmctiue her aesthetics of sympathy. Chapter two of this tliesis investigates the
history of the various ways in which religious and tlieological issues have been
discussed in Eliot criticism. The failuie to read the theological motifs in Eliot is, I argue,
comiected to a general tendency by literary critics and theorists to overlook theological
issues. I look at the specific reasons for this in chapter two.
Chapter two is in thiee sections. The first section looks at Eliot criticism that
does not address the religious, spiritual, and theological themes, images, and motifs that
are present in her novels, including the argument that her novels are about the ‘death of
God.’ The second section explores Eliot criticism that looks at the influence of Stiauss,
Spinoza, Feuerbach, and Comte on the life and writings of Marian Evans. Critics who
have examined Eliot’s fiction via the lens of her relationship with the ‘Religion of
Humanity’ have tended to read the fiction tluough the biograpliical lens. These readings
do not account for tire way theological motifs of incarnation, revelation, and
transcendence operate in both Eliot’s aesthetics and ethics and as a bridge between
them. Moreover, this method of inteipreting Eliot’s novels does little to address the
generic differences between the philosophers and theologians, and Eliot’s novels. The
theological nuances of her aesthetics have not been explored fully by literary critics, nor
has the way in wliich the tlieological motifs provide a bridge between her aesthetics and
her ethics. It is only when we appreciate fully these nuances that we can appreciate fully
Eliot’s aesthetics and ethics and the connection between them. The methods I will
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review do not illuminate how these motifs operate both thematically and stmcturally, 
aesthetically and ethically.
The third section of chapter two is in two parts. The first explores some of the 
ways in which religious and theological themes and language have been examined in 
Eliot’s fiction, and focuses on her use of Biblical language, the way in which Dorothea 
has been interpreted according to a number of religious backgrounds, and Eliot’s 
sympathetic treatment of Dissent and Evangelicalism. Some of the critical approaches of 
the religious, spiritual, or theological ideas in Eliot’s novels ensure that these ideas are 
just treated as one theme among many. Such a methodology, wliich ti'eats religious or 
theological issues as just one theme among many for literature to explore, is not 
adequate for interdisciplinary study. Either, literary critics tend to look at religious 
themes in the novels witliout concerning themselves witii questions that theology raises, 
or theologians use the texts in ways of which literary critics disapprove. The second part 
examines the way in which two theologians, Peter C. Hodgson and Mary Grey, have 
employed Eliot’s wiitings to further their own work. Some theologians have 
misunderstood Eliot’s novels, or used them merely to illustrate their own work. These 
studies which do discuss Eliot’s use of religious and theological themes and language 
have paved the way for my research, hi tiiis thesis I build on the foundation they 
provide, and extend the work that has been done to look at the religious aspects and 
dimensions of Eliot’s aesthetics. To aid me in this work, I employ the ideas of Bakhtin.
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Eliot and the aesthetic o f  sympathy
In chapter thiee I examine the central tenet of Eliot’s aesthetics, namely sympathy. 
Eliot’s novels aim to change her readers for the better; this is her ethics of art. Uiere is 
plenty of evidence for this in Eliot’s letters, reviews, essays and fiction. Some literary 
critics would argue that this evidence is not relevant because they consider the author’s 
life and views of her work to be extianeous to literary criticism. This view is refuted by 
other critics, however, thus enabling us to take into consideration this important 
evidence. Eliot aims to change her reader not tluough didacticism or preaching, but 
tluough expanding her reader’s sympathies. Aesthetics are important in Eliot’s moral 
universe because she wants to change her reader tluough art and not tluough preaching. 
The chapter is in three sections. In section one I situate Eliot’s aesthetic aim of 
extending her reader’s sympathies within literary theoretical discourse about whether or 
not a text has an extra-textual referent. New Criticism was dismissive of the idea that a 
literary text could ‘affect’ a reader, but the work of Martha Nussbaum has recently 
rejuvenated this idea. Nussbauirr challenges the loirg-held presupposition that it is 
inappropriate to ask ethical questions of literary texts. However, Nussbaum does not 
directly address Eliot and her aesthetics, or the role that religious motifs play. In order to 
understand how Eliot’s fiction changes her readers without being didactic, we need to 
look at theological understandings of tiansfbrmation, specifically incarnation, 
revelation, and transcendence. Nussbaum’s understanding of the ethical power of fiction 
does not explain how Eliot’s aesthetic of sympathy works; to articulate this we need to 
turn to the early philosophical wi'itings of Balditin. The work of chapters tluee and four
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provides the groundwork for my analysis of Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda in 
chapters five and six.
Bakhtin and incarnation
Marijke Rudnik-Smalbraak, in an article entitled “The One and Another; George Eliot’s
Dialogic Incarnations,” argues that although Eliot and Baklitin lived at different times
and in different cultures, there are a number of similaiities between them."^  ^Her article is
an excellent introduction to the relation between the two writers, and I believe her work
can be expanded. Rudnik-Smalbraak describes Bakhtin as a “Russian cultural
philosopher with an orientation towards literatuie” and Eliot as a “British novelist with a
leaning towaids pliilosophy.” Rudnik-Smalbraak refers to Bakhtin and Eliot as “two
kindred spirits,” even “two kindred (novelistic) souls” and says:
[Bjotli authors, Balditin and Eliot, assign a ceiihal role to ethics in their thhildng 
and wiiting, and to the ways in which ethics and aesthetics are intercomiected. 
(501)
Uiis joint interest in ethics and aesthetics is of crucial importance to tliis thesis. There 
are a number of ways in wliich Baklitin’s work on ethics and aesthetics provides a lens 
for a reading of Eliot’s novels, and provides criteria for assessing the role that 
incarnation, revelation, and transcendence play in Eliot’s ethics and aesthetics. I argue 
that Baklitin’s early philosophical essays provide significant critical tools for analysing 
Eliot’s novels, and for looking at how theological motifs of incarnation, revelation, and 
transcendence function both thematically and stmcturally in her novels. I diaw on
Marijke Rudnik-Smalbraak, “The One and Another: George Eliot’s Dialogic Incarnations, 
Neophilologus 77: 3 (1993): 499-507.
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concepts found in Bakhtin’s early writings, including answerability, non-alibi in being, 
excess of seeing, and self/other relations and explore how they help us read Eliot’s 
novels.
Rudnik-Smalbraak quotes Mary Ann Evans’s letter to John Sibree, and offers a
Bakhtinian reading of it:
It is necessaiy to me, not simply to be but to utter, and I require utterance of my 
friends. Wliat is it to me that I tliinlc tlie same thoughts? I thinlc them in a 
somewhat different fashion. No mind that has any real life is a mere echo of 
another . . .  It is like a diffusion or expansion of one’s own life to be assured that 
its vibrations are repeated in another, and words are the media of those 
vibrations."*^
Marijke Rudnik-Smalbraak writes:
At an early stage of her existence as a speaking and writing subject, Eliot had 
come to an awareness of the dialogic nature of each individual, living utterance, 
experiencing the specific context in wliich such an utterance must needs arise as 
an existential interaction between “the one” and “another”. (501)
This interaction between the “one” and “another” constitutes a paradigm for our
understanding of Eliot’s aesthetics. In the above quotation we see that Eliot is arguing
for the uniqueness of each individual. Fmtheimore, we see that a response to tlie other is
important to Eliot even at this early stage of her writmg life, that the rhetoric of the letter
demands a response. In her novels, too, her aesthetics are designed to evoke a response
in her reader. Sympathy is not an innate quality, but a response to the other. In her
interpretation of this letter, Rudnik-Smalbraak higlilights Bakhtinian concepts and
argues that “Utterance is being, being is utterance -  the word, the act of speaking is of
vital, of existential importance to the young Mary Ami.” Rudnik-Smalbraak ties this into
several passages from Baklitin, In the series of notes that has been entitled “The
GEL 1, 255. Eliot also refers to her books as “a form o f utterance” In GEL 4, 472.
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Problem of the Text,” Balchtin says: “For the word, (and, consequently, for a human 
being) Üiere is nothing more teixible than a lack o f response'' (127).^  ^Rudnik-Smalbraak 
wiites:
Therefore, the word of the one must be, indeed is inextiicably associated with 
another’s word, in a living exchange, a live interaction. Language is by 
definition “dialogic”, and so is every individual utterance -  it canies within itself 
the response of the other, orients itself towards such a response and is thus 
(partly) constructed in and by the “response-potential”. (499)^*
We will see in chapter four how Bakhtin’s understanding of Chalcedon and intra-
trinitarian theology infoiins his understanding of the word and the human being. For
both Eliot and Bakhtin, then, both words and human beings are embodied in time and
space -  both are relational.
Eliot’s aesthetics are oriented toward the response of the reader. Rudnik-
Smalbraak quotes from Baklitin’s essay “Discoui'se in the Novel” to show that the word
is also directed toward a response:
The word in living conversation is directly, blatantly, oriented toward a future 
answer-word: it provokes an answer, anticipates it and stiuctures itself in the 
answer’s direction. Forming itself in the atmosphere of the already spoken, the 
word is at the same time determined by that winch has not yet been said but 
wliich is needed and in fact anticipated by the answering word. Such is the 
situation in any living dialogue (280).^^
Similarly, Eliot’s aesthetics provoke, anticipate, and are structured towards a response.
Eliot’s aesthetics are dialogic and not simply didactic. Her aesthetics provoke us, they
See “The Problem of the Text in Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences: An Experiment in 
Philosophical Analysis,” Speech Genres and Other Essays, Eds. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. 
Trans. Vem W, McGee (Austin: University o f Texas Press, 1986), 103-31.
In the discussion o f Middlemarch we will see the devastation caused by Casaubon’s lack o f  response to 
Dorothea and Rosamond’s lack o f response to Lydgate.
Mikliail Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel,” The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin, 
Ed. Michael Holquist. Trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University o f Texas, 1981) 
259-422.
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demand a response from us. Rudnik-Smalbraak says that “Mai’y Ann Evans also felt, 
however, that her utterance could only come into being, could only begin to vibrate in 
reciprocity. Words demanded, required a response” (409). We see that this is an 
essential part of Eliot’s aesthetic endeavour. The rhetorical clues in the text call for a 
response from the reader. This again has parallels with Balchtin’s theory of answerability 
as set out in ‘Art and Answerability.’
Chapter four is in two sections and is centied on the role that incarnation plays in 
both Eliot’s and Baklitin’s ethics and aesthetics. Section one of this chapter recaps the 
literaiy criticism of Eliot that overlooks the motif of incarnation and suggests reasons 
for this oversight. Section two explores the role that incarnation plays in thi'ee of 
Bakhtin’s concepts: non-alibi in being, excess of seeing, and self/other relations. 
Following the close textual analysis of Bakhtin’s early philosopliical essays, I offer a 
Baklitinian analysis of selected incidents fr om Eliot’s Romola. The aim of this section is 
to smooth tlie tiansition fr om the theoretical analysis of Bakhtin’s writings to the use of 
this analysis in my reading of Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda. In this section I show 
how the concept of non-alibi in being Inghlights the moral distinction between Romola 
and Tito. In both Eliot and Baklitin’s moral world views, to claim an alibi is wrong. Tito 
moves deeper into narcissism and egoism, and Romola moves further towards altruism. 
In tliis analysis we will see that there is a correlation between those who try and claim 
an alibi and those who aie egoists, and between those who do not try and claim an alibi 
and those who are altruists. This distinction is important for Eliot’s aesthetic aim. Her 
aim is to move her reader from egoism towards altruism, and to have her reader not 
claim an alibi for his or her reading of Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda,
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Balditin’s first published piece, ‘Art and Answerability,’ hints that there is a
connection between art and life, between aesthetics and etliics. Bakhtin writes:
I have to answer witli my own life for what I have experienced and understood in 
ait, so that everytliing that I have experienced and understood would not remain 
ineffectual in my life.
Tliis article is at once dense and profound. Balditin challenges the reader to read 
etliically and responsibly, and to live out the implications of, or to answer for, what he 
or she has read.^  ^ 1 want to suggest that this idea of answerability helps us read Eliot’s 
aesthetics, and understand that the reader of Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda is to 
“answer” with his or her life for what he or she has read in Eliot’s novels. Balditin’s 
understanding of answerability and his explication of non-alibi in being, excess of 
seeing, and self/other relations are based on his understanding of tlie human person, his 
anthi'opology. Bakhtin’s anthropology is distinctly Chi'istian. The theological motif of 
incarnation is central to Balditin’s understanding of the human person, and consequently 
has ramifications for his understanding of ethics and aesthetics. Answerability cannot be 
imderstood without the concept of incarnation.
Balditin’s argument that we are responsible for what we read can best be 
understood witli reference to non-alibi in being, excess of seeing, and selfrother 
relations. These concepts, which in themselves are not explicitly textual procedures, 
nonetheless help us bridge the gap between ethics and aesthetics. Important work has
In Corporeal Words: Mikhail Bakhtin’s Theology o f Discourse, Alexandar Mihailovic says that Baklitin 
encouraged his students to research in a similarly active manner. Mihailovic summarises Baklitin’s advice 
to students at Saransk: “The “active engagement in [the] subject matter” o f a scholarly book is “the most 
important precondition for the productive reading” o f  it, Baklitin writes. “The greater and more insistent 
are our demands towards the book, the more will it speak to us. It does not care for indifferent readers and 
does not respond to them. The true, engaged work on a book is not a passive appropriation but a living 
and passionate dialogue with it” (97).
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been done by Ruth Coates in Christianity and Bakhtin, and by Alexandar Mihailovic in 
Corporeal Words: Mikhail Bakhtin’s Theology o f Discourse, in establishing the 
importance of the Christian motif of incar nation in Bakhtin’s work.^ "* This is a new area 
of Bakhtin scholarship, which can help us address some of the critical problems 
surrounding Eliot’s aesthetics of sympathy and articulate tlie role that religious motifs 
play in this process.
Non-alibi in being
The first of Baklitin’s concepts which I wish to explore is non-alibi in being. Crucial to 
this concept is Baklitin’s understanding of the human person in time and space. Baklitin 
argues that both ethically and aesthetically we each occupy a unique place in space and 
time and that, as such, none of us has an alibi for oui" place in existence. By this he 
means that we are each embodied in a unique space and time, and that our 
responsibilities are to that time and place. We are flee to choose to neglect om* 
responsibilities, but the etliically responsive person does not neglect their duties to the 
other person. ‘Non-alibi’ suggests that as a concept it has legal implications, but for 
Baklitin the emphasis is moral and etliical. It is a concept that resonates in Eliot’s 
novels. Non-alibi in being works on both an intra-textual and an extr a-textual level in 
Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda. I will discuss this in chapters five and six.
Ruth Coates, Christianity in Bakhtin: God and the exiled author (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998).
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Excess o f seeing
The second of Baklitin’s concepts which I wish to bring to a reading of Middlemarch 
and Daniel Deronda is excess of seeing. This is a concept which cannot be understood 
without reference to non-alibi in being and selfrother relations, although it is not 
identical to them. Om* unique position in time and space, and in relation to the other, 
necessitates tliat on a visual level, we do not see tilings as other people see them. Our 
unique position gives us a unique viewpoint. We see what the other does not see. The 
naixator in both Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda is constantly shifting her perspective, 
employing visual motifs such as the telescope and microscope, and encouraging us to 
look at tilings in a different way. This concept also works on an intra-textual and extia- 
textual level in Eliot’s novels. I will look at this in chapters five and six.
Self/other relations
The third of Bakhtin’s concept which I wish to bring to a reading of Eliot’s novels is his 
discussion of self/other relations. We shall see that Balditin’s aesthetics, along with his 
ethics, are based on the recognition of tlie ftmdamental difference between the self and 
the other. In his essays. Toward a Philosophy o f the Act and “The Author and Hero in 
Aesthetic Activity,” we shall see that his ethics and aesthetics are based on the radical 
separateness of the self and the other, and the author and the hero. Eliot also has her 
characters learn the essential otherness of the other characters that they come into 
contact with. Her characters are either more or less egoists or altmists, and tlirough the 
development of these characters Eliot similaily educates tlie reader. Non-alibi in being, 
excess of seeing, and self/other relations do work thematically, but I want to stress their
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importance on a stmctoal level. The reader should also recognise and acloiowledge that 
there is a fundamental difference between the reader and the text.
In chapter five I offer a theological reading of the aesthetics of Middlemarch. I 
remind the reader that Eliot’s understanding of the human being is that each is an egoist, 
and that her aim of extending her reader’s sympathies is directed towards moving her 
reader beyond egoism and towards altruism. I relate Eliot’s portiayal of egoism in 
Middlemarch to her aim of extending her reader’s sympathies. I argue that because of 
tlie excess of seeing that the reader enjoys, the reader camiot claim to have an alibi, and 
must therefore be responsible for liis or her reading of Middlemarch. hi practical terms, 
being responsible for one’s reading means tolerating and accepting the other among 
whom we live, and being ethically responsible. I have divided the chapter into thi'ee 
sections. Section one examines the egoistic behavioui' and thinking of Rosamond Vincy 
and Edwai'd Casaubon. Uiese characters are self-centred in their actions and their 
thinking, and relate events and other people to their own concerns and lives. Neither of 
them responds to the other. Both make their maniage partners unhappy because of their 
umesponsiveness. Their behaviour seiwes as a negative example, i.e., how not to behave. 
In this section I include a discussion of how a number of other characters enjoy an 
excess of seeing in relation to Casaubon but do not use tliis excess charitably. Although 
the naixator of Middlemarch makes it quite clear that Casaubon is not to be excused for 
his behaviour, the reader is not to judge him in the unfavourable way that others do. 
Section two focuses on the moral failings of Nicholas Bulstrode, particularly with 
reference to how he tries to claim an alibi for liis actions. In section tluee, I offer a 
Baklitinian reading of the emotional climax of the novel. I argue that Dorothea’s
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acceptance of her incarnated position, her refusal to claim an alibi for her uniqueness, 
and her employing her excess of seeing in relation to Lydgate, Rosamond, and Ladislaw 
enable us to hilly understand the role of incarnation and transcendence in the aesthetics 
of Middlemarch. Dorothea transcends her egoism because of her acceptance of her 
incarnation in time and space, and her etliical response to that.
In chapter six I offer a theological reading of Daniel Deronda, I have divided 
this chapter into tlnee sections. The first section analyses how Eliot’s presentation of the 
egoistic tliinldng and behaviour of Grandcoui't and Gwendolen is related to her aim of 
extending her reader’s sympathies. The second section compares how Grandcourt and 
Deronda use the excess of seeing they enjoy in relation to Gwendolen, and how this 
relates to Eliot’s ethics of art. The third section examines Deronda’s relation to 
Mordecai. The novel charts the way in which Deronda embraces his Jewish identity and 
how Gwendolen learns to relate better to others. In the course of Deronda’s relations to 
Mordecai we see him learn to accept responsibility to the other, and likewise Gwendolen 
learns this. Baklitin’s understanding of the human being as incarnated and relational 
helps us understand the complex self/other relations Eliot presents us with in this text, 
and how her ethics of art affects the way we relate to oui" neighbour once the act of 
reading is over.
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Chapter Two: Eliot’s novels and Christian theology
Hie presence of the Clnistian theological motifs of incarnation, revelation, and 
transcendence in Eliot’s etliics and aesthetics has, I suggested in chapter one, been 
overlooked by literary critics and theologians. This is problematic because, as we will 
see in chapter three, the theological motifs of incarnation, revelation, and tianscendence 
are insti*umental to the way in which Eliot’s aesthetics have an effect on the reader, 
beyond the text. Eliot’s aesthetics are designed to have an affect on the reader and, as I 
shall demonsti'ate, the theological motifs operate in both the intia-textual and extra- 
textual dimensions of Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda. The failure to appreciate the 
role that theological motifs play in Eliot’s aesthetics contributes to a misreading of 
Eliot’s aesthetics, and in particular, to her being perceived as a didactic moraliser, Eliot 
has a moral aim, but we will see that she shims didacticism as a means of achieving it. I 
do not argue for a ‘Christian’ reading of Eliot’s novels in tliis thesis. Rather, my aim is 
to consider how the Clnistian theological motifs of incarnation, revelation, and 
tianscendence operate thematically and stmcturally within Middlemarch and Daniel 
Deronda, and form a part of Eliot’s aesthetic aim of extending her reader’s sympathies.
There is a vast body of critical literature on Eliot’s life and novels. In my review 
of this literature in this chapter, I focus on three strands: criticism that does not deal with 
Eliot’s religious and theological themes at all; criticism wliich considers the influence of 
David Friedrich Strauss, Benedict Spinoza, Ludwig Feuerbach, and Auguste Comte on 
Eliot’s personal life and/or her fiction; and criticism that has considered Eliot’s use of
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the religious, spiritual, and theological themes, images, and motifs on a thematic level/ 
Each of these strands fails to do justice to the importance of mcamation, revelation, and 
transcendence for Eliot’s aesthetics and ethics. Literature wliich overlooks religious 
themes tends to leave out a fundamental aspect of Eliot’s work. The literature which 
looks at the influence of various nineteenth-century thinkers and theologians fails to take 
into account the subtlety and complexity of Eliot’s ethics as they are developed in her 
fiction. This is a failure which my own work will seek to conect. Tlie literature that 
deals with religious themes in Eliot’s work provides some useful starting points for my 
own research, but rarely goes far enough. My work departs fi'om this, in its emphasis on 
the importance of theological motifs for Eliot’s ethics and aesthetics.
I argue that the presence of the Clnistian theological motifs of incarnation, 
revelation, and transcendence in Eliot’s ethics and aesthetics has been overlooked, even 
by those who otherwise comment on Eliot’s use of religious language, themes, and her 
tieatment of Dissent, Methodism, and Evangelicalism in her novels. This confiâtes with 
both a general tendency in literary criticism to ignore Christianity because of liberal- 
hmnanist assumptions and presuppositions, as well as a more particular focus on Eliot 
because of her ‘conversion’ to the Religion of Humanity.
This chapter explores how literary critics and theologians have read the religious 
and theological themes and motifs in Eliot’s novels. These three strands provide the 
structme of this chapter; it is in tlnee sections, each dealing with one of these areas of 
scholarship, in the order outlined above. In the introduction we saw that there were a
' It is possible to categorise Eliot criticism in many ways, For example, Ten y Wright, in an essay entitled 
“Critical Approaches to George Eliot,” George Eliot: Centenary Essays and an Unpublished Fragment 
ed. Anne Smith (London; Vision Press, 1980), 21-35, offers a different economy of scholarship. He
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number of general tensions between literature and theology, and in this chapter we will 
see how these tensions affect a reading of Eliot’s novels. I now discuss the literary 
criticism that does not deal with religious or theological themes in Eliot’s fiction.
Eliot criticism that does not deal with religious and theological themes
There are a number of ti'ends cuiTent in Eliot scholarship that do not look at theological 
or religious themes at all, or else only touch on them tangentially. This critical literature 
leaves out fundamental aspects of Eliot’s work. I have subdivided this section into three 
parts. Part one looks at inteipretations that do not explore religion and theology. Part 
two looks at criticism that advocates reading Middlemarch as a novel that is about the 
“death of God.” Part three reviews the way in which Eliot was seen as offering an 
alternative to Clnistian morality in her writing, with the consequence that the Clnistian 
motifs in her work were overlooked.
Some of die major areas of recent criticism include Eliot’s relation to feminism,^ 
the natm*e of her realism, her interest in science,  ^and her interest in society, Other
organises criticism of Eliot into the following categories: intellectual, aesthetic, psychological, political, 
historical, and feminist.
 ^There is a large volume of criticism devoted to Eliot’s relation to feminism and feminist thought. There 
is not space here to list all the books and articles; the reader is refened to the bibliogiaphy, and to the 
entries for Austen, Beer, Blake, Chase, Edwards, Gilbert and Gubar, Millet, Moers, Newton, and 
Showalter. In addition, the Oxford Reader’s Companion to George Eliot lists entries for tlie woman 
question and feminist criticism.
 ^There is also a substantial volume o f criticism devoted to Eliot’s relation to science. The reader is 
refeiTed to the following bibliographic entries: Gillian Beer, Danvin's Plots: Evolutionaiy Narratives in 
Darwin, George Eliot and Nineteenth-Centuiy Fiction, George Levine, Dai'win and the Novelists: 
Patterns o f  Science in Victoiian Fiction, Diana Postlethwaite, Making it Whole: A Victorian Circle and 
the Shape o f  the World, Sally Shuttlewortli, George Eliot and Nineteenth-Centuiy Science: The Make- 
Believe o f  a Beginning, and Mark Wormald, “Microscopy and Semiotic in Middlemarch,” Nineteenth- 
Centuiy Literature 50.4 (1996): 501-24. See also the Oxford Reader’s Companion to George Eliot.
For criticism related to Eliot and society see Suzanne Graver, George Eliot and Community: A Study in 
Social Theoiy and Fictional Form, and Bernard Semmel, George Eliot and the Politics o f  National 
Inheritance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
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studies look at Eliot and blaclanail, medicine, the law, or intoxication/ The Oxford 
Reader’s Companion to George Eliot, in addition, offers entries on new historicist (67- 
9), post-colonial (69-70), and psychoanalytic approaches to Eliot’s novels (70-71). All 
of these areas of interpretation offer insight into one or other of Eliot’s novels, but do 
not engage witli the religious and theological in those novels. However, a number of 
critics challenge the neglect of critical attention to the religious aspects of Eliot’s novels.
TeiTy Wright, in “Critical Approaches to George Eliot,” argues that religion is 
intrinsic to any real understanding of Eliot’s work. He argues that “it is difficult to write 
about her without discussing the religious and philosophical framework of her novels” 
(21), and that “any critical approach to George Eliot, if it apprehends her work at all 
accur ately, retimrs to the central concern with religion in its broadest sense, the attempt 
to give meaning to life.” I agr'ee with Wright’s critical assessment of religion in Eliot’s 
novels. It is important to comprehend the religious element of her work, and an 
mterdisciplinary approach is best. However, I have alluded to numerous strands of Eliot 
criticism which do not attend to the religious and philosophical issues in the novels.
Peter C. Hodgson’s Theology in the Fiction of George Eliot provides an 
alternative to these studies that overlook the religious aspects of Eliot’s fiction. His work 
is a response to the critical neglect of religion in Eliot’s fiction. He attributes this neglect 
to “conventional wisdom” that says Eliot lost interest in religion because she became a 
disciple of the Religion of Himianity, and then explored other subjects in her novels. 
Hodgson does not agree with this interpretation, and writes: “On a simple level the latter
 ^See Hao Li, Memoiy and Histoiy in George Eliot; Transfiguring the Past (London: Macmillan, 2000), 
Kathleen McCormack George Eliot and Intoxication: Dangerous Drugs fo r  the Condition o f  England 
(London: Macmillan, 2000), and Alexander Welsh, George Eliot and Blackmail (Cambridge Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1985).
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statement, at least, is demonstrably false” (1). By this Hodgson means that Eliot’s novels 
do contain explorations of religions subjects. But he says that critics either ignore these 
religious issues or find “deconstructive devices” to explain them away (1). These 
devices might include her ‘conversion’ to the Religion of Humanity, or argue that Eliot 
only deals with religious issues because she lived during a time when religious issues 
were more ‘relevant’ than they are today. However, this line of argument conflicts with 
criticism that situates Eliot in her liistorical context, but which ignores religion in her 
work.
Nonetheless, it seems that Hodgson has his own agenda in looking at theological 
and religious issues in Eliot’s fiction. He is convinced not only that this aspect of her 
work has been neglected, but also that her “ideas are of considerable interest to 
theological efforts at retlrinldng the meaning and substance of religious faith in our own 
time” (ix). My own reading of Eliot’s novels focuses on the role that Christian 
theological motifs play in her aesthetics, and is a very different project fiom Hodgson’s 
reading of Eliot’s novels as source material for retliinking the meaning and substance of 
religious faith in our own time.
Another prominent trend in Eliot scholai'ship at the moment is the need to 
understand her fiction in its cultural and historical context, i.e., to articulate our 
understanding of Eliot fiom our' understanding of her context. Josephine McDonagh, in 
George Eliot, argues against reading Eliot as a “wiiter-genius, oracle of imiversal and 
unchanging moral truths”; instead we should see her as “the Victorian intellectual, 
solidly rooted in the conditions and cultur e of her own time.”  ^McDonagh argues that it
Josephine McDonagh, George Eliot (Plymouth: Northcote House, 1997).
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is vital to understand the cultui e in which Eliot wr ote if we are to understand her fiction.
She argues that one feature of the “history-of-ideas approaches” to Eliot’s work has
been “to offer insight into the way in which her works provide a fomm for the
discussion of a surprisingly wide range of non-literary debates, from arenas such as
science, politics, or philosophy” (10). She writes that “Eliot adapted the very flexible
form of the novel in order to incorporate discussion of the pressing intellectual issues of
the day” (11). She argues:
Tire tlrrust of recent approaches to Eliot has been to restore her works to this 
context. Rather than reading tliem as uncomplicated documents of an enduring 
reality, critics have begun to see them as complex texts that weave together 
various kirrds of ideas about the world that had a special pertmence in the 
irrtellectual debates of the period -  ideas to do with evolution, the organisation of 
society, the place arrd responsibilities of the individual, or the limits of social 
progress. (11)
I agree that this assessment is accurate, but it comrrrerrds everything except religion. It is 
important to situate Eliot’s novels within the irrtellectual coirtexts and debates of her 
day; but this should not be at the expense of religious issues, as religion is an intrinsic 
part of Eliot’s historical coirtext. As I meirtioned earlier, tire idea that Eliot oirly wrote 
about religion because of the time in which she lived, conflicts witir this rreglect of 
religious motifs arrd concerns irr the Iristory of ideas approach.
These approaches are broad, interestirrg, arrd insightful, and willhrg to consider 
almost everything except religion arrd theology, unless, as we shall see in the second 
section of this chapter, it is to consider Eliot’s relation to the Religion of Humanity. 
Before looking at Eliot’s relation to Strauss, Spinoza, Feuerbach, and Comte, I now look
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at how some critics have read Middlemarch as being about tlie death, or in the words of 
J. Hillis Miller’s book, ‘The disappearance of God,’ in the nineteenth centuiy/
Middlemarch and the ‘death o f  God'
Teny Wright is associated with a stiand of criticism which subverts the presence of the 
religious and theological in Eliot’s fiction. This strand of criticism argues that her fiction 
is really about ‘the death of religion.’  ^Terry Wright and Keny McSweeney write about 
the absence of God in Middlemarch. In the nineteenth century, biblical scholarship was 
posing a challenge to the Bible’s historicity, and scientific developments were posing a 
tlueat to the Genesis nanative. Traditional forms of Christian belief were being 
challenged on many fronts at this time. The ‘death of God’ made way for the ‘Religion 
of Humanity.’
Teny Wright’s Middlemarch contains a chapter on “The Death of God,” and in 
"^Middlemarch as a Religious Novel, or Life without God,” he writes: “Nowhere in 
George Eliot’s work is the absence of God so noticeable as in MiddlemarcF^ (641). He 
argues that Middlemarch “goes further than George Eliot’s other novels, in which God 
and Clirist are more prominent though very much watered down not only in the 
narration but in the mouths of Iris believers,” and says the narrative of Middlemarch 
“never for a moment suggests that God might exist” (641).^ It is tme that there are no
’ J. Hillis Miller, The Disappearance o f  God: Five Nineteenth-Centuiy Writers (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Hai*vard University Press, 1963).
* W. H. Mallock, in his 1879 review o f Impressions o f  Theophrastus Such, writes that Eliot was “the first 
gi eat godless writer of fiction that has appeared in England.” His review is included in George Eliot: The 
Critical Heritage, ed. David Can oll (London; Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971), 448-460.
’ TeiTy Wright, “Middlemarch as a Religious Novel, or Life without God,” Middlemarch, ed. Bert G. 
Homback (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000), 640-649. The essay was first published in 
Images o f  Belief in Literature, ed. David Jasper (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1984), 138-53. Also 
George Eliot’s Middlemarch (London: Harvester Wlieatslieaf, 1991).
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explicit references to or discoui'se about God and Chiist in Middlemarch. However, 
Christian motifs are nonetheless present in the texts in a number of ways. Kerry 
McSweeney agi'ees with Wright that Middlemarch is “an important piece of evidence in 
the case of the disappearance of God in the nineteenth century.”^^  Terry Wright 
suggests:
Cliristian critics, or those with an interest in literatme and religion, should be 
able to appreciate the novel for its vivid and accurate representation of the 
agonies endured in the nineteenth century by those learning to live without God. 
(641)
Tlie dangers inherent in tliis approach are two-fold. Hiis is a somewhat socio-religious 
approach to the novel. There is a tendency to read the novel tlirough Eliot’s historical 
situation, or a pseudo-biogi*aphical approach -  that the search for religion or God in the 
novel is really Eliot’s account of her own religious agonies.
Kerry McSweeney does not focus on the religious “agonies,” but on what he 
perceives to be Eliot’s alternative body of belief, i.e., alternative to Cliristianity. He 
writes:
hr Middlemarch, Eliot presents a non-theological and non-metaphysical body of 
beliefs that she believes capable of providing a basis for non-egotistic values and 
other-regarding actions, and of performing for gifted members of the modem 
social organism, the same ennobling function that traditional religious ideals had 
performed for St Teresa of Avila, who lived in a society still in its theological 
phase. Hiese beliefs form the doctrinal core of Middlemarch', since tliey are 
directly articulated by the naiTator, as well as reflected in character and action, it 
is not difficult to extrapolate them fiom the text. (26)
I agi'ee that “non-egoistic values and other-regarding actions” are important, but they are
not achieved by the means that McSweeney identifies. From McSweeney’s argument
above, it is not clear whether he is advocating the notion of extrapolating “non-
Quoted in W. J. Harvey, “Criticism o f the novel: contemporary reception,” Middlemarch: Critical 
Approaches to the Novel, ed. Barbara Hardy (London: Athlone Press, 1967), 145.
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theological and non-metaphysical beliefs” from the text. I question whether we can take
the naixator of Middlemarch to be a mouthpiece for Eliot herself. It is dangerous to
conflate what we know of Eliot’s life with the narrator of Middlemarch, shice the use of
a naixator is a complex nanative device, and one that Bhot skilfully manipulates
tlii'Dughout her texts. In chapter five I argue that in addition to learning about the agonies
endui'ed by tliose learning to live without God, Middlemarch can be appreciated for
many more reasons. It can be appreciated for the way m which the motif of incarnation
functions thematically and stmcturally in and tlnougli characters like Dorothea and
Lydgate. It can be appreciated for the way in which revelation is important for the
characters and the readers, and the way in which Eliot employs the motif of
transcendence in the lives of her characters and in a position of centiality in her ethics.
Wright says that Middlemarch is:
a religious novel hi tlie broad sense that it is concerned with religious need, the 
desire to find unity, meaning and purpose in life, in a world in which God, to use 
one of the key words of the novel, is a ‘blank’. (641-2)
Tliis catch-all definition of a religious novel could refer to many novels which are much
less explicitly religious than Middlemarch. Middlemarch, along with Daniel Deronda, is
a “religious novel” in much more explicit ways. Wright says that Middlemarch
“represents a world umedeemed by revelation in which religious needs must be met by
entirely human means” (649). Eliot’s belief or unbelief in revelation is not the issue
here: religious motifs, including the motifs of incarnation, revelation, and transcendence,
operate in Middlemarch in a more sophisticated way that Wright here suggests. In the
chapters on Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda I argue that for those interested in
religion and literature, Baklitin offers a different way of reading these novels, one that
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enables the reader to appreciate Eliot’s use of theological motifs in both her ethics and 
her aesthetics. It is not my intention to argue for a Cliristianised reading of 
Middlemarch, or indeed Daniel Deronda. However, I do argue that there are theological 
motifs in these novels. Moreover, incarnation, revelation, and transcendence are part of 
the fabric of Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda. It is important to recognise these 
because I vdll show that the “other-regarding actions” and “non-egotistical values” 
highlighted by McSweeney still rely on the theological motifs of incarnation, revelation, 
and transcendence. These theological motifs are integral to Eliot’s moral vision.
Eliot as moral guide
hi addition to the criticism that proposes that Middlemarch is a novel about the ‘death’ 
or ‘disappearance’ of God, there is a strand of criticism that argues that Eliot’s novels 
helped bridge the gap between a Clnistian and a post-Cliristian world view.^  ^ Tliis 
criticism argues that Eliot’s novels helped ensuie the continuance of a Clnistian 
morality, without the supematmal aspects of the religion. At the height of her literary 
career, Eliot’s reputation rested not only on her literary merit, but also on the moral 
contents of her work. As Josephine McDonagh writes in George Eliot, at the time of her 
death Eliot had gained not only “literary acclaim,” but also “moral prestige” (2). 
McDonagh quotes Bernard Semmel’s argument in George Eliot and the Politics o f 
National Inheritance, that Eliot “came to occupy the revered position of a moral guide 
within a period of changing religious and social views.” Semmel cites G. M. Young’s
’ ' Sara M. Putzell-Korab, in The Evolving Consciousness: An Hegelian Reading o f  the Novels o f George 
Eliot (Salzburg, 1982), argues that Eliot is the “most influential o f post-Christian Victorian novelists” (2). 
Putzell-Korab defines post-Christian as seeing the Christian faith "not as the goal or fulfillment o f  an
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claim that Eliot had ‘saved us from the moral catastrophe which might have been 
expected to follow upon the waning of religious conviction.’ McDonagh argues that: 
“The idea that Eliot’s work is morally redemptive, capable of supplying secure moral 
values in a profane world, is a theme that comes to the fore in much of the criticism of 
her work” (2). Some contemporary critics did not realise tliat Eliot was writing as an 
agnostic. Others praised her work because her morals kept going in spite of the loss of 
religious faith. David Carroll, in “George Eliot: The Sibyl of Mercia,” writes that 
“despite losing her own Clnistian faith, [Eliot] reasserted in no imcertain teims firm 
moral truths” (12).^  ^This reputation of being a moral guide was a mixed blessing. On 
the one hand the moral content of her work softened the disapprobation that Eliot had 
suffered as a fallen woman, but on the other hand it led to her being perceived as an 
overt moraliser.
We saw in chapter one how English literatur e came to be perceived as offering 
an alternative to Christianity. There is a need to recognise the role that Clnistian motifs 
play in Eliot’s moral vision. Carroll says that “there were those who never became 
aware that she was seeldng to separate the forms and rituals of religion from its moral 
content, and they remained happy with what one reviewer called the “high Christian 
morality” of the early novels” (12). In chapter three we will see that following Eliot’s 
death her novels became unpopular and her literary reputation suffered a decline. Her 
novels were perceived to be too moralistic and too didactic. However, developments in 
literary criticism and theory now mean that Eliot’s novels are read in different ways. Her
individual’s life, but as a phase through which an individual develops and beyond which the true, modern 
hero progresses” (2).
David Carroll, “George Eliot: The Sibyl o f  Mercia,” Studies in the Novel 15.1 (Spring 1983): 10-25.
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texts ai’e more complex and do not preach. Her morals or ethics are an integi*al part of 
the nan ative stinctnie and are not easily extracted.
In this section I have shown some of the ways in winch literary critics ignore the 
religious and theological themes in Eliot’s novels. I have also examined two texts of 
literary criticism that argue that Middlemarch is about the absence or death of God. In 
the third section I discussed whether Eliot’s novels have been offered as an alternative to 
Christianity morality. Some of the reasons behind this critical oversight stem fiom the 
cultural climate of literature and theology today, but as we shall see in the next section, 
other reasons stem fiom reading Eliot’s novels througli a biogiapliical lens and seeing 
them as representing the Religion of Humanity.
Eliot criticism which considers the influence o f David Friedrich Strauss, 
Benedict Spinoza, Ludwig Feuerbach, and Auguste Comte on her personal 
life and/or her fiction
Much of the literary criticism that has considered the religious aspect of Eliot’s novels 
has focused on the natur e of the influence of Sti*auss, Spinoza, Feuerbach, and Comte on 
her life and fiction. In this section I examine the literary criticism which has focused on 
her relation to these thinlcers, I have identified five general problems with tliis type of 
criticism, as well as a number of specific problems with the individual writers. First, 
some critics actually seem to conflate a religious biogr aphy of Eliot with interpretations 
of the novels. There is a danger that critics allow Eliot’s own religious biography to 
dictate their reading of the novels, thereby analysing her novels in a mamier that follows
53
Eliot’s autobiography/^ Second, while Marian Evans writes of the rapport she feels with 
the authors she translated and studied, this does not necessarily result in a direct 
conelation of influence in the novels themselves. Third, individual critics argue over the 
extent to which Eliot was influenced by one or other of these thinkers. One result of tliis 
is a number of conflicting, even contradictory, readings of the novels. For example, both 
Romola mà Middlemaixh are described as Positivist and anti-Positivist novels.Fourth, 
this type of criticism can be reductionist. For example, Terxy Wright, in Theology and 
Literature, writes:
All George Eliot’s novels, in fact, present Christianity through the reductive 
lenses of Strauss and Feuerbach, whose Life of Jesus and Essence of Christianity 
she tr anslated. The tlri'ee clergymen depicted in Scenes o f Clerical Life learn to 
place more importance on hmiian than divine love. Adam Bede learns humility 
tlirough the Feuerbachian ‘baptism’ of suffering while Dinah Morris, the 
Methodist preacher, grows to lean more on her innate intuition than on tlie Bible, 
Maggie Tulliver accepts the gitidance of à Kernpis, imitating Clirist in self- 
sacrifice, but without any hope of sharing in the resurrection. Savonarola 
withdraws his claims to supernatural vision, so wimiing Romola’s devotion. 
Felix Holt pours scorn on all improvable metaphysical beliefs wlnle Dorothea 
Brooke loses all faith in anything but a ‘divine’ struggle of good against evil. 
Even for Daniel Deronda liis discovery of Judaism involves a sense of historical 
mission rather than a spiritual call. (115-16)
This comment is problematic because it does not allow for the change we saw in Eliot’s
religious beliefs to filter tlnough into her fiction, hr comparing the early and the later
novels it offers no comment on any developments in Eliot’s artistry. I am troubled by
Peter C. Hodgson argues that it is misleading to suggest that she became a disciple of any o f  these 
thinkers (6).
James F. Scott, in “George Eliot, Positivism, and the Social Vision o f Middlemarch,” Victorian Studies 
16 (1972); 59-76, argues that Eliot was at once respectful and critical o f Comte and Positivism. He argues 
that although there are some sections of Middlemarch that could be interpreted as following the 
recommendations o f Frederic Hanison, ultimately the failures o f Lydgate and Bulsti ode argue against a 
Comtean inteipretation o f Middlemai'ch. Martha Vogeler, in “George Eliot and the Positivists,” 
Nineteenth-Centwy Fiction 35 (December 1980): 406-31, agrees with Scott, and says thiA Middlemarch is 
not a positivist novel, and that the Positivists themselves did not recognise it as such either. For further 
discussion see Nancy L. Paxton, “Feminism and Positivism in George Eliot’s Romola,” Nineteenth- 
Centwy Women Writers o f  the English-Speaking World, ed. Rlioda Nathan (Westport, CT.: 1986), 143-
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the idea that Eliot is presenting Christianity in any explicit way. Also tliis inteipretation 
of Eliot’s novels relies heavily on the fact that Eliot translated these authors. Eliot’s 
ti'anslations of Strauss and Feuerbach are stumbling blocks to literary critics, when they 
use them as reasons not to look at the Christian motifs in her fiction. Here Wright is 
reducing Eliot’s involvement with Chiistianity to a thematic level only, and his 
hiterpretation is heavily dependent on the plots of the novels. Wright neither engages 
with the structui'e or the extia-textual dimension of the novels, nor with Eliot’s aesthetic 
aim of extending her reader’s sympathies. Eliot may have aimed to extract the 
supernatural from Cliristianity, but she did not extract Clnistian motifs from her fiction.
A fifth problem is that Strauss, Spinoza, Feuerbach, and Comte were all 
philosophers or theologians, and Eliot was a writer of fiction. There is little writing that 
addresses the questions of interdisciplinary influence. Critical writing that discusses the 
influence of these writers on Eliot overlooks these generic differences. It is better to 
exercise caution and avoid confusing Eliot with these thinlcers. The differences between 
Eliot and these thinkers will become clearer in chapter three when I look at Eliot’s 
aesthetics. I do not offer an exhaustive critique of Eliot criticism wliich considers the 
influence of these thinkers on Eliot’s life and fiction. I am not wishing to read the fiction 
against the biographical facts of Marian Lewes’s life and religious conscience and 
convictions, but I argue that reading Eliot’s novels tlnough the lens of Strauss, Spinoza, 
Feuerbach, and Comte, is not the most appropriate lens to help the reader to appreciate 
the theological motifs that can be found in the novels. Rather, my pinpose in this section 
is to argue that this type of literary criticism offers inadequate analysis of the theological
50, Bernard Semmel, George Eliot and the Politics o f  National Inheritance, and Terry Wright, "George 
Eliot and Positivism; A Reassessment,” Modern Language Review 76.2 (1981): 257-72.
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motifs of incarnation, revelation, and ti anscendence found in the novels, and inadequate 
analysis of the complexities and particulars that occur in Eliot’s fiction. In particular, I 
focus on the motif of the incarnation, and on the individual and how this ties to the idea 
of the novel as a fonn of ethical knowledge. I have divided this section into foui’, and 
look at each of these writers in tmm. A more sophisticated and integrated 
interdisciplinary approach that looks at tlie differences between the writers, as well as 
the degrees of influence, is needed. Reading Eliot’s novel tlnough the lens of Bakhtin 
provides this integrated interdisciplinary approach.
Eliot and Strauss
Eliot scholars have focused on the influence of Strauss on her life and work because she 
translated his work. However, it is clear tliat Eliot formd tlie task, the subject matter, and 
the methodology of the translation unpalatable. Of immediate concern for my discussion 
of the role that theological motifs play in her ethics and aesthetics, is the fact that she 
found the subject matter of the translation unpalatable. Strauss’s argument that the 
hitman and the divine ai'e united in humanity as a whole rather than in an individual, 
Jesus Clirist, is antithetical to Eliot’s artistic endeavour. After briefly describing Eliot’s 
experience of translating Strauss, I examine his understanding of the unity of the human 
and the divine, and show how Eliot’s aesthetics and ethics divert from this 
understanding.
We saw in chapter one that Marian Evans took on the task of translating 
Strauss’s Das Leben Jesu, after Rufa Brabant gave up the translation after marrying
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Charles Hemiell/^ Evans considered the task a duty and worked diligently, consulting
Sara Hennell on points of Geraian as she went along. The translation took from 1844 to
1846, and at various points along the way Evans described herself as “Sti'auss-sick.” *^’
David Jasper, in The Sacred and Secular Canon in Romanticism: Preserving the Sacred
Truths, in a chapter entitled, ""Weltliteratur and the Biblical Critics,” writes:
Stiauss [. . .] she often found dry and pedantic, a ‘German system-monger’ 
whose methodology was to her relentless, dissective and repetitive. It was said 
that she frequently could only endure to continue her work of translation by 
gazing while she worked at a cast of tlie neoclassical Danish sculptor Bertel 
Thorwaldsen’s beautiful figure of the Risen Christ. (77)
Basil Willey, in Nineteenth-Centuiy Studies: From Coleridge to Matthew Arnold, writes
of Evans’ “much groaning and sickness of heart” (220), and quotes her description of
“soul-stupefying labour.”^^  It is ironic that Evans had to gaze at a statue of Clnist while
she was tr*anslating a text which dissected traditional Clnistian understanding of the
incarnation.
Strauss critiqued the Clnistian concept of tlie particularity and uniqueness of 
Jesus Clnist and the traditional understanding of the incarnation. Hans Frei, in The 
Eclipse o f Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Centuiy 
Hermeneutics, in a chapter entitled “Strauss’s Perfection of the “Mythical” Option,” 
writes:
The upshot of [Strauss’s] study seemed to him to be that the truth of the 
Clnistian claim, the idea of reconciliation or of the unity of the infinite and finite 
in man and his history, is philosophical [. . .] in nature and, therefore, has no 
essential, indispensible comiection witli any single historical occurrence or series
Evans met Strauss on two occasions. The first occasion was unprofitable, as Strauss appeared down, 
and Evans’s spoken German was not good enough to permit conversation (GEL 2, 171). A second 
meeting occurred in July 1858, when Eliot’s spoken German was much improved (GEL 2 ,472), For 
further details see the Oxford Reader’s Companion to George Eliot, under ‘Strauss’.
GEL 1, 206, 207, and 217-18.
Basil Willey, Nineteenth-Centuiy Studies: Coleridge to Matthew Arnold (London: Chatto & Windus, 
1949), and GEL 1, 185.
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of occmTences. In other words, it is not dependent for its tmth on the claims that 
a God-man once existed and that Jesus Clnist was that God-man. (235)*^
In theological terms, Sti'auss is sayhig that Jesus Clirist was not uniquely both God and
man, and tliat his life, death and resurxection were not responsible for reconciling God
and humankind in any substantive way. Strauss himself asks:
[I]s not the idea of the unity of the divine and human natures a real one in a far 
higher sense, when I regard the whole of mankind as its realization, than when I 
single out one man as sirch a realization? is not an incarnation of God from 
eternity a truer one than incarnation limited to a particular point of time (780, 
xxvii).*^
In this, Strauss is denying the uniqueness and particularity of Jesus Clnist, and
dismissing the doctrine of the Incarnation as implausible. By arguing that the idea of the
unity of the divine and human is more real when considered in respect of the whole of
hmiianrty as opposed to being centred in one individual, Strauss profoundly alters and
diminishes the uniqueness and person of Jesus Christ. Peter C. Hodgson summarises this
line of argmneiit: “It is humanity to which the christological predicates are properly
ascribed” (6). Strauss goes on to argue that everyone is affected by the time and place
into which they are bom, and argues that traditional Clnistian interpretations of Clnist
ask one to believe that Christ, and Christ alone, is miaffected by the time and place in
wliich he was bom. He expands:
[E]ven the most highly gifted of human individuals is always influenced by the 
conditions of the particular circle in which he lives and moves. He belongs to a 
special family, age, and nation; his soul, however, independent and self-centred, 
is fed on the one hand, and on the other limited by the nature and degr ee of the 
culture so derived; his aims are swayed by surromiding circumstance, and are
Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse o f  Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Centwy 
Hermeneutics (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1974).
Marian Evans, In her review o f R. W. Mackay’s The Progress o f  the Intellect, highlights his faith that 
divine revelation is similarly not contained exclusively in one age or nation; it is rather, an ongoing 
process. See Willey, Nineteenth-Centwy Studies, 229. Tins review is included in Essays o f  George Eliot, 
27-45.
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hence exposed not only to obstructions in their execution, but also to indefinite 
modifications and improvements resulting from maturer experience. But the 
divinely begotten Son or Incarnate Word of traditional belief in under no such 
restriction. His original endowment needs no human teaching, being entirely and 
absolutely independent of limiting conditions of family or nation; his aims, or 
rather the single aim to frilfil which he is sent into the world, is pre-appointed 
from eternity, and canied out with inevitable persistency and certainty, apart 
fr om any of the usual influences of social life, or even of the laws of nature.
Strauss’s argument that the divinely begotten Son or Incarnate Word of traditional belief
is under no such restrictions as ordinary human beings is, like most heresies, based on a
half-fruth. It is tiue that Clnist’s aim is pre-appointed from eternity, and is earned out
with certainty, and the world around him cannot prevent this aim. The problem for
Strauss was the idea that Jesus was unlike otlaer people, and did not seem to have to
abide by the same lules. David Jasper writes that Strauss offers a negative response to
his formulation tlrat a person can at once be a rmiqiie manifestation of the divine life and
also participate fully in the nexus of history like other human beings (Sacred and
Secular, 84). Tlris idea that Jesus Christ was unlike other people and did not have to
abide by the same rules is at once trire and not true. The paradox in the Christian
conception of Jesus Christ, both biblically and according to Clnistian tr adition, is tliat he
is unique and yet at the same time like us in every way.^ ® However, Strauss deviates
from mainstream Clnistian belief about the nature of the incarnation, which is about
God taking on human flesh and being subject to time and place.
Biblical support for this view can be found in the following passages: John lv l-3 , 14, Romans 1 v l-4  
(“who as to his human nature was a descendant o f David”), Romans 8v3, Galatians 4v4, Phil 2v5-8 
(Christ Jesus “being in very nature God, did not consider equality with God something to be grasped, but 
made himself nothing, taking the very nature o f  a servant, being made in human likeness”), Colossians 
2v9 (“For in Christ all the fullness o f the Deity lives in bodily form”), Hebrews 2vl4-18 (“he too shared 
in their humanity,” and “he had to be made like his brothers in every way, in order that he might become a 
merciful and faithful high priest in service to God, and that he might make atonement for the sins o f the 
people. Because he himself suffered when he was tempted, he is able to help those who are being 
tempted”), Hebrews 4vl 5 (“For we do not have a high priest who is unable to sympathise with our
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It is difficult to know the effect that Strauss had on Eliot. Peter C. Hodgson
offers this commentary on Strauss’s argument that humanity as a whole is the union of
tlie divine and the human, rather than a single individual:
Eliot must have found such a conclusion to be both abstiact and unproductive: 
we have to do not with humanity as a whole but with concrete human beings, 
tlnough whom alone ideals and values become historical realities. It is a rather 
odd bourgeois illusion to suppose, as Sti'auss did, that humanity as such is tlie 
union of two natmes, divine and human -  working intellectual miracles, 
progiessing toward moral perfection, tiiumphing over nature, etc. (6)
This is a significant observation for Eliot’s aesthetics and ethics. In Eliot’s fiction, she is
very much concerned with concrete individual human beings rather than humanity as a
whole. Her novels focus on the struggle of individuals, her characters learn that they
have to relate to specific others, and she encourages her readers to relate to individuals.
Eliot and Strauss are different types of writers. The novel as a genre does not deal with
humanity as a whole, but with specific human beings. Eliot expresses clearly this
concern for individual human beings in a letter to Charles Bray, 15 November, 1857.
She wiites:
I dislike exh'emely a passage [. ..] in wliich you appear to consider the disregard 
of individuals as a lofty condition of mind. My own experience and development 
deepen every day my conviction that our moral progi ess may be measured by the 
degree in which we sympathize with individual suffering and individual joy. The 
fact that in the scheme of things we see a constant and tremendous sacrifice of 
individuals is, it seems to me only one of the many proofs that uige upon us our 
total inability to find in om* own natures a key to the Divine Mystery. I could 
more readily turn Clnistian again and worship Jesus again than embrace a 
Theism which professes to explain the proceedings of God.
Eliot’s conviction, expressed in this quotation, that om* moral progress can be measuied
by the degi’ee in which we sympathise with “individual suffering and individual joy” is
weaknesses, but we have one who has been tempted in every way, just as we are -  yet was without sin”), 
and 1 John 5v20.
G E L l, 402-4.
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central to her whole aesthetic endeavour. Our sympathy with another individual is both 
the theme and the goal of her writings, and shall be explored more fully in the next 
chapter. In my analysis of Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda in chapters five and six I 
will show that Baklitin provides a better model for understanding the incarnation motif 
in Eliot than Stiauss. A comparison of Sti’auss and Eliot is misleading for a reading of 
Eliot’s aesthetic of sympathy. Strauss denies the possibility and validity of the 
uniqueness of Clu’ist’s incarnation, i.e., he argues that the Clnistian doctrine that Cln-ist 
was both frilly human and fully divine is implausible. He argues against Christ’s 
uniqueness, because it sets him apart from us. However, Bakhtin hints that it is only 
Chi’ist’s incarnation that allows for our uniqueness. We are only capable of treating the 
other properly, etliically, as it were, once we accept his or her uniqueness. Christ’s 
uniqueness is the guarantee of our uniqueness. Christ’s uniqueness does not belittle us, 
and it is the only thing that guarantees that each hmnan being is seen as unique. Because 
Christ is unique, we see tlie other as unique. Clnist’s incarnation in time and space 
means that we need to recognise that everyone else is also in time and space. Strauss 
thinks that an emphasis on Chi'ist’s uniqueness limits and restricts us, but in fact it is 
only Chi’ist’s incarnation that guarantees our freedom. Christ’s incarnation provides the 
rationale behind why we should treat the other or the neighbour fairly. Bakhtin’s early 
philosophical essays, and the concepts of answerability, non-alibi in being, excess of 
seeing, and selfrother relations, all rely on the motif of incarnation. Bakhtin argues that 
our ethics and aesthetics depend on our incarnation, which in tui’n is dependent on 
Clirist’s incarnation. In Baklitin, we see Jesus Clnist compared to human beings, and
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that Clnist, like us, is incarnated in time and space. It is Chiist’s uniqueness that 
legitimises attention being paid to individuals.
In this section we have seen that Eliot translated Strauss’s work, but that she 
found it an unpleasant task, both with regard to theme and methodology. The work itself 
she found difficult and the conclusions unsatisfying. Strauss’s idea that the divine and 
the human are united in humanity as a whole, rather than in an individual (z.e., Jesus 
Christ), is antithetical to Eliot’s whole aesthetic endeavour. Eliot wants us to have 
sympathy for “individual suffering and individual joy,” and she would have her 
characters and her readers respond to the particular, rather than the more vague notion of 
the species that Strauss proposes. Moreover, she presents fiawed characters and calls us 
to sympathise with them. In tlie next section I look at the divide in critical opinion over 
the degi'ee to which Spinoza influenced Eliot, before looking at Dorothy Atkins’s work 
on Spinoza’s influence on Eliot’s novels. Atkins’s book is one of the few devoted to the 
study of both authors.
Eliot and Spinoza
Eliot scholars have considered whether Spinoza’s work influenced Eliot because she 
translated his writings. Marian Lewes worked on a translation of Spinoza’s Hactatus 
Theologico-politicus (1670) in 1849 (it was unpublished), and Ms Ethics (1677) between 
1854 and 1856 (published in 1981). Althougli there is significantly less critical material 
written on Eliot’s relation to Spinoza, critical opinion is nonetheless divided over the 
extent to which Eliot was influenced by Ms work. Rosemary Ashton, in George Eliot, 
says that Spinoza is quite influential on her work (15), whereas Peter Jones, in
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Philosophy and the Novel, says that Eliot was not influenced by Spinoza/^ Dorothy
Atkins, in George Eliot and Spinoza, laments “the neglect of detailed consideration for
the influence of Spinoza on George Eliot,” and her book is one of the few to address the
specific relation between the two writers/^ Atkins discusses Eliot’s characters in
relation to freedom and bondage. She argues that Eliot often pairs characters
thematically, to show the struggle for freedom from bondage. This criticism relates to an
understanding of the human being and the way in which we sympathise with
individuals. Atkins offers an interesting perspective on Eliot’s presentation of character.
She says that people need to understand their position in the world, and tlie way they
should relate to others. She writes:
The action of [Eliot’s] novels is dramatised against a background which is very 
large and complicated, and char acters have to come to an understanding of the 
intricate web of interconnecting hmnan lives and the larger framework of 
community existence. Individuals must work out personal salvation within fixed 
temporal and social bomidaries. Characters either grow into knowledge or 
remain in bondage, depending on then acceptance and understanding of this 
large sphere of existence. (10-11)
This is an interesting commentary on Eliot’s novels, which contains some insights with
wliich I agree. For example, the background, or medium in which the novel’s action
occms, is large and complicated, and Eliot’s characters do have to come to an
understanding of the intricate web of interconnecting hmnan lives, as well as the larger
framework of comimmity existence. Similarly, in chapters five and six, we see that
Rosemary Ashton, George Eliot (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 74-75, and Peter Jones, 
Philosophy and the Novel: philosophical aspects o f  'Middlemarch ‘Anna Karenina 'The brothers 
Karamazov’, ‘A la recherche du temps perdu’ and o f  the methods o f  criticism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1975).
^  Dorothy Atldns, George Eliot and Spinoza, Salzburg Studies in English Literature Romantic 
Reassessment 78 (Salzburg, 1978). “The neglect o f  detailed consideration for the influence o f  Spinoza on 
George Eliot is unfortunate because Spinoza, alone among the philosophers she studied carefully for 
translation, formulated a complex ethical system [...] George Eliot based her assumptions concerning 
human responsibility and morality in part on the ethical philosophy o f Spinoza” (5).
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Eliot’s characters are aware, often acutely so, of their “fixed temporal and social 
boundaries” or the lack thereof. We see that this selves a dual purpose in Eliot’s 
aesthetics: Eliot’s characters learn to be more sympathetic to one another, and readers 
learn to be sympathetic to characters. In Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda Eliot shows 
a thematic and stmctm al interest in the individual both in relation to society and others. 
An understanding of the human being in his or her social context is vital to Eliot’s 
aesthetic aim. Tlirough understanding how an individual character is situated in a 
particular time and place, with specific responsibilities and social pressui'e being exerted 
on them, we learn about the pressiues an individual faces, and consequently learn to 
sympathise with him or her. However, I argue that Baklitin’s concepts of non-alibi in 
being, excess of seeing, and his understanding of self/other relations are better lenses 
through which to view this phenomenon than Spinoza’s concepts of bondage and 
freedom, and they also help the reader understand the role that the motifs of incarnation, 
revelation, and transcendence play in Eliot’s novels.
Eliot and Feuerbach
Eliot scholars have focused on the influence of Feuerbach because, once again, Eliot 
translated his work. Eliot had gieater choice over her translation of Feuerbach’s work, 
and seems to have enjoyed more affinity with his writings than with either Strauss or 
Spinoza. Marian Evans’s tianslation of Feuerbach was the only work to be published 
under her own name. It was published by John Chapman in 1854. The Oxford 
Companion to George Eliot says Eliot’s decision to translate Feuerbach was “self­
initiated” (418). Eliot scholars comment on the greater influence of Feuerbach.
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However, once again, differences emerge when we look at the understanding of the 
human being in relation to Eliot’s aesthetics and ethics. Differences emerge not only 
between the styles of the two wiiters, but also m the understanding and treatment of 
hmnan beings.
Critics and biographers agi’ee that Eliot found Feuerbach’s teaching about
marriage being a ‘free bond of love’ and ‘sacred in itself congenial to her decision to
live with George Hemy Lewes. Kathryn Hughes, in George Eliot: The Last Victoiian,
argues that Marian foimd “theological justification” for her relationship with Lewes in
Feuerbach’s ideas that the quality of relationships, and not their legal status was what
mattered, and was what made a mamage ‘moral’ and ‘religious’ (146). Eliot’s
translation of Feuerbach and her decision to live with Lewes are concurrent. Rosemary
Ashton, in “The Intellectual ‘Medium’ of Middlemarch,^'' says that Feuerbach’s writings
about maixiage were “of intellectual and emotional importance” to Eliot at this time
(166). '^^  Critics also suggest that Eliot learnt the notion of sympathy from Feuerbach, but
as we have seen, she may also have learnt it fr om Wordsworth or Christianity.
Keixy McSweeney, in George Eliot (Marian Evans): A Literary Life, writes:
The Essence o f Christianity was a frontal assault on the transcendental and 
supematmal postulates of tiaditional Christian belief. For Feuerbach, nothing 
transcended man. Tlie tine sense of theology was antliropology [. . .] there was 
‘no distinction between the predicates'' of the divine and the human subject. (32- 
3)
As we saw in chapter one, Eliot herself was troubled by the supernatural tenets of 
Cliristianity. Feuerbach attacks not only the subject of theology, i.e., he attacks the idea 
that God is a Supreme Being, transcendent of hmnankind, he also attacks the method by
Rosemary Ashton, "The Intellectual ‘Medium’ o f Middlemarch,” The Review o f  English Studies 30 
(1979): 154-168.
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which we talk about God. Specifically he challenges the idea that humans can only 
know about God or know God to the extent to wliich God chooses to reveal Godself. It 
is something of a circuitous argument. If you say that theology is notlring more than 
antlnopology then it is clear that your system of thought caimot allow for any notion of 
revelation tliat is beyond the human. I now discuss Feuerbach’s understanding of 
revelation in more detail.
In The Essence o f Christianity Feuerbach attacks the idea that man can in and of 
liimself know nothing of God, ie,^ the idea tliat the only loiowledge we have of God is 
what God himself reveals to us. Feuerbach critiques the Christian understanding of 
revelation in particular. Feuerbach sees revelation in opposition to human knowledge 
and reason:
The belief in revelation exhibits in the clearest manner the characteristic illusion 
of the religious consciousness. The general premiss [5/c] of this belief is: man 
can of liimself know nothing of God; all his knowledge is merely vain, earthly, 
hiunan. But God is a superhuman being; God is known only by himself. Thus we 
IcQOw nothing of God beyond what he reveals to us. The Imowledge imparted by 
God is alone divine, superhuman, supernatural knowledge. By means of 
revelation, therefore, we Imow God tlnough himself; for revelation is the word of 
God -  God declaring himself. Hence, in the belief in revelation man makes 
himself a negation, he goes out of and beyond himself; he places revelation in 
opposition to human knowledge and opinion; in it is contained a hidden 
knowledge, the fullness of all supersensuous mysteries; here reason must hold its 
peace. (206)^^
Feuerbach attacks this “illusion” and says that God must have reference not to himself 
but to man’s power of comprehension. He argues, therefore, that what man can 
understand can only come freni man in God. He argues that the ideal nature of man 
reveals itself to the phenomenal man:
From “The Contradiction in the Revelation o f God,” The Essence o f  Christianity, tians. George Eliot 
(New York: Prometheus Books, 1989). All subsequent references are to this edition.
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Now what God thinks in relation to man is detemiined by the idea of man -  it 
has arisen out of reflection on hmnan nature. [. . .] In the scheme of his 
revelation God must have reference not to himself, but to man’s power of 
comprehension. Tliat which comes from God to man, comes to man only flem 
man in God, that is, only from the ideal nature of man to the phenomenal man, 
flem the species to the individual. Thus, between the divine revelation and the 
so-called human reason or nature there is no other than an illusory distinction; ~ 
tire contents of the divine revelation are of himian origin, for they have 
proceeded not flom God as God, but from God as determined by human reason, 
human wants, that is directly flom human reason and human wants. And so in 
revelation man goes out of himself, in order, by a circuitous path, to return to 
liimself! Here we have a striking confhmation of the position that the secret of 
theology is notlihig else than arithiopology -  the knowledge of God nothing else 
than a knowledge of man! (207). Preface to second edition xxxvi-xxxix.
Feuerbach rejects the revelation contained in the Bible, for example, tlirough the
creation account in Genesis, Exodus, tlie Law, the Prophets, and the theological
arguments contained in Romans and Hebrews. Feuerbach limits God’s revelation to
human comprehension. Since human comprehension is the limit of what he can learn,
then what can ultimately be revealed is only human; therefore God must be human. He
ai’gues away any distinction between human reason and divine revelation (The biblical
text of 1 Corinthians differentiates between human reason and divine revelation).
Feuerbach’s conclusions are by no means widely accepted by theologians: many
challenge Feuerbach’s argument that the secret of tlieology is anthropology. I now move
to look at the differences between Eliot and Feuerbach, including differences in style
and differences in the understanding and treatment of human beings. Feuerbach’s
understanding of the species and the individual is not in accord with Eliot’s artistic
endeavour.
In The Essence o f Christianity Feuerbach aigues that the faults of one human 
being are cancelled out by the virtues of another human being. Consequently, although 
each individual human being is flawed, the species as a whole is perfect. We read:
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All men are sinners. Granted; but they are not all sinners in the same way; on the 
contrary, there exists a great and essential difference between them. One man is 
inclined to falsehood, another is not; he would rather give up his life tlian break 
his word or tell a lie; the third has a propensity to intoxication, the fourth to 
licentiousness; while the fifth, whether by favour* of Nature, or firom the energy 
of his character, exhibits none of these vices. Thus, in the moral as well as the 
physical and intellectual elements, men compensate for each other, so that taken 
as a whole they are as they should be, they present the perfect man. (155-6)^^
Feuerbach puts this thought succinctly: “The sins and failings of individuals vanish in
the species itself’ (157). He says that in the species alone “lies the redemption, the
justification, the reconciliation and the cure of the sins and deficiencies of the
individual” (159). This line of reasoning does not take into account die way in which
each human being’s sin or moral failings has consequences on the next human being.
Eliot’s novels, on the other hand, show in great detail the effect that one’s behaviour has
on one’s neighbours. In Feuerbach’s moral scheme, there is little call to act ethically
toward the other, since one’s individual flaws will be cancelled in the species anyway.
Eliot, on the other hand, wants her characters and her readers to learn to act ethically
towards the other.
Tliree literary critics advise caution in considering Feuerbach’s influence on 
Eliot, Ken*y McSweeney, in Middlemarch, criticises the “constant rhetorical excesses 
and intermittent fatuities of Feuerbach’s discourse” (33). As we have already seen in 
section one of this chapter, McSweeney argues that Middlemarch can be read as a book 
about the death of God, which makes his warning against oversimplifying the 
relationship between Feuerbach and Eliot all tire more potent. He wai*ns against 
obscuring “the distinction between the fine mind of Marian Evans and the comparatively
From “The Distinction between Christianity and Heathenism,” in The Essence o f  Christianity.
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crude mind of Feuerbach, and between her temperament and sensibility and his” (33).
Peter C. Hodgson also points out the differences between Eliot and Feuerbach:
Feuerbach lacked a sense of the tr agic and thus had no real understairding of the 
religious awareness of guilt and forgiveness, siir and redemption. His theory is 
too predictable, too unnuanced, too prosaic, too insensitive to intended religious 
meanings. How pretentious to suppose that one has fouird, in Casaubon-like 
fashion, the key to all religious mythologies! (160-1)
The genre of the novel does not easily correspond with an imnuairced theory. The novel
is an open fonrr, one that focuses on the individual, and his or her particular
circumstances. Hodgsoir argues tlrat it is possible that Eliot has Feuerbach, or Strauss, or
a composite of theologiarrs in nrind when she created the character of Casaubon in
Middlemarch. He continues:
Wliile Casaubon thought he had discovered the key to all religious mythologies 
in a primordial revelation, Feuerbach found it in a primordial psychic projection 
and Strauss in a primordial divine-human unity. George Eliot was suspicious of 
all such totalizing theories, all proposals about the ‘essence’ of something.
Wliat Feuerbach lacked above all else was poetic sensibility -  an appreciation 
for mystery, an attention to the concrete and particular, an ability to see and 
articulate the surprising connections (as well as differences) between tilings, an 
apprehension of both deep conflicts and new possibilities. George Eliot 
possessed it in abundance. (161)
The generic difference between the two wiiters has not been clearly spelt out. Botli
Baklitin and Eliot, in their aesthetics and ethics, are against totalising theories.
Feuerbach’s wiiting is too systematic and does not pay enough attention to the
individual. There is a significant difference between theological and philosophical
systems and the novel, particularly in the scope that each fonn of writing has for
focusing on the individual. The novel has more scope for nuances, and can give
attention to the concrete and paiticular. I will develop this argument in chapters tliree
and four, in my discussion of tlie work of Martha Nussbaum and Baklitin.
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Brian Davies, in “George Eliot and Christianity,” is also aware of an
“experienced difference” between reading Eliot and Feuerbach/^ He argues that in her
novels Eliot is “not simply negative in her treatment of and approach to religious
individuals with their various parcels of traditional religious doctiines,” and that her
religious characters aie drawn “with sympathy, with understanding, and with real
appreciation of tliem taken for what they are rather than what they might be after a
reading of Feuerbach” (54). He argues that her attitude to Christianity cannot be
adequately explained with reference to Feuerbach alone:
So to appreciate George Eliot’s attitude to Chiistianity we must do more than 
acknowledge her debt to Feuerbach, gieat tliough it is, and her intellectual 
conviction that a proper religion for man, the true essence of Christianity, lies in 
a religion of humanity, a religion of service, love and sympathy. For George 
Eliot’s interest in Chi'istianity went well beyond that of a totally emancipated 
obsei*ver. [. . .] The conclusion must be that George Eliot has not been fully 
understood by someone who calls her a sti'aightforward atheist. Her attitude to 
Clnistianity is a complex one [...]. (60)
Some literary critics have seen Clnistianity in Eliot and we look at them in the next
section. Not only is her attitude to Clnistianity complex, but she employs motifs in a
complex way. Peter C. Hodgson also writes of the difference between Eliot and
Feuerbach:
While affinning that religion ought above all to promote human flourishing, her 
sense of human evil and historical tragedy was too deep to allow her to embrace 
a religion that might actually worship or idolise human beings either as 
individuals or as a species -  those very humans whose tendency, out of ambition 
or fear, is to draw everything into themselves. Her insight into the human 
condition was more profound and also more tragic than that of Feuerbach and 
Comte. Hers was a religion of humanity directed, not to veneration, but to 
service and sympathy. (9)
Hodgson makes some important points here. Nowhere in Eliot’s writings, in her letters,
joimials, or novels, does she even hint that she would worship, idolise, or venerate
Brian Davies, “George Eliot and Christianity," Downside Review 100 (January 1982): 47-61.
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human beings, either on an individual level, or at the level of the species. Her moral 
vision and understanding of the human being is that we are all egoists, and are all tainted 
by “moral stupidity” (see Middlemarch, chapter 21).^  ^ The whole of her aesthetic of 
sympathy is based on the presupposition that we are egoists, and we have a flawed 
perspective on the world, witli relation to our understandmg of our own position in the 
world, and oui* relation to others. Eliot’s understanding and treatment of egoism poses 
an overt challenge to a Feiierbachian interpretation of her work. In chapter three we will 
see in more detail her portiayal of flawed characters, and in five and six her 
understanding of the way in which “moral stupidity” affects each of us. The religious 
motifs of incarnation, revelation, and transcendence, are insti'umental in paving out a 
way from this moral stupidity.
Eliot’s reading and translation of Feuerbach coincided with, and possibly 
justified, her decision to live with Lewes; on this personal level, her reading of his work 
is thus significant. The translation itself was less ti'oublesome than her translation of 
Strauss. However, given the different gemes in which they wrote, and the different ends 
of those gemes it is pmdent not to conflate the work of Eliot and Feuerbach.
Eliot and Positivism
It is important to discuss the nature of Comte’s influence on Eliot, since one reason 
given for not paying attention to the Christian motifs in Eliot’s fiction is that she was a 
disciple of Comte and a follower of the Religion of Humanity. I tliinlc it is significant 
that Positivists of her day thought that neither her life nor her works reflected their
28 George Eliot, Middlemarch, ed. David Canoll (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 205. All subsequent
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beliefs. This fact rebuts the idea that her work is only religious in so far as it is about the 
Religion of Humanity. In addition, we wiU once again see that there is a different 
understanding of human beings in Comte and Eliot’s works.
In the previous section we looked at some of the ways in which it is possible to 
overemphasise a degree of influence of Feuerbach on Eliot, and this caution is also 
relevant when looking at Eliot’s relation to Auguste Comte and his British followers. 
We must be cautious about assuming a dhect correlation between Positivist thought and 
Eliot’s novels. In tliis section I focus on two related questions. I want to consider not 
only Eliot’s familiarity with Comte’s work, but also the related question of whether 
Comte’s British disciples saw Eliot as propagating Iris work, or recognised his influence 
on her work. I look briefly at Eliot’s faiuiliarity with Comte, before looking at how a 
number of leading British Comtists read both Eliot’s life and her writings, and their 
conclusion that she had betrayed Positivist principles in both.
Both Marian and George Flenry Lewes were familiar with Comte’s work. Ten*y 
Wright, in The Religion o f Humanity: The Impact o f Comtean Positivism on Victorian 
Britain, says that Eliot’s copy of Comte’s work is closely amiotated (266).^  ^However, 
tills does not in itself prove whether Eliot was a disciple, a follower, or an interested 
reader. Critical opinion has been divided over whether Eliot was a Comtist or not. 
Wright says that the subject of Comte’s influence on Eliot has always been 
“controversial,” “from the first reviews by CMstian critics, who used the Positivist 
stigma to beat her dogma, to recent more sympathetic accounts of her work” (173). As I
references are to this edition.
^  Teny Wright, The Religion o f  Humanity: The Impact o f  Comtean Positivism on Victorian Britain 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986),
72
have already mentioned, both Romola and Middlemarch have been read as positivist and 
anti-positivist novels. The fact that such contradictoiy readings exist of the same novels 
should give us pause when considering the extent to which Eliot was influenced by 
Comte. I now consider Eliot’s friendships with two British positivists.
Martha S. Vo geler, in “George Eliot and the Positivists,” examines Marian 
Lewes’s friendships with a number of British Positivists. The Leweses enjoyed 
friendships witli several people who were deeply committed to Positivist thought, 
including Frederic Hanison and Richard Congieve. Vogeler concentrates her attention 
on the Lewes’ friendship with these men.^ ® The Leweses met the Congieves in Februaiy 
1859, and a close fiiendship developed between Marian Lewes and Maria Congieve. W. 
M. Simon, in European Positivism in the Nineteenth Centwy: An Essay in Intellectual 
Histoiy, says that there are “few references” to Comte “to be found in her writings 
before 1859, when she and Lewes became neiglibours of the Congreves in Wandsworth” 
(207).^  ^Vogeler contends that neither Congieve nor Hanison saw Eliot as a Positivist or 
believed that she propagated Positivism in her work. Vogeler points out that Harrison’s 
first visit to the Priory was not to discuss Comte, but the legal issues that were 
concerned with Eliot’s wilting of Felix Holt (413). Marian Lewes and Frederic Harrison 
had a lengthy epistolai'y discussion over the role of fiction, and whether it could be used 
as a vehicle to promote Positivist thought, and I shall look at their conespondence in 
greater detail in chapter tlnee. Vogeler argues that it has not been sufficiently noted that 
Eliot’s response to Harrison “implied her repudiation of key Comtist principles” (414).
Terry Wnglit also concentiates on friendships with Congreves and Frederic Hanison (173-5).
W. M. Simon, European Positivism in the Nineteenth Century: An Essay in Intellectual History (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1963).
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In later years Eliot’s friendship with both the Congi'eves and Frederic Hanison became 
sti'ained.
Vogeler argues that a number of events towards the end of Eliot’s life tested her 
ties with the Positivists. The first was her marriage to John Cross following Lewes’s 
deatli. As Teny Wright says, “All these friendly relations [. . .] were shattered by her 
decision to marry Jolni Cross, winch was seen as an abrogation of the Positivist duty of 
eternal widowhood” (177). Vogeler says that the Comtists interpreted this event as 
showing that she was not tiuly a Positivist (420-21). Cross asked Frederic Harrison 
about maniage and Hanison assured him that the Positivists would not dream of 
applying the doctrine of eternal widowhood “to those who stand entirely aloof from our 
ways and oui* thoughts” (421). Harrison’s letter of 6 May 1880 to Cross has been seen as 
a “double-edged letter of congratulation and veiled excommunication.” Vogeler records 
that although Congieve dined with the Crosses, Hanison avoided meeting Eliot during 
the six remaining months of her life (421), and Wright records Congreve is reported as 
saying that she was never really a Positivist, and that Hanison called her an “epicene 
woman” (178).
The response of Harrison and Congieve to Marian Lewes’ death in December 
1880 is also indicative of a distance between her thinldng and their thinking. Both 
Frederic Harrison and Congieve attended her funeral. However, Congieve, who thought 
that she had betiayed Positivists by marriage, did not mention her in his New Year’s 
Day addiess to followers, and, as Vogeler says, did not appear to mention her in print 
again (422). Frederic Hanison did not speak about her Positivism at the centenary of her 
birth (430). Despite Marian Lewes’s fiiendsliips with a number of Positivists, their
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responses to her inaniage to Cross and to her death make it impossible to conclude that 
they saw her as one of them. I now look at the ways in winch Congreve and Hanison 
interpreted her novels.
Both Congieve and Frederic Hairison made comments about Eliot’s fiction. 
Teny Wright argues that Congi eve himself appears not to have recognised the Positivist 
significance of her work, finding Middlemarch “gloomy,” seeing no reason “to 
encourage his adopted daughter to persevere with Romola f  and wiiting dismissively of 
‘such works’ as Daniel Deronda (175). Vogeler records that Frederic Hanison disliked 
most of Eliot’s later work. In paiticular, she points out that the works Hanison found 
unsatisfactory in Eliot’s canon are just those most often mined today for Positivist ore. 
Hanison disliked “The Spanish Gypsy”, thinking it a ‘fiasco’ (414-15), Middlemarch 
(416-7), Daniel Deronda (417), and The Impressions o f Theophrastus Such (419). He 
thought Middlemarch was “tedious and disagieeable by reason of the interminable 
maunderings of tedious men and women” who were “cuiiously uninteresting.” Vogeler 
writes:
He did not, however, mention as grounds for his antagonism its peiversely anti- 
Comtean featuies. Instead of a community about to attain Positivist cultuie under 
an altruistic physician, as in the plot Harrison had urged upon her earlier, 
Middlemat'ch portiays an unenlightened town, provincial in the worst sense. Its 
promising physician proves no spiritual leader: he fails in his twin goals of 
building on the work of Bichat (admired by Comte) and of overturning that of 
tire Saint-Simonians (Comte’s arch-rivals). His wife, far from inspiring him by 
superior moral virtue (expected of women by Comte), ruins Iris career. His 
uirscrupulous banker friend is a parody of Comte’s ideal temporal leader. And 
the novel’s heroine is beguiled by the labors of a pedant (exemplifying the 
irrisdirection of iirtellect Comte deplored), and makes a second marriage 
(prohibited by Comte’s doctrine of eteiiral widowhood). (417)
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In this passage Vogeler presents quite clear reasons why it is mappropriate and 
inaccurate to read Middlemarch tlirough the lens of Comte and his British followers/^
Despite the fact that a number of leading British Positivists did not see Eliot as a 
Positivist, or her work as expounding or propounding Positivist thought, there are still 
some critics who persevere in assuming she was a Comtist. Frederic Karl, in George 
Eliot: Voice o f a Century, offers an intriguing argument concerning Eliot’s relation to 
Positivism:
What is likely is that while Eliot did not accept any formalized system of beliefs, 
within positivism -  as we see in her letters to Maria Congieve -  she found 
enough sympathetic material parallel to her own beliefs to make her a believer of 
sorts. Critics of Eliot who feel her positivistic concerns have been “greatly 
exaggerated” are judging on the basis of her denials, not on her practices. It is 
true Üiat she told Benjamin Jowett, the great classicist, that she was never a 
Comtist, and equally true that she was reported as saying she would never submit 
to an unqualified acceptance of it; it is also true that Congreve himself said she 
was not a convert, but an acceptor of certain general ideas. But her denials were 
part of the Eliot intellectual game: in her mature years, she denied all fonnal 
commitments to any sect or group. Nevertheless, in positivism she had foimd 
that empirical and rational approach to human existence which satisfied her. She, 
too, had advanced from theological to metaphysical to scientific or rational, the 
very steps Comte had recommended for society as a whole. (315)
The above quotatiorr is an example of a critic who seems determined to hold that Eliot
was a Positivist, without any evidence for this case, and with plenty of counter-evidence.
It is necessar y to ask what, precisely, a “believer of sorts” means? Karl even provides
the counter-argument liimself {le., the lack of evidence that Eliot accepted Positivism
within her letters to Maria Congreve, the fact that she told Benjamin Jowett she was
never a Comtist, and that Congieve himself did not believe that she was a ‘convert’).
Terry Wright also says that Harrison similarly disliked Daniel Deronda. Writing to Beesly, Harrison 
commented: “Knowing all I do o f her, and how she recently spoke to me o f ‘us Positivists’, I am quite 
indignant at the silly playing about Judaism, and the unfair appeal to Theistic prejudice. . .  when I think 
of the Positivist view of her art which she perfectly understands and professes to embody in art, I am quite 
grieved to see her career end in a poor literary aim.” See The Religion o f  Humanity, 176-7.
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These denials, says Karl, were all part of Eliot’s “intellectual game,” although it is not at 
all clear what this game consisted of, and against whom it was played. The amount of 
counter-evidence provided by Karl cannot be rebutted in such a hypothetical fashion.^  ^
In short, British positivists did not see evidence of positivist commitments in either 
Eliot’s life or works.
Teny Wright distinguishes between the writings of Comte and Eliot in a very 
important way:
Perhaps the most important difference between Comte’s religion and George 
Eliot’s lies in their concept of Humanity. For Comte the Great Being did not 
include all human beings but only those worthy of incorporation. He had little 
sympathy with the mass of mankind. George Eliot, on tire contrary, could not 
place too much emphasis on the mediocrity of her characters. One of her greatest 
strengths as a novelist is her ability to show the moral significance of tire 
smallest acts. For ‘it is in these acts called trivialities that the seeds of joy’ are to 
be lost or found. Her novels consistently display the qualities of humility, 
tolerairce, sympathy and humour so noticeably absent from Comte’s writing. His 
Religion of Humanity, it irriglrt be said, gained in her the quality of humanity. 
(201)
This distinction between Eliot aird Comte’s understanding of humanity is extremely
important for an understanding of her ethics and aesthetics. Wright’s observation in
miiTored in a conrment by Helena Granluird, in The Paradox o f Self-Love: Christian
Elements in George Eliot’s Treatment o f Egoism. Granluird distinguishes between
Eliot’s view of humanity, and that of Feuerbach and Comte:
Although Eliot shares the antlri'opocentiic world view of Feuerbach and Comte, 
and although she recognises a potential for good aird altruism in human nature, 
her work does not convey the same optimism regarding human nature in general, 
nor do we find the species replacing the individual as the centre of interest in her 
work. Her emphasis on the individual can partly be attributed to her medium, the
Vogeler says that some studies have linked Eliot’s development to Comte, including Felicia Bonaparte, 
Will and Destiny: Morality and Tragedy in George E liot’s Novels (New York: New York University 
Press, 1975), Bernard J. Paris, Experiments in Life: George E lio t’s  Quest fo r  Values, and Michael Wolff, 
“Marian Evans to George Eliot: The Moral and Intellectual Foundations of Her Career,” Diss, Princeton 
University, 1958.
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subject of the novel being the development of individual chai'acter, but in my 
view, Eliot’s novels reflect a sense of the individual rather than the species or the 
community as the basis for moral development. In the complex relationship 
between the individual and his environment, it is the development of the 
individual that foims the primary factor in the evolution of society. Eliot’s 
meliorist hopes for humanity are founded on her sense of the individual’s 
potential for regeneration. Her meliorist views are balanced by her equal 
awar eness of the human liability to corruption and degeneration and the effect of 
such coiiTiption on social development. Thus the general impression of human 
natur e emerging from her work is one of mixed good and evil, quite different 
from the impressions conveyed by Comte and Feuerbach. (5)^ ^
Wright and Granlund ai*e right to suggest that it is Eliot’s attitude to humanity that
distinguishes her from all these writers. We have already seen that she has a more
sympathetic response to humans than Feuerbach does.
At tire end of section one of this chapter I suggested that there are two reasons
why critics have ignored the religious, sphitual, and theological themes, images and
motifs in Eliot’s fiction. The first was the cultural climate of literatui'e and theology
today, and the second was the tendency to read Eliot’s novels tlnough the lens of the
‘Religion of Humanity.’ In this section I have looked at Eliot’s relationship with Strauss,
Spmoza, Feuerbach, and Comte, hi each case I have argued that it is important to
recognise that there is a difference between the types of writing, i.e., between biblical
criticism, pliilosophy, and novels. Strauss, Spinoza, Feuerbach, and Comte are wiiting in
a theoretical and systematic way, and Eliot is writing novels. I am not suggesting that
Eliot was not influenced by these wiiters; each of them was a part of Marian Lewes’s
cultui'al and intellectual history and development in some ways. I am, however, arguing
that Eliot’s relationship with these thinkers is not the only way to view the religious and
Helena Granlund, The Paradox o f  Self-Love: Christian Elements in George Eliot’s Treatment o f Egoism 
(Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1994).
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theological in her novels.^^ Tlie two important differences aie her attitude to Clnistianity 
and her attitude to humankind. First, Eliot’s understanding of and relationship to 
Clnistianity is more subtle and nuanced tlian the more systematic challenges to 
traditional Clnistian belief offered by Strauss, Spinoza, Feuerbach, and Comte. None of 
these thinkers offer the only lens tlnough which to read the theological in her fiction. 
Critical assumption has been that the Religion of Humanity offers the only way to read 
religious motifs in Eliot’s work. Second, her understanding of the human being is 
radically different to that of these tliinkers. As Peter C. Hodgson says, Eliot is more 
concerned that we sympathise with other human beings, rather than idolise or worsliip 
them. In the next section I will look at some literary critics and theologians who have 
examined Eliot’s use of religious, spiritual, and theological themes in her fiction. Their 
methods are diverse, but each in some ways interprets Eliot’s relation to the Bible and/or 
Clnistianity. However, these are mostly thematic, and do not engage with Eliot’s aim of 
extending her reader’s sympathies.
Eliot criticism that has considered religion and theology on a thematic level 
There are a number of critical texts which deal with religious themes in Eliot’s novels, 
and they provide a useful foundation for my work. In tins section I look at the work of 
literary critics and theologians who argue that Eliot’s novels show the influence of the 
Bible and Clnistianity. I have chosen to divide tins into foui* sections. The first looks at 
Eliot’s use of biblical language in her fiction. The second looks at her use of motifs such
James Champion, in “George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda-. Imaginative Communion and the Critical 
Imperative,” says “the influence o f  Feuerbach and Auguste Comte on Eliot tends to get noticed; what she 
calls her ‘yearning affection towards the great religions o f the world’ does not” (281). See In Good
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as Chi'ist figures, themes and motifs drawn from spiritual autobiogi-aphy and Saints’ 
lives. I focus on the character of Dorothea in order to show the vaiiety of interpretations. 
The third looks at Eliot’s representation of different CMstian denominational groups 
within her novels. The fourth section focuses on Peter C. Hodgson and Mary Grey, two 
theologians who interpret Eliot’s novels.
Eliot and Biblical language
There are a number of literary critics who cite Eliot’s use of biblical language in her
fiction. Tliis takes two foiins; the argument that specific passages have biblical
overtones, and the argument that all of Eliot’s wi'itings are saturated with biblical
language. David Jasper, for example, in Sacred and Secular, says that “without the
Bible, George Eliot’s fiction would be inconceivable and incomprehensible” (86). He
interprets a specific passage in Middlemarch. Writing about Dorothea’s vision from her
window in chapter 80, after her lonely night of stmggle when she believes that Will
Ladislaw is in love witli Rosamond, Jasper points out that the language of Middlemarch:
refers in almost every single word to the Bible, claiming still the authority of its 
phrases and resonances. The image of the caring father, the ‘little child’, the help 
against stumbling (Psalm 91:12), the Pauline images of baptism, resonate in the 
reader who is thoroughly familiar with Old and New Testaments. (87)
Terry Wright, in ^Middlemarch as a Religious Novel, or Life Without God,” also
describes this passage as “full of Biblical resonance” (645). Robert Coles, m Irony in the
Mind’s Life: Essays on Novels by James Agee, Elizabeth Bowen, and George Eliot, says
Company: Essays in Honor o f  Robert Detweiler, Eds. David Jasper and Mark Ledbetter (Atlanta, Georgia: 
Scholars Press, 1994), 275-295.
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that language about Adam and Eve resonates thi'ougliout Middlemarch}^ Beryl Gray, in 
“Power and Persuasion: Voices of Influence in Romolaf speaks of George Eliot’s 
“familiarity with the King James Bible” (125)/^ These are nice obsei-vations, but they 
do not address the way in which religious motifs play a part in Eliot’s aesthetics and 
ethics.
Lisa Baltliazar in “The Critique of Anglican Biblical Scholarship in George 
Eliot’s Middlemarchf and Barry Qualls in “George Eliot and religion” talk more 
generally of Eliot’s use of the Bible in her writings.^^ Balthazar argues that Eliot’s early 
repudiation of supernatural religion in no way involved a repudiation of the Bible. Of 
Eliot, she writes:
All her writings -  fiction and non-fiction, conespondence and journals -  are 
replete with biblical references; many of which demonstrate Eliot’s high regard 
for the Bible as a principal, indeed iiTeplaceable, souice for ethical discussion.
I agiee with Balthazar that all of Eliot’s wi'itings aie replete with biblical references. But
the significance of these biblical references for her aestlietics and ethics has not been
explored fully. Balthazar does not articulate what she means by Eliot’s “high regal'd” for
the Bible as a principal source for ethical discussion. Religious and theological motifs
aie not just a source of ethical discussion, but are operative within Eliot’s aesthetics and
ethics, and form a bridge between them.
Robert Coles, Irony in the Mind's Life: Essays on Novels by James Agee, Elizabeth Bowen, and George 
Eliot (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1974).
Beryl Gray, “Power and Persuasion: Voices o f Influence in Romola f  From Author to Text: Re-Reading 
George Eliot's Romola, eds. Caroline Levine and Mark W. Turner (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 123-34. 
Marilyn Higuera’s article, “Prelude to a Vocation,” also pays attention to Eliot’s use o f  religious language, 
or words with religious connotations. Higuera traces the etymology o f  ardent fl om the Latin, ardere, to 
bum. She turns to the writings of St. Theresa and St, John of the Cross, to understand the ardent nature, 
the one who reaches beyond the self.
Lisa Balthazar, “The Critique o f Anglican Biblical Scholarship in George Eliot’s Middlemarch," 
Literature and Theology 15:1 (2001): 40-60, and Barry Qualls, “George Eliot and religion,” The 
Cambridge Companion to George Eliot, ed. George Levine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
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Barry Qualls, in “George Eliot and religion,” wi'ites:
Tellingly, the author who represented to her generation what the novel could 
accomplish did not write, did not thinlc, without the texts that she abandoned 
when she lost her faiüi, without the language of the Bible and the traditions that 
formed around it, without the histories of its texts that she transformed into 
contexts and structures for the lives of her char'acters. (119-120)
Clnistian motifs and tlie language of the Bible were translated into her fiction. But more
is at stake here. Eliot based her aestlietics on the Christian theological motifs of
incarnation, revelation, and transcendence. In order to demonstrate this, I will focus in
the next chapter on Eliot’s aesthetics, and do a textual analysis of Middlemarch and
Daniel Deronda in chapters five and six.
Eliot and Saints '  Lives and Spiritual Autobiography
In this section I review Eliot’s use of themes and motifs drawn from spiritual 
autobiography and Saints’ lives, focusing on Dorothea. Kerry McSweeney argues that 
there are two ways we can view Dorothea’s literary lineage. The first is to view her 
character “as a less exceptional character belonging to a less exalted lineage -  that of the 
heroines of many eighteenth- and nineteenth-century novels by women wiiters, 
including Jane Austen’s Emma Woodhouse and Fanny Price, and Chaiiotte Bronte’s 
Jane Eyre and Lucy Snowe” (98). The second is to associate Dorothea with “Protestant 
heroines,” including the Lady in Milton’s Comus and Richardson’s Clarissa. David 
CaiToll, in George Eliot and the Conflict o f Interpretations: A Reading o f the Novels, 
ai'gues that Dorothea Brooke’s career is “cast in the form of a saint’s life,” and says that 
she is compared to St Theresa, St Barbara, St Clara, St Catherine, and the Virgin Mary
2001), 119-137.
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(242).^  ^He argues tliat Eliot employs traditional elements associated from the life of a
saint, for example, the dark night of the soul, and the beatific vision, and recasts them in
nineteenth-century England. He makes the following comment:
This is where the life of the saint, that mytliic hypothesis with its language of 
torture, sacrifice, and martyrdom, engages most intimately with the Jane Austen- 
like gentilities of provincial life.
CaiToll concludes that the saint’s life is one of the myths or models of life that Eliot is
decentring in Middlemarch. There are certainly similarities between Dorothea and all
these other literary heroines mentioned by McSweeney. Within Middlemarch she is
certainly compared to saints and the Virgin Mother, but these motifs alone do not tell us
much about the role that Christian motifs play in Eliot’s aesthetics of sympathy.'*^
Katlileen Blake, in an essay entitled “George Eliot: the critical heritage,”
assesses Kathi'yn Bond Stockton’s God Between Their Lips: Desire Between Women in
Irigarary, Bronte, and EliotP Stockton examines female spirituality in Eliot’s fiction.
She offers a reading of the higlily charged scene between Dorothea and Rosamond in
chapter 81 of Middlemarch. Stockton reads this scene as exhibiting “the dynamics of
autoeroticism and/or of erotically charged interchange between women.” She argues that
in this climatic scene both Dorothea and Rosamond ai'e “engulfed by inwardness and by
the Other,” and links this spirituality to “ecstasy in the mode of St Theresa” (Blake,
214). This is sometliing of a peiverse reading of tlie scene between Dorothea and
Rosamond, and infrises the scene with erotic lesbian overtones. It is one of the more
David Caiïoll, George Eliot and the Conflict o f Interpretations: A Reading o f  the Novels (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992),
See also Judith Johnston, Middlemarch's Dorothea Brooke and Medieval Hagiography,” George Eliot 
Review 23 (1992): 40-45.
Kathleen Blake, “George Eliot: the critical heritage,” The Cambridge Companion to George Eliot, 202- 
225, and Kathryn Bond Stockton, God Between Their Lips: Desire Between Women in Irigaray, Brontë, 
and Eliot (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).
83
original readings of this passage, but ultimately I do not find it persuasive, since it does 
not accord with the narrative of Middlemarch and its presentation of the two women/^ I 
offer my own analysis of this passage and the religious motifs tliat I find operative in it, 
in chapter five.
Eliot and Dissent and Evangelicalism
This section explores Eliot’s sympathetic presentation of Dissent and Evangelicalism in 
her novels, Valentine Cuiniingham, in Eveiywhere Spoken Against: Dissent in the 
Victorian Novel, and Elisabeth Jay in The Religion o f the Heart: Anglican 
Evangelicalism and the Nineteenth-Centiiiy Novel, discuss Eliot’s relation to Dissent 
and Evangelicalism respectively."^  ^ Valentine Cunningham argues that Eliot “stands out 
as a writer who will treat Dissenters with enormous compassion and with a notable 
measure of fairness. The fact that hi the end she does not agi’ee with Clnistianity is an 
indication of just how gieat her opemiess is” (9). Indeed, he argues that: “No great 
English novelist has got closer than George Eliot to the heart of the Dissenting matter.” 
Elisabeth Jay, in The Religion o f the Heart, argues for Eliot’s “eminence as a novelist 
interested in religion” (69). She praises the “detailed fidelity and imaginative sympathy” 
with wliich Eliot portrayed Evangelicalism (209), and argues that Eliot does not portiay 
the crisis of faith in her fiction. She writes:
To a novelist like George Eliot, fascinated by the complex relation between the
individual and society, the evangelical spirit sei*ved to create characters with a
Ellen Argyi'os, in '‘Without Any Check o f Proud Resetye Sympathy and Its Limits in George E liot’s 
Novels, also suggests that there is a homosexual undercurrent in this scene between Rosamond and 
Dorothea (14).
Valentine Cunningham, Eveiywhere Spoken Against: Dissent in the Victorian Novel (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1975) and Elisabeth Jay, The Religion o f  the Heart: Anglican Evangelicalism and the 
Nineteenth-Centwy Novel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).
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clear sense of tlieir own identity and to thmw their conflict with society into 
more prominent relief. (7)
Eliot is indeed fascinated by the complex relation between tlie individual and society,
and I want to argue tliat she relies on the motif of incarnation in her analysis of this
relationship. Tncaination is a motif that mediates between the self and the world, and is
highly important for her analysis and understanding of the self’s understanding of its
relation to the world, and the way in which the self relates to the other."^ "^
Similarly, David Lodge, in the Introduction to Scenes o f Clerical Life, says that
“Janet’s Repentance” is:
a completely non-ironical account of a conversion from sinfulness to 
righteousness achieved tlnough the selfless endeavours of an Evangelical 
clergyman -  a representative, that is, of precisely the kind of Protestant 
Clnistianity against which Marian Evans had herself rebelled fourteen years 
before, and of winch she had written a withering critique little more than a year 
before in an article entitled ‘Evangelical Teaching: Dr Gumming’. (8).
Eliot is not only sympathetic to religious characters, altliough she undeniably was.
Something far more radical is going on in her work, and that is the use of Christian
theological motifs at the centie of her aesthetics of sympathy. Jay and Cunningliam offer
interesting analyses of Eliot’s representation of liistorical sub-groups within Christianity,
but their concern is not with the role that Christian motifs play Eliot’s aesthetics.
Eliot and theologians
In this section I look at the work of two theologians who have offered readings of Eliot’s 
fiction. It is interesting to note that these theologians have not responded to Eliot’s 
religious motifs either. Although Mary Grey and Peter C. Hodgson have different
There is a contemporary review o f  Adam Bede in Nonconformist, 19 (6 April, 1859), which also praises 
Eliot’s treatment o f Evangelicalism.
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theological agendas, both suggest that Eliot’s novels may be resom'ces which can aid
theological discussion. I have already quoted Hodgson’s argument that Eliot’s “ideas are
of considerable interest to tlieological efforts at rethinking the meaning and substance of
religious faith in our own time” (ix). He says that he “has found in George Eliot a
surprising resoince for reflecting on one of the most difficult questions: whether and
how it is possible to speak meaningfully of tlie presence and action of God (or of the
Divine Mystery) in the world today” (ix). He argues that Eliot was seeldng to move
tlnough and beyond evangelicalism and the religion of hmnanity toward something new,
and that she was moving towaids:
A tiutliful religion without accusation and consolation, a practical religion 
orientated to human feelings, needs and deeds, and a religion open to the idea of 
a sympathetic, suffering, (omni)present God. (13)
Hodgson’s work on Eliot’s relationship with Feuerbach, Strauss, Comte, and Spinoza is
helpful. Also, his argument that Eliot’s religious ideas were in a state of change is a
valid point. However, when he starts arguing that Eliot presents a “cosmotheandric”
theology, I depart fi'om him. I question whether it is valid to look at a literary author in
order to support one’s own theological agenda. He imposes on Eliot theological
language and ideas. A similar criticism can be made of Mary Grey’s reading of Eliot.
Mary Grey, in Redeeming the Dream: Feminism, Redemption and Christian
Tradition, also thinks that Eliot’s writings might help us with theological questions."^^
She says:
I use the writings of Mary Ann Evans frequently: she is one of the best examples 
of a theologically educated literary woman with insights into the importance of 
relationships which drew her to battle with the restiictive fiamework of society 
in which she lived. (188)
Mary Grey, Redeeming the Dream: Feminism, Redemption, and Christian Tradition (London; SPCK, 
1989).
I find Grey’s methodology quite confusing. It is not always easy to tell whether she is 
refening to George Eliot the author, the narrator of the novels, or Marian Lewes. Grey 
reads ‘George Eliot’s’ life and work thi'ough her feminist revisioning of the doctrine of 
atonement. Grey’s central thesis is that redemption today works thiough the restoration 
of broken relationships, and “building right relation” (x and 10). She argues that 
“relating is at the heart of what is redemptive,” and that “right relation is at the heart of 
the redemptive process” (31). She draws on the work of women novelists (those with a 
spiritual vision) because she thinks that tins is an alternative to the lack of published 
theological writmg by women. (Grey argues that in societies wliich prevented women 
from access to fomial theological education, even when women managed to educate 
themselves informally, they had little chance of publishing their work. She 
acknowledges that not much had remained of women’s theological wiiting -  and what 
we have has been usually edited by the wiiter’s confessor or spiritual director.) 
However, to my knowledge. Grey does not address or raise the question of what is the 
coiTect approach for this interdisciplinary study. This issue raises a number of questions 
about the quotation above. Certainly Mary Ami Evans/Marian Lewes was a 
theologically-aware woman, who had insiglits about the importance of relationslnps, I 
am not suie, though, about the connection between these and the “battle with the 
restrictive framework of society in which she lived.” Did she battle as a woman? A 
feminist? A theologian? A novelist? And what, exactly, is the natm*e of the battle? We 
saw in section one of this chapter that Eliot’s relation to feminism is far from 
straightfoiwai'd. Both her novels and her life have been closely scmtinised. Feminist 
literary critics have sometimes chastised her for not going far enough. During her
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lifetime she held her peace on the ‘Woman Question.’ Barbara Bodichon and Bessie 
Rayner Parkes both were more radical than she. Tlirougliout her life there was a tension 
between rebellion and conformity, and radicalism and conseiTatism. We see tins in her 
relation to her father and chui'ch, and her relationship with Lewes. Eliot did rebel against 
chm'ch, but then continued attending with her fatlier, she was antagonistic towards 
Clnistianity, but her attitudes later softened. Eliot lived with the already-married Lewes, 
but considered their relationship to be a marriage. She was Icnown as Mi's. Lewes, and 
they would have made their relationship legal, were it a possibility. In order to fit Eliot 
into her theological framework, Grey overlooks a number of major literary critical 
issues.
In this section I have looked at a number of ways in which literary critics and 
theologians have interpreted religious, sphitual, and theological themes, images, and 
motifs in Eliot’s fiction. We have seen that Eliot retamed a high regard for the Bible, 
and its language infused her fiction. I have shown how some literary critics see Eliot as 
subverting or recontextualising a number of religious motifs including aspects of 
spiritual autobiography and saints’ lives. I have looked at Eliot’s relation to 
Evangelicalism and Dissent. I then looked at how two theologians have looked at her 
work. These different critical methods go some way to showing that the Religion of 
Humanity is not the only way to read Eliot’s fiction.
In this chapter I have reviewed critical material on tln*ee areas of Eliot 
scholarship: criticism that ignores religious and theological themes, criticism that looks 
at Eliot’s relationship with Strauss, Spinoza, Feuerbach, and Comte, and criticism that 
looks at religious and theological ideas on a thematic level. None of these have provided
an interdisciplinary approach that enables us to look at die role that the theological 
motifs of incarnation, revelation, and transcendence play in Eliot’s aesthetics and ethics. 
Before looking at how Bakhtin can help us here, in the next chapter I look at Eliot’s 
aesthetics in more detail.
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This chapter explores the relationship between Eliot’s aesthetics and ethics. I have 
suggested so fai' that there is a need for better critical appreciation of the interaction of 
aesthetics and ethics in Eliot’s work, and especially of what is entailed in her 
understanding of sympathy. In this chapter I will demonsti'ate that Eliot had a very 
specific aesthetic aim -  that of extending her reader’s sympathy, and that this aesthetic 
aim is one that has an etliical dimension. As I mentioned in the introduction, Eliot 
herself does not use the terms ‘ethics’ or ‘ethical’ in relation to her aesthetics of 
sympathy, but the way in which she suggests that reading can improve tlie way you 
relate to your neighbour is inherently ethical. Eliot intended the reading of her novels to 
produce an effect in her readers beyond the act of reading itself. She intended her 
readers to be changed as a result of reading her novels in two ways: they would have a 
better understanding of themselves, and a better imderstanding of the other. Central to 
Eliot’s moral and ethical vision is the presupposition that all human beings are egoists. 
Her aesthetics of sympathy is directed towards the ann of moving her reader beyond 
egoism towards altmism. Due to om* egoism, we have a limited perspective on the 
world, and pail of Eliot’s aesthetic aim is to help us perceive new things. In brief, Eliot’s 
aesthetic of sympathy is aimed at achieving a change in her readers that will improve the 
way they treat other people. Any sepaiation between aesthetics and ethics is therefore 
problematic when we read Eliot, because her aesthetics have a definite ethical 
dimension. It is therefore necessary to find ways of expressing her aesthetic aim without 
being either critically naïve, or neglecting her ethical aims.
90
In this chapter I will argue that the ethics of Eliot’s art is to change her readers 
for the better. Her aim is for her reader to have a better understanding of hmi or herself, 
and his or her relation to the world, and his or her relation to the other. There is plenty of 
evidence that this is Eliot’s ethics of art; it can be found in her letters, reviews, and 
fiction. Some literary critics would argue that this evidence is not relevant because they 
consider the author’s life and views of her work to be extraneous to literary criticism. 
Other critics, however, refute this view, and enable us to take into consideration this 
important evidence. In section one of this chapter I will discuss tlie way in which ethical 
literary criticism, as expounded by Martha Nussbaum et al, enables us to refiite the New 
Critical position that it is inappropriate to examine the relationship between works of 
fiction and etliical questions. In section two I will examine in detail Eliot’s own 
comments about her art, and begin to address how exactly Eliot aims to extend her 
reader’s sympathies, avoiding didacticism and preaching. I argue that we can understand 
how Eliot’s fiction changes her readers without being didactic by looking at the 
theological motifs of incarnation, revelation, and transcendence. Nussbaum’s 
understanding of the ethical power of fiction does not explain how this works in Eliot; 
for this, we need to turn to the early philosopliical writings of Baklitin.
hi section tluee I explore the history of Eliot criticism in relation to her ethics of 
art. I consider how Eliot came to be perceived as an overt moraliser shortly after her 
death, and how developments in literary criticism have challenged this perception. There 
has been a tendency in Eliot criticism to overemphasise either aesthetics or ethics at the 
expense of tlie otlier. The responsible reader of Eliot should attempt to avoid two 
pitfalls: the first is paying excessive attention to what goes on in the text and paying no
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attention to any extra-textual dimension; the second is paying excessive attention to the
moral dimension of a literary work and avoiding a close reading of the text. The danger
in focusing only on what is within the text and ignoring the wider ethical issues, is that
this ignores Eliot’s stated aim. To say that texts only refer to other texts, and not to life
itself, clearly does not accord with Eliot’s aesthetics aims. This problem is not unique to
Eliot scholarship; the relationship between aestlietics and etliics is a complex one in
literary critical and theoretical circles.
Aesthetics and ethics were divorced in New Criticism, an Anglo-American
critical movement of the middle decades of the twentieth century, wliich focused on
‘close reading’ of literary texts.  ^New Criticism focused on the words on the page, and
did not use any further source of information to arrive at an interpretation of a text. For
example, what literary critics knew about the author’s beliefs, background, or intentions,
would not be brought to bear upon tlie interpretation, Andrew Bennett and Nicholas
Royle, in Aft Introduction to Literature, Criticism, and Theory: Key Critical Concepts,
offer this definition of New Criticism:
New criticism involved a way of reading that emphasized form -  tlie importance 
of considering ‘the words on the page’ -  rather than factors such as the life of the 
author and his or her intentions, or the historical and ideological context in which
’ Rick Rylance, in “The New Criticism,” Identifies New Criticism as an American movement o f  the 
twentieth century. He traces its origins to a gi oup o f  theorists fiom Vanderbilt University, including John 
Crowe Ransom, Allen Tate, and Robert Penn Wairen. The name o f their method was ‘close-reading’ (or 
in Britain ‘practical criticism’). Seminal New Critical texts include Cleanth Brooks, The Well Wrought 
Urn: Studies in the Structure o f  Poetiy (London: Methuen, 1947), John Crowe Ransom, The New  
Criticism (Norfolk, CT.: New Directions, 1941), and I. A. Richards, Practical Criticism: A Study o f  
Literaty Judgement (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1929). See “The New Criticism,” Encyclopedia o f  
Literature and Criticism, Eds. Martin Coyle, Peter Garside, Malcolm Kelsall, and John Peck (London; 
Routledge, 1990).
In addition, see the chapter entitled “New Criticism, moral formalism and F. R. Leavis,” in A R eader’s 
Guide to Contemporaiy Literaiy Theoiy, eds. Raman Selden and Peter Widdowson (London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1993), 10-26.
Martha Nussbaum, in Love's Knowledge, says that New Critical foimalism divorces aesthetics from 
ethical and practical issues.
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the text was produced. New critics considered that such questions, wliile no 
doubt interesting, were irrelevant to a consideration of the text itself: they 
thought of literary texts as ‘autonomous’, as self-sufficient and self-contained 
unities, as aesthetic objects made of words. CoiTespondingly, new critics argued 
that to ti*y to take account of die reactions or responses of readers in the context 
of, for example, a poem, was to introduce an alien and fundamentally extraneous 
factor. They even invented a term for what they saw as the ‘error’ involved in 
talking about a reader’s response in discussions of literaiy texts: they called it the 
‘affective fallacy’. For new critics, then, what was important was to pay 
scrupulous attention to tlie words of texts themselves, and to go beyond the 
subjective impressionism of the reader’s response. (11)^
This quotation identifies a number of new critical concerns, including the emphasis on
the words on the page, the argument that the author’s life is inelevant to the text itself,
and the fact that the reader’s reaction should not be taken into account when forming an
interpretation.
A New Critical reading of Eliot’s novels would discuss the form or structure of 
her novels, as opposed to reading them in light of what Eliot herself said about 
aesthetics elsewhere, or her religious preferences, or her historical and cultui al situation. 
Thus, New Criticism would not look at Eliot’s letters, journals, or essays, in inteipreting 
her fiction, and would warn of the dangers of considering the author’s intention when 
attempting to arrive at an inteipretation of one of their literary texts. New Criticism says 
that using what the autlior said elsewhere, Le., other tlian in the work itself, would be to 
fall into the ‘intentional’ fallacy. W. K. Wimsatt Jr. and Momoe. C. Beardsley published 
the influential essay, “The Intentional Fallacy” (1946) in Sewanee Review. A related 
essay, “The Affective Fallacy,” argued that you could not take into account the way in 
which a reader might be affected by the literary work in foimiiig an inteipretation of that
 ^Andrew Bennett and Nicholas Royle, Aîi Introduction to Literature, Criticism and Theory: K ey Critical 
Concepts (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1995).
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literary work/ Such a reading would deny the possibility of Eliot having an effect on her
readers beyond the act of reading. However, as I will show in my discussions of
Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda, it is the veiy foiin of the novels, as well as what we
learn from her essays, reviews, and letters, which suggests that we need to take Eliot’s
stated aesthetic aim seriously. New Criticism would not allow for Eliot’s stated aim to
be taken into account in interpretations of her texts. However, developments in literary
tlieory have challenged many of the assiunptions and practices of New Criticism. I am
now going to look at how developments in etliical literary theory in particular have
challenged Üiese assumptions and practices. I shall focus on the work of Martha
Nussbaum, as a representative of ethical literary theoiy. Ethical literary theory is an
approach to literatuie that is concerned with the role that narrative fiction can play in the
moral life of the reader.
Martlia Nussbaum, in Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature,
writes that after New Criticism:
It was assumed tliat any work that attempts to ask of a literary text questions 
about how we might live, treating the work as addressed to the reader’s practical 
interests and needs, and as being in some sense about our lives, must be 
hopelessly naïve, reactionary, and insensitive to the complexities of literary form 
and intertextual referentiality. (21)*
In this quotation we can see Üiat the result of New Criticism was that any approach to
texts that implied or suggested that they might be ‘about life’ was naïve and reactionary.
 ^“The intentional fallacy” (1946) and “The affective fallacy” (1949) are included in Twentieth Century 
Literaiy Criticism: A Reader, ed. David Lodge (London: Longman, 1972), 334-345 and 345-358.
See “Introduction: Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature,” Love’s Knowledge, 21-2. All the 
subsequent quotations in this paragr aph are from these pages.
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Implicit in New Criticism was the idea that only this fonn of criticism could properly 
interpret a text. However, as we shall see in this chapter, Eliot did see that nanative 
fiction could be addressed to the reader’s needs and interests, that what we read does 
have an effect on our* lives. Eliot deliberately structured Middlemarch and Daniel 
Deronda to achieve these ends, as we shall see in chapters five and six. To say that 
Eliot’s texts are addressed to the reader, that they are in some sense about our lives, is 
not hopelessly naïve, or reactionary, or insensitive to the complexities of literary form. 
Indeed, it is the sensitivity to the complexity of Eliot’s novels that prevents us from 
interpreting the texts in a naïve manner. Nussbaum’s own work, and that of a number of 
other scholars interested in the intersection between literatiue and ethical theory, has 
begun to challenge the assumption that it is naïve or inappropriate to turn to literature 
for help in answering ethical questions. Nussbaum does not wish to do so by avoiding 
literary complexity and intertextual referentiality. Hiis relates to the secorrd pitfall tliat 
the reader should attempt to avoid; in the past Eliot’s ‘ethics’ have been divorced from 
her ‘aesthetics.’ In other words, critics have tried to ‘extract’ the moral of her work, and 
in doing so have neglected the complexities of her texts.
This second pitfall involved in divorcing Eliot’s ethics and aesthetics is drawing 
the conclusion that she had really specific aims and was trying to cultivate set doctrines. 
Eliot herself was critical of authors who were expressly didactic, and wanted to avoid 
this in her own work. Insufficient textual analysis led her to be perceived as an overt 
moraliser after her death. There is a fine line to tread between saying that Eliot’s texts 
have sometliing to say about our' lives, and saying tliat the novels contain maxims by 
which we should live. Equally, there is a fine line to tread between close textual
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analysis, and Üie idea that the text has no referent beyond itself. Nussbaum 
aclcnowledges that in the past some literary discour se was “insufficiently sensitive to the 
ways in which a literary text as a whole hangs together, both with itself and with other 
texts, to die play of metaphor and allusion, the self-conscious patterning of language” 
(21). She also says that some more recent practitioners of etliical criticism have tried to 
“force the text into a narrow moral straitjacket, neglecting other ways in which it speaks 
to its reader, neglecting, too, its formal complexities” (21). Nussbaum wishes to avoid 
“excessively simple theories about ‘the’ moral role of literature” (21), and any views 
that ti'y to conceal literary complexities. She argues that “literary work of recent years 
has done an enormous amount to make readers more precisely and firmly aware of 
subtleties of literary structure and intertextual reference” (22). The concerns that 
Nussbaum has are directly relevant to interpretations of Eliot. As I have already 
emphasised, Eliot’s novels are complex texts that require a great sensitivity, and it is 
impoifant not to conceal the complexities.
Nussbaum’s work poses a number of challenges to the student of literatur'e, as 
well as to the reader of Eliot’s novels. She talks of the strange ‘absence of the etliical’ in 
literary theory. She has noted that literary theory has lost the sense that “we are social 
beings puzzling out, in times of great moral difficulty, what might be, for us, the best 
way to live.” She says that literature has always been concerned with this question, but 
that recent literary theory has lost sight of this. Her work is important for literary studies 
in that it asks how the reading and study of novels can help us in our ethical life. In the 
essay “Perceptive Equilibrium: Literary Theory and Ethical Theory,” Nussbaum talks 
about the desire for “wi'itmg about literature that talks of human lives and choices as if
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they matter to us all” (171). She looks to “a future in which literary theory [., .] will join 
with ethical theory in pursuit of the question, ‘how should one live?’” Nussbaum sees 
that literary texts pose these questions, but that literary theory and criticism has not risen 
to the challenge. We cannot go back to the innocence of New Criticism, and simply 
ignore that the text refers beyond itself. As I have already stressed, Üiis type of reading 
is insufficiently nuanced for a reading of Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda. Nor can we 
pretend that the challenges posed by deconstnxction and reader response criticism do not 
exist. I will now look at how Nussbaum argues that ethical criticism has become more 
sophisticated.
Nussbaum argues that the best ethical criticism, instead of “insisting that all
literature must play some single, simple role in human life,” instead “has insisted on the
complexity and variety revealed to us in literature, appealing to that complexity to cast
doubt on reductive theories.” She argues:
It is, in fact, criticism that focuses exclusively on textual form to the exclusion of 
human content that appears to be unduly nanow. For it appears to talce no 
account of the urgency of our engagements with works of literature, the intimacy 
of the relationships we form, the way in which we do, like David Copperfield, 
read “as if for life,” bringing to the texts our hopes, fears, and confusions, and 
allowing the text to impart a certain stnicture to our heaits. (22)
So again, an approach that neglects the reader’s engagement with the text would be
inappropriate for Eliot’s novels. As I aim to show in the rest of this chapter, Eliot
believed that our engagement with her fiction would have an effect on oui* life. I want to
articulate the nature of our engagement with Eliot’s novels, and the way that Eliot’s
aesthetics encourage us to be aware of the importance of theological motifs and to
respond to them. In my discussion of Eliot’s aesthetics I will show that she takes great
pains to avoid any “reductive theories” and her endeavoui* is to move us away from any
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tendencies we have to make generalised ethical judgements. Eliot wants us to 
sympathise with individuals, and to understand the particular circumstances and 
situations they face.
Nussbaum is critical of New Criticism’s argument that it is inappropriate to ask 
ethical questions of literature. She suggests that the novel can be a foim of ethical 
Icnowledge through its emphasis on individuals and the complex situations that they 
face. Nussbaum argues that the novel helps us focus on individuals, emphasises 
contextualisation, and does not encourage us to overlook complexity. In the discussion 
of Eliot’s relation to Stiauss, Spinoza, Feuerbach, and Comte we saw that one of the 
important distinctions to be drawn in comparisons of her work and theirs is that novels 
allowed Eliot to focus more attention and respect on the individual than their more 
systematic thinking allowed. I will now focus on some of Nussbaum’s arguments and 
descriptions of the way in which the novel can not only explore ethical questions 
thematically, but also, how, as a genre, the form of the novel can encourage the reader to 
pay attention to particulars and complexities. I include in this section a number of critics 
who agree with Nussbaum, including the novelist and philosopher Iris Murdoch.
hr the Preface to Love's Knowledge Nussbaum ar gues that novels give “a certain 
type of priority to the perception of particular people and situations, rather Üran to 
abstract rules” Qx). She says that “stories cultivate our' ability to see and care for 
particulars, not as representatives of a law, but as what they themselves are.” This is 
similar to Eliot’s aesthetic aim, as we will see below. Eliot adheres to the idea that we 
are affected by what we read, and wants to change her readers in quite explicit and 
specific ways. In an essay entitled “Transcending Humanity” Nussbaum says that: “The
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novel as geni e is committed, in its very structmes and in the stmctures of its relationship 
with its reader, to tlie pui'suit of tlie uncertainties and vulnerabilities, the particularity 
and the emotional riclmess, of the human form of life” (390). She says that novels 
“speak to the reader as a human being, they immerse them in the characteristic 
movements of human time and the adventures of human finitude -  in a form of life in 
which it is natural to love particular people and to have concern for the concrete events 
that happen to them” (391). In “Introduction: Form and Content, Literatuie and 
Philosophy,” Nussbaum argues that the novel allows for a “much finer responsiveness to 
the concrete” (37) and is “more complex, more allusive, more attentive to particulars.”  ^
We will see in our discussion of Eliot how closely her novels fit some of Nussbaum’s 
descriptions. Eliot wants to make her reader responsive, and keeps a persistent emphasis 
on “concrete” and “particular” people and situations. I argue that it is through having her 
reader pay attention to pai'ticulars and complexities that Eliot achieves her aesthetic aim 
of extending her reader’s sympathies. Also I argue that theological motifs play a large
 ^This view is not unique to Nussbaum, but she is one o f its most aiticulate proponents. See also 
Renegotiating Ethics in Literature, Philosophy, and Theoiy, eds. Jane Adamson, Richard Freadman and 
David Parker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), and David Parker, Ethics, Theoiy and the 
Novel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). David Parker in “Introduction: the turn to ethics 
in the 1990s,” writes that: “literature is rightly esteemed as a highly paiticularised, complex and richly 
contextualised mode o f ethical reflection [ . . . ]  it is able to ponder moral questions in ways unavailable to 
conventional philosophical discourse” (Renegotiating Ethics, 12). In the same essay, Parker says that 
further work is being done by Charles Altieri, Wayne Booth, Stanley Cavell, Cora Diamond, Richard 
Eldridge, Mmray Krieger, Alasdair MacIntyre, Frederick Olafson, Richard Rorty, Paul Seabright, Tobin 
Siebers, and Leona Toker. In addition, the following journal editions are devoted to the topic of ethical 
criticism: Ethics 103 and Ethics 110. The main drive for this type of criticism has so far come from 
philosophers.
J. Hillis Miller, in The Ethics o f  Reading, writes; “Without storytelling there is no theory o f ethics.
Nan atives, examples, stories [ . . . ]  are indispensable to thinking about ethics. An understanding o f ethics 
as a region o f philosophical or conceptual investigation depends, perhaps unsurprisingly, on mastery o f  
the ability to interpret written stories, that is, on a land o f mastery usually thought to be the province o f  
the literary critic. If this is true it has important implications [ . . . ]  for my claim that the rhetorical study of 
literature has cmcial practical implications for our moral, social and political lives.” See Miller, The 
Ethics o f Reading: Kant, de Man, Eliot, Trollope, James, and Benjamin (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1987), 3. This passage is also quoted in Pauline Nestor, George Eliot (London: Palgrave, 2002), 8.
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part in the particulars and complexities. In our discussion of The Mill on the Floss we 
will see that Eliot commends casuistical tliinking. Eliot’s characters and readers learn to 
love and cai'e for particular people and events that happen to them. The role that 
religious motifs play in this process has been overlooked by Eliot scholars.
Iris Murdoch is another novelist and philosopher who has commented on the 
way in which novels portray complex dilemmas of characters, and the way in which, 
sti'ucturally, novels help us to think ethically, his Murdoch contrasts the ‘abstract’ 
nature of philosophical wilting to the ‘messiness’ of novels in which all kinds of people 
live, in all kinds of ways. She wi'ites: “The traditional novel is a place where people live 
in all kinds of different ways, where different kinds of characters meet, where it’s the 
deep aspects of human life that are being spoken of and not an abstract theory.” Writing 
a novel, says Muidoch, “involves being plunged into all the details of a human life.”  ^
Similarly, the reader of novels is plunged into the details of paiticular lives and 
situations. Josepliine Donovan, in Women and the Rise o f the Novel, 1405-1726, 
summarises Muidoch’s argument in The Sovereignty} o f Good, that a gi eat novel teaches 
one to attend to the particulars of one’s envhonment.^ Donovan argues that Murdoch 
derives this notion of attention from Simone Weil’s concept of “attentive love.” 
Murdoch, says Donovan, argues that novelists can make us aware that the other is a 
being with “needs and wishes” of her own, and this awareness makes it harder to treat
® s. B. Sagare, “An Interview with Iris Murdoch,” Modern Fiction Studies 47.3 (Fall 2001): 696-714.
 ^Josephine Donovan, Women and the Rise o f  the Novel, 1405-1726, and Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty) o f  
Good  (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970).
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the other person as a thing. Donovan summarises Murdoch’s argument in Metaphysics
as a Guide to Morals:
The imagination that is exercised in both writing and reading a novel is thus “a 
moral discipline” that makes us aware of others’ situations, their suffering, and 
their coping. Such awareness should induce not only ethical compassion or 
sympathy; it may also “help people not to become embittered or brutalised or 
stupefied by affliction.”^
Eliot, I will argue, aims to induce sympathy in her readers, for her characters, and for
those the reader encounters once the act of reading is over. It is significant here, as
elsewhere in Murdoch’s wiitings, that it is not just the wilting of novels that is an ethical
act; reading and criticising novels is also a mode of etliical reflection.*^
Nussbaum argues that the act of reading can have an effect on the reader.
However, her understanding of the ethical power of fiction does not explain how this
process works. The notion of transcendence is essential to a coherent understanding of
how a reader can be changed by his or her reading of a literary text. In the introduction I
suggested that Clnistian theology might provide a more adequate discourse to appreciate
Eliot’s aesthetic aim than cuirent literary theory. In tuin, the concept of transcendence
cannot fiilly be understood without reference to other elements of Christian doctrine,
particularly the concept of the incarnation and the nature and purpose of revelation. I
argue that the religious motifs of incarnation, revelation, and transcendence are the
bridge between Eliot’s aesthetics and ethics, and I will focus on this in my discussion of
® Murdoch, Sovereignty, 66.
 ^See Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (London: Chatto & Windus, 1992), 322, and 
Donovan, Women and the Rise o f  the Novel, 8.
Simon Haines, in “Deepening the Self: The language o f ethics and the language o f  literature” 
(Renegotiating Ethics), says that Murdoch talks about literature and moral thought, and that reading, 
taking seriously, and criticising literature is a mode o f  ethical reflection (30).
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Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda in chapters five and six. Balditin provides us with the 
critical discourse to read Eliot’s aesthetics and ethics, and I will examine his work in the 
next chapter.
In the rest of this chapter I will examine Eliot’s own comments about aesthetics, 
as they are found in her essays, letters, and fiction. I will concentrate on a number of 
aspects of her aesthetics, including writing about non-idealised characters and 
expressions against overt moralising or didacticism, and trace them through her essays, 
letters, and fiction. There is substantial primary material that shows that Eliot had 
specific and definite aesthetic aims, there is critical consensus that Eliot’s early critical 
comments and review essays match with her aesthetics, and there is internal evidence 
within the novels. Following on fiom tliis discussion, I offer a brief history of Eliot 
scholarship as it relates to Eliot’s role as a teacher and moralist. Here we see the 
problems that occui" when her ethics and aesthetics are separated. I include critical 
responses to Eliot’s aesthetics amongst critics of her day, and amongst literary critics 
today. I include a discussion of how, in the years immediately after her death, Eliot 
came to be perceived as an overt moraliser, and look at various ways to account for this 
phenomenon. Whatever its causes, this perception lead to a generally negative view in 
critical opinion about Eliot, which was only reversed as a result of post-Second World 
War literary criticism. None of the scholars discussed in section two discuss the role that 
religious motifs play in Eliot’s aesthetics and ethics, and in chapter four I turn to 
Baklitin to help us articulate this.
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Eliot and aesthetics
In this section I explore Eliot’s own comments about aesthetics. There is a consensus
amongst literaiy critics that Eliot had developed her aesthetic thinldng before beginning
to write fiction herself. Neil Roberts, in George Eliot: Her Beliefs and Her Art, argues
that by the time Eliot came to write fiction she already had set ideas about the nature of
art and the role of the artist. He writes about her “clear and distinct views of the role of
the ariist and the nature and purpose of art” (15). W. J. Har vey, in The Art o f George
Eliot, says that Eliot “had fully worked out her basic aesthetic principles” before
beginning to write (36).** Similarly, Richard Stang, in The Theory o f the Novel in
England, 1850-1870, writes:
Among all the Victorian novelists, George Eliot was perhaps unique in that she 
formulated her ideas about life and art before she started to write her first novel. 
In the essays she wrote for the London periodicals fiom 1851-8, especially the 
reviews of belles-lettres for the Westminster Review fiom 1855-7, almost all her 
ideas about art are stated explicitly, and together with her letters, they furnish an 
invaluable source from which her creed as a novelist may be derived. (40)*^
hr this section I will focus on these essays, reviews, and letters. As Nancy Henry says, in
George Eliot and the British Empire, these letters are “relevant intertextual material for
the illumination of her fiction” (114).*  ^Thomas Noble, in the “Introduction” to Scenes
o f Clerical Life, argues that Eliot “had thought long and carefirlly about the aims and
methods of novelists, and thus when she came to write fiction herself she had a very
‘ ’ W. J. Harvey, Tiie Art o f  George Eliot (London: Chatto & Windus, 1961).
Richard Stang, The Theory o f  the Novel in England, J850-1870 (London; Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1959).
Nancy Henry, George Eliot and the British Empire (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2002).
103
clear idea of what she wanted to accomplish” (vn‘).*'* I agree with these literary critics, 
and in the following sections I aim to show that the views expressed in her review 
essays find expression, not only in Eliot’s letters about her own fiction, but also in the 
fiction itself. I have subdivided this section into tlu'ee. The first looks at Eliot’s review 
essays, the second at her letters, and the third looks at comments on aesthetics that are 
found in her early fiction. I focus on her reviews of Charles Kingsley’s Westward Ho! 
and Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister, and the essay “The Natural History of German Life.” In 
the second subsection I explore letters that Marian Lewes wrote to her publisher John 
Blaclcwood, the Conitist Frederic Harrison, and to two fiiends, namely Charles Bray and 
Mrs. Peter Alfied Taylor. The third subsection explores the ideas about aesthetics that 
are contained within Eliot’s early fiction, with specific reference to “Amos Barton,” 
Adam Bede, and The Mill on the Floss. It becomes apparent that in order to increase our 
sympathy for the other, Eliot commends sympathy for non-idealised characters, and 
emphasises avoiding reductive tendencies.
E liot’s review essays
Marian Evans moved to London in 1851, and was editor of the Westminster Review until 
1854. She continued to write articles until 1857.*  ^ During these years Evans honed her
“Introduction,” Scenes o f  Clerical Life, ed. Thomas A. Noble (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
All subsequent references are to this introduction, not to the intioduction in the Claredondon edition o f  
Scenes.
In January 1857 Eliot’s \2iSX Belles Lettres section for the Westminster Review was published, together 
with “Worldliness and Other-Worldliness: The Poet Young.” At the same time, Scenes o f  Clerical Life 
began serialisation in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, In 1858 Eliot declined Bessie Rayner Parkes’s 
invitation to write for the English Woman’s Journal, and she also resisted Dickens’s invitation to publish 
in All Year Round. Subsequently, journal articles were only published in journals o f which Lewes was the 
editor. For example, Eliot published articles in the Pall Mall Gazette (March-May 1865), and the 
Fortnightly Review  (15 May 1865). The exception to this is “Address to Working Men, by Felix Holt,”
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writing skills and employed her talents to support herself financially/^ As Thomas
Noble writes in the “Inti oduction” to Scenes o f Clerical Life, Eliot began to write fiction
“with a great deal of experience as a literary critic behind her” (yii). This literary
criticism is the genesis of her own aesthetics. Tluee principles of Eliot’s aesthetics
emerge fi'om these reviews: the artist is a teacher; Art does not have to be about ideal
chaiacters, and Ai*t should not be didactic. It is important to hold the tension between
Eliot’s desire that ait can teach, and that it should not be didactic. This has been a source
of disagi'eenient in Eliot scholai’ship fiom her contemporaries onwards.
Eliot’s review of Charles Kingsley’s Westward Hoi appeared in the Westminster
Review in July 1855.*  ^ In tliis review Eliot complains that Kingsley makes his moral
point too clear. We read:
Habit has made [Kingsley] superlatively a preacher: he drops into the homily as 
readily as if he had been ‘to the manner born;’ and while by his artistic faculty he 
can transplant you into whatever scene he will, he can never trust to the 
impression that scene itself will make on you, but, tiue to his cloth, must always 
‘improve the occasion’. (126)
Eliot criticises Kingsley for underlining the moral a scene should contain, instead of
letting the scene speak for itself. (As we will see in section two of this chapter, Eliot
herself has been criticised for this.) She continues with a mixture of approbation and
criticism:
[Kingsley] sees, feels, and paints vividly, but he theorizes illogically and 
moralizes absurdly. If he would confine himself to his tiue sphere, he might be a 
teacher in the sense in wliich every gieat artist is a teacher -  namely, by giving 
us liis higher sensibility as a medium, a delicate acoustic or optical instiument.
which appeared in Blackwood’s in January 1868. For these details and more, see the entry for “journalist, 
George Eliot as” in the Oxford Companion to George Eliot, 180-81.
See Gordon S. Haight, George Eliot and John Chapman (Hamden, CT.: Archon, 1969), for further 
details o f this time.
This review is included in Essays o f  George Eliot, 123-136.
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bringing home to oui' coai'ser senses what would otherwise be unperceived by us. 
(126)
Eliot argues that the artist can and should be a teacher, not by overt moralising, but
rather by helping us perceive new things. An important principle of Eliot’s aesthetics
emerges from tliis quotation, namely, tliat the role of the artist and the role of the teacher
are closely connected. The artist is a teacher precisely because he or she can help us
perceive new things, and not simply because he or she points out moral issues. Beryl
Gray, in George Eliot and Music, proceeds from Eliot’s review of Kingsley, and her
argument that a “gi'eat artist teaches by giving us his higher sensibility as a medium, a
delicate acoustic or optical instmment, bringing home to our coarser senses what would
otherwise be unperceived by us,” and formulates the following thesis: George Eliot’s
“auditory imagination (and therefore her demand on the reader’s auditory imagination)
was at least as vital to her as her visual imagination.” Gray writes:
[T]he extent to which sound permeates and animates the novels has failed to 
permeate our understanding of diem, and we have remained therefore partly deaf 
to that which George Eliot would have her own ai't ‘teach’. For the ability to 
listen -  to be stirred by the tones and modulations of the human voice, and to 
discern and respond to all forms of natur al and humanly wrought harmony -  
invariably symbolises George Eliot's most cherished moral virtue: the capacity 
for human sympathy, (x)*®
We will see in Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda how Eliot’s narrators’ use of visual
and aural metaphors helps us perceive new things. I will concentrate specifically on how
Eliot helps us perceive new things visually. The principle that the artist can teach us new
things is also stated clearly in “The Natural History of German Life,” to which I shall
Beryl Gray, George Eliot and Music (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989). There are a number o f  critical 
studies looking at Eliot and music. See also Alison Byerly, ““The Language o f the Soul": George Eliot 
and Music,” Nineteenth-Century Litei'aiure 44.1 (1989): 1-17; Shirley Frank Levenson, “The Use o f
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turn shortly. Eliot’s review of Kingsley continues with an analysis of his delineation of 
character, or character types. Eliot dislikes Kingsley’s tendency to “hold up certain 
persons as models” (129). She complains that they are too “exemplary” for the reader to 
like, and that Kingsley makes them “texts” to “preach from” (129). She says that 
Kingsley’s “parsonic habit” prevents him fiom creating truly human characters (129).*  ^
A second principle of Eliot’s aesthetics that emerges fiom this review is that art 
does not always have to deal with exemplary characters. She says “human beings, 
himian parties and himian deeds are made up of the most subtly intermixed good and 
evil” (130). We shall see Eliot’s concern for human character in “Amos Barton” and 
Adam Bede. A third principle is that overt tlieorising is neither recommended nor 
desirable. Richard Stang, in The Theory o f the Novel in England, 1850-1870, writes: 
“Rumiing tlu'ough all her reviews is a continual condenmation of didacticism and the 
moral exhortations of her contemporaries” (43), In her literary criticism, her letters, and 
her fiction, she warns against didacticism and the rnaldng of facile moral judgements. 
As I mentioned earlier, one of the dangers incurred when we divorce Eliot’s aesthetics 
and her ethics, is that she can be seen to be a didactic moralist. Eliot does want her 
novels to ‘teach’ her readers, but thrcugh the medium of fiction, not tlirough moral 
aphorisms.
Music in Daniel D erondaf Nineteenth-Century Fiction 24 (1969): 317-34; and Phyllis Weliver, “Music 
as a sign in Daniel Deronda,” The George Eliot Review 27 (1996): 43-48.
Teny Wright, in Theology and Literature, comments on Eliot’s review o f  Kingsley: “Eliot could not 
resist the temptation to laugh at the crude didacticism evident in such ‘oracular’ novels. She poked fun at 
Westward Ho!, for example, in which the ‘preacher’ in Kingsley so often overcomes the ‘painter’, the 
author labelling his heroes and villains with a clumsy force which was an insult to his readers’ judgement” 
(115).
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Eliot’s review of Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship appeared in the
Leader, 21 July 1855/° This review starts with the same dislike of the easy separation
into good and bad characters and overt moralising that we saw in her review of
Kingsley. She condemns this trend in Goethe’s detractors. Of Goethe she writes:
Everywhere he brings us into the presence of living, generous humanity -  mixed 
and erring, and self-deluding, but saved fiom utter corruption by the salt of some 
noble impulse, some disinterested effort, some beam of good natur e, even though 
grotesque or homely. (146)
Eliot questions whetlier Wilhelm Meister is an “immoral” book (144). She says: “But we
question whether the direct exhibition of a moral bias in the writer will make a book
really moral in its influence” (145). She argues that children lose interest in a story the
moment they detect any “intention to moralise” (145) and the same is true for adult
readers. Eliot argues that direct moralising is ineffective for children and adults alilce.
Rather, Eliot states that the task of the novelist is to “call forth our best sympathies”
(146).
Eliot’s essay “The Natural History of German Life” was published in the
Westminster Review, in July 1856/* In this essay Eliot gives an insight into how the
artist can teach us, and that is by helping us perceive new things, Eliot offers the
following comment on the role of tire artist:
The greatest benefit we owe to the artist, whether painter, poet, or novelist, is the 
extension of our sympathies. Appeals founded on generalizations and statistics 
require a sympathy ready-made, a moral sentiment already in activity; but a 
pictur e of human life such as a gr eat artist can give, surprises even the trivial and 
the selfish into that attention to what is apart from themselves, which may be 
called the raw material of moral sentiment. (270)
20 Tliis review is included in Essays o f  George Eliot, 143-147. 
This essay is included in Essays o f  George Eliot, 266-299.
108
This quotation highlights a number of recuirent concerns of Eliot’s aesthetics. Eliot saw
her task as a novelist being to extend her reader’s sympathies. The artist can thus
surprise the reader into attending to that which is apart from him or herself. She, as a
novelist and aifist, is not trying to make “generalizations” or use “statistics” to win or
extend her readers’ sympathies. We will see this refusal to make generalizations again
when we look at her aesthetics in The Mill on the Floss. The novel as a genre focuses on
concrete and particular individuals. Eliot continues:
Ai't is tlie nearest thing to life; it is a mode of amplifying experience and 
extending our contact with our fellow-men beyond the bounds of oui' personal 
lot. All the more sacred is the task of the artist when he undertakes to paint the 
life of the People. Falsification here is far more pernicious than in die more 
ai'tificial aspects of life. It is not so very serious that we should have false ideas 
about evanescent fashions -  about the manners and conversation of beaux and 
duchesses; but it is serious that oui’ sympaüiy with the peremiial joys and 
struggles, the toil, the ti'agedy, and the humour in the life of oui' more heavily- 
laden fellow-men, should be peiverted, and turned towards a false object instead 
of the true one.^  ^(271)
In this quotation we see that Eliot ties the doctiine of sympathy and realism together.
Realism and sympathy have a social aspect to them, and are class-conscious. It is
important, says Eliot the reviewer, not to distort the representation of working-class
people. Tlie artist has a moral responsibility to portray people as accurately as possible.
We need to sympathise with people as they are and not as we should like them to be. We
will see that this same concern for truthfulness informs Eliot’s aesthetics in “Amos
Barton” and Adam Bede. Realism and tmthfulness are subservient to sympathy within
Eliot’s aesthetics.
Similarly, in “Silly Novels by Lady Novelists” {Westminster Review, October 1856), Eliot berates 
female novelists for the lack o f ti'uthfulness in teims o f plot and language. They are not writing because 
they need the money, but are writing out o f vanity. The essay is included in Essays o f  George Eliot, 300- 
324.
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In these three essays we see a remarkable continuity in Eliot’s aesthetics and a 
number of key principles emerge: art must represent people truthfully, art can represent 
flawed human beings, didacticism should be avoided, and the aim of art is to increase 
the reader’s sympathies for liis or her fellow human beings. Eliot understands sympathy 
to be a coiTective to our egoism and our limited perspective. Sympathy enables us to 
attend to that wliich is other than the self. And this is done by helping us perceive new 
things. There is a narrative comment in Adam Bede wliich neatly expresses this 
sentiment. Adam’s suffering, his acquaintance with “deep sorrow,” has led him to see 
things more clearly (Book 6, chapter 54, 492),^  ^He feels that the “fuller life” which his 
experience of suffering has brought is worth the “personal share of the pain” (chapter 
54, 491). The narrator adds that it is not “possible for a man with cataract to regiet the 
painful process by which his dim blmi'ed sight of men as trees walking had been 
exchanged for a clear outline” (491). Dinali helps Adam to “see things right” and the 
nanative comments produce a similar effect in the reader (492). Eliot saw sympathy as 
an ability tliat we can cultivate and gi'ow, an ability that reading literature can foster.
There is critical agreement that sympathy is a vital component of Eliot’s 
aesthetics, even if there is disagreement about its souice. Literary critics, including Neil 
Roberts, Kai'en Chase, Suzamie Graver, and Jolm McGowan, agree that sympathy is 
important for Eliot’s aesthetics. Neil Roberts argues that sympathy is a “crucial” word in 
her moral and aesthetic vocabulary. Karen Chase, in George Eliot, Middlemarch, 
accurately identifies that sympathy is at the centi'e of Eliot’s aesthetic and moral 
doctrine. She writes:
George Eliot, Adam Bede, ed, Carol A. Martin (Clarendon: Oxford, 2001). All subsequent references
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The word poised at the center of George Eliot’s aesthetic as of her moral 
doctrine is “sympathy,” a word that retains for her a rich power of implication 
far beyond ovu* pale ordinary uses of the tenn. In Middlemarch as in her critical 
writings, it suggests a fundamental human gesture -  an overwhelming of 
instinctive egoism, a turning outward to the world beyond the self, a meeting and 
a mingling and a merging with another self, anotlier center of another world. 
(42)“
I agree with Chase that sympathy is central to Eliot’s aesthetic and to her moral doctrine. 
However, I disagi'ee with Chase’s suggestion that it is a “fundamental human gesture.” 
This suggests that it is an inlierent part of human nature. If tliis were the case there 
would not be the need for novels with the aim of extending our sympathies. Neither do I 
agree that it is a “meeting,” “mingling,” or “merging” with another person. The 
relationship between self and other in Eliot’s fiction is complex, but Balditin’s concepts 
of non-alibi in behig, excess of seeing, and his understanding of selfrother relations give 
us a lot of help in understanding Eliot’s texts. We will see how this works out in the 
chapters on Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda.
Suzanne Graver, in George Eliot and Community: A Study in Social Theory and 
Fictional Form, argues: “So important was an aesthetic of sympathy to George Eliot that 
she justified her life and her art according to its ethic” (265). Graver makes the 
connection between the ethic and the aestlietic, but not the role that theological motifs 
play in the process. Jolm McGowan, in Representation and Revelation: Victorian 
Realism from Carlyle to Yeats, writes: “morally, sympathy functions as the only escape 
from a solipsism that not only insures a limited knowledge of the world but also an 
inability to improve the life of others and oneself.” He goes on to say that “rhetorically.
are to this volume.
Karen Chase, George Eliot, Middlemarch (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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the author requests oui" sympathy as she works to persuade us to accept her vision of the
real and how our lot might be best enduied and/or improved” (135-6)/^
Ellen Argyros, in “Without Any Check o f Proud Reserve Sympathy and Its
Limits in George Eliot's Novels, ai'gues that as Eliot moved from essayist to novelist she
moved from describing or praising sympathy as a practice that others engage in, to a
notion that sympathy must be actively evoked for others. She argues that Eliot had an
increasing awareness that sympathy has a performative dimension to it. Argyi'os argues
that in the essays on Young and Cuimning, Eliot is “unabashedly judgmental” (69), that
she shows “disdain for maxims” (70), and that she particularly dislikes Young’s
didacticism (81). Argyi'os writes:
Wliat differentiates Eliot the essayist from Eliot the novelist is that the maturer 
woman recognises the performative dimension of sympathy: the fact that 
sympaüiy is not just an idea to be described but a moral emotion to be evoked 
and that this perfoimative dimension camiot function within the context of 
polemical jomnal writing but requires a fictional context in order for this 
performative dimension to be dramatised. (71)
Ai'gyi'os makes an important observation here: tliat there is a perfoimative dimension to
sympathy. In my discussions of Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda I will show that the
ethics of Eliot’s art is such that this performative dimension of sympathy extends not
just to Eliot’s presentation of her characters, but also how the reader relates to others
beyond the text. In her review of Young, Eliot offers the following conclusion:
In Young we have the type of that deficient human sympathy, that impiety 
towards the present and the visible, which flies for its motives, its sanctities, and 
its religion, to the remote, the vague, and the unknown: in Cowper we have the 
type of that genuine love wliich cherishes things in proportion to their nearness, 
and feels its reverence grow in proportion to the intimacy of its knowledge.^°
John McGowan, Representation and Revelation: Victorian Realism from  Carlyle to Yeats (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 1986).
“Worldliness and Other-Worldliness: The Poet Young,” Essays o f  George Eliot. 335-385.
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We will see how this works out in the chapters on Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda. hi 
the chapters on these novels I shall look at how the religious motifs of incarnation, 
revelation, and transcendence are operative within Eliot’s aim of extending her reader’s 
sympathies. I will see how sympathy functions as a means of avoiding solipsism on both 
an intra-textual and an extra-textual level. Eliot has her characters learn the importance 
of sympathy, and the same applies for the reader. In the next subsection we will see 
these same principles expressed in Eliot’s letters.
Eliot's letters
In this second subsection I have selected fom* letters in wliich Eliot discusses aesthetics.
These are not the only letters in which Eliot comments on aesthetics, but they are a
representative selection. Even before she started to wiite fiction, Eliot shared the
presupposition that we are changed by what we read. In a letter to Maria Lewes, dated
16 March 1839, she wrote:
We cannot, at least those who read to any purpose at all, we camiot I say help 
being modified by the ideas that pass tlirough oui" minds. [. . .] We are each one 
of the Dramatis personae in some play on the stage of life -  hence our actions 
have their share in the effects of our reading.^^
The foui- letters I have selected each reveal something of Eliot’s thought about how our
reading can affect our lives, and in particular about her hopes for the effect that her
fiction will have on her readers, and how the artist is a teacher and can help us perceive
new things.
GEL 1, 2 3 .
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The first letter that I want to look at is Eliot’s letter to Charles Bray, dated 5 July
1859. This letter reveals that Eliot wants her writing to have an “effect” on her readers,
and that that moral effect is to enlarge her reader’s sympathies. She writes:
If Art does not enlarge man’s sympathies, it does nothing morally ... opinions 
are a poor cement between human souls and the only effect I ardently long to 
produce by my writings, is that those who read them should be better able to 
imagine and to feel the pains and joys of those who differ from themselves in 
everything but the broad fact of being stmggling erring human creatures.^^
We see that she considers “opinions” are ineffective in enlarging man’s sympathies with
one another, and consequently her aim is to help us “imagine” and “feel” the pains and
joys of those who differ fr om us.^° We see an emphasis on non-ideal and non-exemplary
characters. All her characters are “struggling ening human creatures.” In chapter two,
when discussing Eliot’s relationship to the Religion of Humanity, we saw that Eliot in
no way proposed humanity as a subject for worship. The extra-textual element or ethical
dimension of Üiis aesthetic is recognised by Mai-y Ellen Doyle, in The Sympathetic
Response: George Eliot's Fictional Rhetoric. She writes: “[Eliot] wishes to influence
the intellectual and emotional attitudes of real readers toward other real people in Üie
real world outside her books” (1).^° This is an explicit statement of Eliot’s ethical
practice.
^^GEL3, 111.
Janice Carlisle, in The Sense o f  an Audience: Dickens, Thackeray, and George Eliot at Mid-Ceniuiy, 
(Athens: University o f Georgia Press, 1981), argues that at this point in its history, the novel’s "moral 
intentions and their implications” were “insistently at the forefront o f  its aesthetic.” She writes: “It is a 
commonplace o f literary history that Victorian novelists inherited the romantic belief in the power o f the 
sympathetic imagination. Their confidence in their ability to affect their audience rests on their faith in the 
reader’s innate capacity to feel with and for the characters in their stories” (2 and 5).
Mary Ellen Doyle, The Sympathetic Response: George E lio t’s Fictional Rhetoric (Rutherford, NJ.: 
Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1981).
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Eliot’s letter to Frederic Hamson, dated 15 August 1866, was written as a
response to Harrison’s letter of 19 July 1866, in which he detailed his “old fancy,” his
dream, “that the giand features of Comte’s world might be sketched in fiction.” In her
reply Eliot talks explicitly and at length about aesthetic teaching, once again disclaiming
an interest in teaching tlirough overt moralising:
That is a tr emendously difficult problem which you have laid before me, and I 
think you see its difficulties, though they can hai'dly press upon you as they do 
on me, who have gone tlnough again and again the severe effort of trying to 
make certain ideas thoroughly incarnate, as if they had revealed themselves to 
me first in the flesh and not in the spirit. I tliink aesthetic teaching is the liighest 
of all teaching because it deals with life in its liighest complexity. But if it ceases 
to be purely aesthetic -  if it lapses anywhere fiom the pictuie to the diagiam -  it 
becomes the most offensive of all teaching. Avowed utopias are not offensive, 
because they are understood to have a scientific and expository character: they 
do not pretend to work on the emotions, or couldn’t do it if they did pretend. I 
am sure, from your own statement, that you see this quite clearly. Well, then, 
consider the sort of agonizing laboui* to an English-fed imagination to make art a 
sufficiently real back-ground, for the desired picture, to get breathing, individual 
forms, and group them in the needful relations, so that the presentation will lay 
hold on the emotions as human experience -  will, as you say, “flash” conviction 
on the world by means of aroused sympathy.^^
Eliot sees that aesthetics involves an element of teaching, with tlie aim of arousing
sympatliy, but here she aigues that it not achieved by directing the reader to
diagrammatic statements. Art needs to be about complexities. We will see how this
works in Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda by examining the religious motifs of
incarnation, revelation, and transcendence.
Uiere aie a number of similarities between tliis letter and the one Eliot wrote to
Jolm Blackwood, dated 12 November 1873. This letter discusses Alexander Main’s
A selection o f the conespondence between Frederic Hanison and Marian Lewes is reproduced in 
George Eliot: Selected Essays, Poems and Other Writings, eds. A. S. Byatt and Nicholas Warren 
(Hannondsworth: Penguin, 1990), 241-257. For further details the reader is referred to the GEL. 
GEL 4, 300-1.
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project to publish PFise, Witty, and Tender Sayings in Prose and Verse Selected From
the Works o f George Eliot^ a book of exti’acts selected from her writings. Eliot writes:
Unless my readers are more moved towards the ends I seek by my works as 
wholes than by an assemblage of extracts, my writings are a mistake. I have 
always exercised a severe watch against anything that could be called preaching, 
and if I have ever allowed myself in dissertation or in dialogue [anything] which 
is not part of the structure of my books, I have there sinned against my own 
laws.
We see Eliot’s concern to avoid preaching and theorising, as well as the concern to
move her readers by her works as a whole, rather than tlu'ough extracted quotations or
extrapolations. The structui'e of her work, i.e., the work as an aesthetic whole, is the way
in which Eliot seeks to move her readers:
Unless I am condemned by my own principles, my books are not properly 
separable into ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ teaching.^
Eliot does not want her readers to be able to draw an easy moral fr om her fiction, and
we will see this later when I discuss The Mill on the Floss.
A fourth letter in wliich George Eliot emphasises her aesthetic teaching is her
letter to Mis. Peter Alfr ed Taylor, dated 18 July 1878. Eliot writes:
My function is that of the aesthetic, not the doctrinal teacher -  the rousing of the 
nobler emotions, which make mankind desire the social right, not the prescribing 
of special measures, concerning which the artistic mind, however strongly 
moved by social sympathy, is often not the best judge. It is one thing to feel 
keenly for one’s fellow-beings; another to say, “This step, and this alone, will be 
the best to take for the removal of particular calamities.”
Once again we see Eliot’s resistance to prescribing special measures. It is not the
prescription of a set of rules that is important, but the particular circumstances that a
novel presents that allow us as readers to consider the particularities of a case. She
GEL 5, 459. 
GEL 7, 44.
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argues that it is important to feel for one’s fellow human beings, but that does not extend 
to dictating or advising them what to do.
In these letters, written over a period of almost twenty years, we see continuity in 
Eliot’s aesthetic thinking, and similarities to the arguments expressed in her review 
essays.This section has been concerned with Eliot’s comments about her own writing. 
We see that as an artist she aimed to produce an effect on the reader, that that effect was 
to produce or evoke sympathy in the reader for his or her fellow hmnan beings, tliat she 
aimed to achieve tliis not by preaching or direct moralising, but by an emotional 
response to her work as a whole, hr the chapters on Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda 
we will see that Eliot received letters witnessing that her aesthetic was having the 
desired effect on her readers. It is now time to look at Eliot’s comments about aesthetics 
that are found in her early fiction.
Eliot and the aesthetics o f the early fiction
In this subsection I concentrate on Eliot’s early fiction, with specific reference to “Amos 
Barton,” Adam Bede, and The Mill on the Floss. I have chosen to focus on Eliot’s aim of 
extending her reader’s sympathies, with reference to her presentation of character and 
her desire to resist theorising. I focus on “Amos Barton” and Adam Bede in my 
discussion of Eliot’s representation of character, and I focus on Adam Bede and The Mill 
on the Floss in my discussion of her desire to resist theorising. In these discussions also,
Thomas Noble, in his Introduction to Scenes o f  Clerical Life, says that Eliot returned to these views o f  
art and morality and the connection between the two throughout her career (yii).
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we find Eliot liinting that her aesthetic has ethical implications, and she calls her reader 
to respond to the other on a textual level, but also beyond the text.
Eliot's representation o f character
The aim of Eliot’s fiction is to help the reader understand people in a deeper way. It is
clear that at this early stage in her writing career there is an extia-textual referent to her
aesthetics. From the narrator’s comments about character that are found in “Amos
Barton” and Adam Bede, we see that Eliot is quick to point out that her fiction is not
concerned with extraordinary characters and extraordinary events. In chapter 5 of
“Amos Barton” we are told that he is:
in no respect an ideal or exceptional character, and perhaps I am doing a bold 
thing to bespeak your sympathy on behalf of a man who was so very far from 
remarkable, -  a man whose virtues were not heroic, and who had no undetected 
crime within his breast; who had not tire slightest mystery hanging about him, 
but was palpably and unmistakably commonplace, (chapter 5, 41)^^
Amos Barton is not a remarkable character, but the narrator nonetheless seeks our
sympathy on liis behalf. Indeed, he is a “stmggling erring human creature.” Thomas
Noble argues that one element of Eliot’s artistic credo is her insistence upon the
importance, as a subject for serious literature, of the lives of commonplace men and
women, and the novelist’s moral obligation to give a true picture of those lives.^^
We see the same concern not to overlook ordinary people in Adam Bede, In
chapter 17 the nan ator speaks of ordinary people doing ordinary tasks, and says that we
should not overlook them in art;
George Eliot, Scenes o f  Clerical Life, ed. Thomas A. Noble (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985). All 
subsequent references to this volume will be in the text.
See Noble, Introduction to Scenes, viii.
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There are few prophets in the world; few sublimely beautiful women; few 
heroes. I can’t afford to give all my love and reverence to such rarities: I want a 
great deal of those feelings for my every-day fellow-nien, especially for the few 
in the foreground of the great multitude, whose faces I know, whose hands I 
touch, for whom I have to make way with Idndly courtesy, (chapter 17,168)
Eliot’s aim is to make her readers sympathetic to the “every-day fellow-men” they meet,
and not “prophets,” “sublimely beautiful women,” and “heroes.” In chapter 7 of “Amos
Barton” the naiTator tells us:
I wish to stir your sympathy with commonplace troubles -  to win your tears for 
real sorrow: sorrow such as may live next door to you -  such as walks neither in 
rags nor in velvet, but m very ordinary decent appaiel. (chapter 7, 56)
Once again we are encouraged to move beyond the textual example Eliot sets before us
in her nanutive. Similarly, in Adam Bede, the narrator wants to win our sympathy for
those we live amongst. In chapter 17 the narrator talks in detail about the people she is
writing about:
These fellow-mortals, every one, must be accepted as they ar e: you can neither 
str aighten their noses, nor brighten their wit, nor rectify their dispositions; and it 
is these people -  amongst whom your* life is passed -  that it is needful you 
should tolerate, pity, and love: it is these more or less ugly, stupid, inconsistent 
people, whose movements of goodness you should be able to admire -  for whom 
you should cherish all possible hopes, all possible patience. And I would not, 
even if I had the choice, be the clever novelist who could create a world so much 
better than this, in which we get up in the morning to do om* daily work, that you 
would be likely to tur*n a harder, colder eye on die dusty streets and the conunon 
green fields -  on the real breathing men and women, who can be chilled by your 
indifference or injiued by your prejudice; who can be cheered and helped 
onward by your fellow-feeling, your forbearance, your outspoken, brave justice, 
(chapter 17, 165-6))
Tills passage reveals the explicit purpose of Eliot’s realism: we need to accept, tolerate, 
love and pity one another. Her aim is the exact opposite of turning a harder, cold eye on 
people. We are to love others not because of their inherent loveliness, but because we
119
are in a position to exercise the faculty of sympatliy. David Parker, in an essay entitled
“‘Bound in Charity’: Middlemarchf in Ethics, Theory and the Novel, writes:
For George Eliot, ‘fellow-feeling’ is not the imposition of wishful rose tints on 
my neighbour’s factual ugliness; it is rather understanding him or her in a deeper 
way, one that is not blinkered or distorted by an excessively individualistic 
selfiother binaiism. (80)
Her novels do not try to hide the “factual ugliness” but they do try to extend the reader’s
sympathy and help die reader understand other people in a deeper way/^
Eliot’s aim is that we continue to exercise our capacity for sympathy beyond the
reading of her texts. The naiTator of Adam Bede says that he likes Dutch paintings:
It is for this rare, precious quality of tiudifulness that I delight in many Dutch 
paintings, which lofty-minded people despise. I find a souice of delicious 
sympathy in these faithful pictui es of a monotonous homely existence, which has 
been the fate of so many more among my fellow-mortals than a life of pomp or 
of absolute indigence, of tragic suffering or of woiid-stiiring actions. (Chapter 
17, 166)
Here we see again the emphasis on ordinary people with a “homely existence” rather 
than a life of “world-stirring actions” and the emphasis on art’s ability to be a source of 
sympathy for oui* fellow human beings. In the next section I look at how Eliot discusses
Eliot’s contemporary, the critic E. S. Dallas, comments on her ability to help us sympathise with others, 
despite their faults. In a review o f Silas M amer, 29 April 1861, he writes:
“She has given dignity to the life o f boors and peasants in some o f our bucolic districts, and this not by 
any concealment o f tlieir ignorance, follies, and frailties, nor by false colouring, bombastic sentiment, and 
exceptional events, but by a plain statement o f the everyday o f the people. The charm o f George Eliot’s 
novels lies in their truthfulness. Nothing is extenuated nor aught else set down in malice. We see the 
people amid all their grovelling cares, with all their coarseness, ignorance, and prejudice -  poor, paltry, 
stupid, wretched, well-nigh despicable. This mean existence George Eliot raises into dignity b y endowing 
it with conscience and kindliness. There is nothing glittering about it. Here we have no mock heroics. 
There is not the slightest attempt to represent [ . . . ]  the passing pedlar as a poet wanting the 
accomplislnnent o f verse. Tlie personages o f the tale are common, very common people [ . . . ] . ”
Dallas says that Eliot makes us “feel a warm interest in all their petty concerns and humble endeavours.” 
See George Eliot: Tlie Critical Heritage, ed. David Carroll (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971), 
179-185.
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ait’s ability to bring out oui* sympathies, without the necessity of being too didactic or 
moralising.^^
Eliot and anti-didacticism
Eliot wants to prevent her readers from condemning and approving at a glance, and
wants to change the very way that we judge people, to change our perspective on the
way we judge others and the world. Eliot aims to increase om* sympathy for characters
once we loiow why they act the way they do. This is one of the key ways she extends
our sympathy in Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda. She wants to disturb our
prepossessions and shake our confidence.
hi section one we saw that in her review of Kingsley’s Westward Ho! Eliot
condemned his easy separation of characters into good and bad, or right and wrong.
Eliot expresses this same dislike of separating characters into good and bad in Adam
Bede and The Mill on the Floss, In chapter 17 of Adatn Bede, the narrator writes:
It is so very rarely that facts hit that nice medium required by our own 
enlightened opinions and refined taste! Perhaps you will say, “Do improve the 
facts a little, then; make tliem more accordant with those coirect views which it 
is om* privilege to possess. Tlie world is not just what we like; do touch it up 
witli a tasteful pencil, and make believe it is not quite such a mixed entangled 
affair. Let all people who hold unexceptionable opinions act unexceptionably. 
Let yom* most faulty characters always be on the wi*ong side, and yom* virtuous 
ones on the right. Then we shall see at a glance whom we are to condemn, and 
whom we are to approve. Then we shall be able to admire, wiüioiit the slightest 
distmbance of om prepossessions: we shall hate and despise with that true 
ruminant relish which belongs to undoubting confidence.” (Chapter 17, 165)
The tone in this quotation is one of studied exaggeration. The nanator is not advocating
but mocldng these suggestions. The nanator mocks such “enlightened opinions” and
Noble similarly recognises that she is critical o f didacticism, in the hitroduction to Scenes (yni-viii).
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“refined taste” precisely because they fail to appreciate that life is a “mixed entangled
affair.” Good and bad are not so easily distinguished in life, as they are in the types of
fiction that Eliot’s narrator is here mocking. And the narrator does wish to ‘disturb’ our
‘prepossessions’ and shake our ‘confidence’ in order to enable us to have more feeling
for others. This will be important when we look at Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda.
Tlie naiTators of these novels suggest the difficulty involved in judging people by
actions -  we do not know their motives, and sometimes actions that look wrong to
outsiders were prompted by the best motives. Eliot also shows how external decisions
and things can affect our actions.
In The Mill on the Floss the nanator comments on the inappropriateness of
“maxims” to the “mysterious complexity of our life.”"^® She writes:
All people of broad, strong sense have an instinctive repugnance to the men of 
maxims; because such people early discern that the mysterious complexity of our 
life is not to be embraced by maxims, and that to lace ourselves up in fomiulas 
of that sort is to repress all the divine promptings and inspirations that spring 
from glowing insight and sympathy. And the man of maxims is the popular 
representative of the minds that are guided in their moral judgement solely by 
general mles, tliinking that these will lead them to justice by a ready-made patent 
method, without the trouble of exerting patience, discrimination, impartiality -  
without any care to assure themselves whether they have the insight that comes 
from a hardly-earned estimate of temptation, or from a life vivid and intense 
enough to have created a wide fellow-feeling with all that is human. (Book 7, 
chapter 2,438/^
The narrator warns us against “maxims,” “formulas,” “ready-made patent general rules,” 
and says that we need the “insight” that comes fr om a “wide fellow-feeling with all that 
is human.” The narrator of The Mill on the Floss says:
George Eliot, The Mill on the Floss, ed, Gordon S. Haight (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). All 
subsequent references are to this edition.
For a discussion of Eliot’s use o f  maxims see Susan Sniader Lanser, “Woman o f Maxims: George Eliot 
and the Realist Imperative,” Fictions o f Authority: Women Winters and Narrative Voice (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1992), 81-101.
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The casuists have become a by-word of reproach; but their perverted spirit of 
minute discrimination was the shadow of a tiuth to which eyes and hearts are too 
often fatally sealed -  the truth, that moral judgements must remain false and 
hollow, unless they are checked and enlightened by a peipetual reference to the 
special circumstances that mark the individual lot. (Book 7, chapter 2, 437-8)
In chapter one we saw that casuistry played a part in tire rise of the novel. We saw tliat
the novel allows for fonns of ethical thinking that avoids maxims and formulas. I
explore the role that theological motifs play in the process of ethical thinking and the
aesthetics of Eliot’s novels in chapters five and six.
We have seen a continuity of aesthetic thought from Eliot’s early essays through
to her early fiction. We have seen that she is keen to emphasise the ordinariness of her
characters, her dislike of overt moralising, and her endeavour* to extend her* readers
sympathies. In the next section I am going to look at how contemporary critics of Eliot
viewed her as a teacher, and how critics today view her. Eliot wanted to teach, but not
by simplistic and overt moralising.
Critical responses to Eliot's aesthetics and ethics
In this section I review briefly the Iristory of Eliot criticism that has discussed her roles 
as artist and teacher. I have divided the section into two, and look firstly at how Eliot’s 
contemporaries viewed her work, and secondly at how literary critics today read her 
work. In the history of Eliot scholarship there has been a tension between Eliot’s desire 
that the artist can teach, and tlie dangers of didacticism. In section one I look at how 
contemporaries of Eliot understood her aesthetics. I begin with one of E. S. Dallas’s 
critical coimnents on Eliot, before widening the discussion to consider how she became 
to be perceived as an overt moralist. I consider the way in which a number* of factors
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contributed to tliis perception and its influence on Eliot’s critical reputation. In section 
two I look at how some contemporary critics suggest ways in wliich Eliot can be 
considered a teacher.
Eliot the moral teacher
Eliot’s contemporary, E. S. Dallas argued that she was not a didactic moralist. For
example, in The Times, 29 April 1861, he wi'ote:
Hers is a very sphitual natuie, and she cannot choose but regard life from a very 
lofty point of view. But her novels are tine novels, not sermons done into 
dialogue. The moral purpose which is evident in her writing is mostly an 
unconscious pmpose. It is tliat sort of moral meaning which belongs to every 
great work of art, and which no elevated mind can get rid of. She tells a simple 
story without the least idea of inculcating any copy-book lesson, but by merely 
elevating die reader to her mount of obseiwation she cannot fail to suggest to the 
mind some profound reflections.'^^
I agi ee with Dallas that Eliot is not trying to write sermons, and is not guilty of the very
charges she laid against Kingsley. He also articulates, thi ough the visual metaphor of the
“mount of observation,” how Eliot’s aim was to help us perceive new things. However, I
do not agree with Dallas that the moral purpose of Eliot’s novels is an “unconscious”
one. It seems evident from what we have said about Eliot’s aesthetics up to now that the
reverse is tme. Eliot had a conscious moral purpose in her art -  to extend her reader’s
sympathies. Eliot employs complex nanative devices in order to ‘elevate’ her reader to
her point of observation, and to help him or her perceive new things. A close reading of
this quotation highlights a whole area of critical discussion. A review of the critical
history of Eliot’s literary reception and reputation reveals that there is a tension between
See Critical Heritage, 185.
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whether she should be considered primarily as a philosopher or as an artist. Dming her 
lifetime Eliot enjoyed popularity with critics and readers alike, but in the decades after 
her death, her literary reputation was challenged and became diminished. A number of 
reasons have been suggested for this, and Eliot and/or George Henry Lewes, consciously 
or unconsciously, may be responsible for some of these. They include the nature of the 
Sunday afternoon gatherings at the Priory, Alexandar Main’s publication of the Wise, 
Witty, and Tender Sayings of George Eliot in Prose and Verse, Eliot’s letters to 
individuals, the biogiaphy produced by J. W. Cross, and the personal testimonies of F. 
W. H. Myers and Charles Bray.
Rosemarie Bodenlieimer, Elaine Showalter, and Deirdre David all argue that 
during her fifties ‘George Eliot’ was giudually transformed into an institution or myth."^  ^
The Sunday afternoon gathering that the Leweses held at their north London home were 
part of this process. Deirdre Davies argues that Eliot was encouraged to believe in her 
own “mythologised reputation” thi'ough the stream of visitors who would sit at her feet 
and seek “words of wisdom” ft om the woman who was the “intellectual matriarch to a 
tribe of admirers” (170). James Champion, in “George Eliot’s Daniel Derondœ. 
Imaginative Communion and the Critical Imperative,” writes: “I concur with George 
Levine when he says that ‘the image’ of Eliot on such an occasion, ‘bending foiward, 
listening . . . with selfless and disciplined attention to her admiring visitors, corresponds 
precisely to the moral and intellectual ideal that infonns her novels’” (290). Dorothea 
Bairett, in Vocation and Desire, talks of a “concerted effort on the part of both George
See Dorothea Barrett, Vocation and Desire: George Eliot’s Heroines (London: Routledge, 1989), 
Rosemarie Bodenlieimer, The Real Life ofM aiyA nn Evans, and Deirdre Davies, Intellectual Women and
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Heiuy and Marian Lewes to manufacture and disseminate an image of George Eliot that
would be powerful, morally autlioritative, and spotless enough to erase the prior image
of Marian Lewes.” Barrett goes on to explain:
Tliis can only be understood in the context of the severe disapprobation she had 
suffered all her life, for being plain, for being passionate, for being intellectual, 
and above all for being umnarried. The initial creation of the sibyl image was the 
means by which an embattled woman, whose character and circumstances 
tlireatened the dominant ideology, gained peace, power, and acceptance in 
Victorian England. (5)
Barrett is suggesting that the persona of ‘George Eliot’ was an antidote to the figure of
Marian Evans who had scandalised society by her fi'ee-tliinking and her free-living. This
persona of the Sunday gatherings also was present in her response to certain individuals
who wrote to her. Kathi-yn Hughes, in her biogiaphy George Eliot: The Last Victorian,
wiites that men and women from around the world wrote to Eliot begging for advice
about the most personal matters, from mamage tlnough God to their own poetry. She
suggests that they saw Eliot as one who “seemed to understand the pain and difficulty of
being alive in the nineteenth century” (4). In both the Sunday afternoon gatherings and
the letters she wrote, there seems to be a bluiring of the persona of ‘George Eliot’ with
the person of Marian Lewes.
Alexandar Main’s publication of Wise, Witty, and Tender Sayings o f George
Eliot, a collection of extracted quotations from her novels, was another contributing
factor to Eliot’s reputation as a sage or sibyl. Eliot was aware of the danger inlierent in
such a book of extracts, as is evident in the letters we discussed earlier in this chapter.
She was aware that this book would isolate her words and remove them from their
Victorian Patriarchy: Harriet Martineau, Elizabeth Barrett Browning, George Eliot (London: Macmillan, 
1987).
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original literary and naiTative context. In Üie section on her letters we saw that Eliot
wished her readers to be moved by her work as a whole, and not by plnases or sayings
taken out of context. Again we see the dangers of divorcing ethics and aesthetics; it is
against Eliot’s aim of having her works achieve their aim as wholes rather than as a
collection of sayings.
The publication of J. W. Cross’s biography of Eliot was another contributing
factor to her being perceived as an overt moralist. Dorothea Bairett argues that
Marghanita Laski, in her acerbic biography George Eliot and her World, claims that the
Cross biography was “disastrous” for Eliot. Barrett quotes Laski:
[I]n attempting to conceal not merely possible scandal but the smallest flaw, he 
presented only a whited sepulclne; and it is impossible to feel confident that all 
the wliitewash has yet been removed. Tliis hagiolatrous biography was more than 
contemporaries could stomach, and George Eliot’s literaiy reputation, till then 
almost supreme, almost immediately slumped, (ll?/"^
In the introduction to volume one of The George Eliot Letters Haight quotes
Gladstone’s opinion of Cross’s George Eliot's Life: As Related in Her Letters and
Journals (1885): “It is not a Life at all [. . .] It is a Reticence in tlnee volumes” (x/v).
Haight says: “[Cross] created a George Eliot who never really existed [. . .]. The legend
of lofty seriousness, fostered in the beginning by Lewes, became tlnough Cross’s efforts
so fninly fixed that it colouied her reputation as a novelist” (xv). Haight also quotes
William Hale White’s letter to the Athenaeum, 28 November 1885, which says that
Cross’s work has made her too “respectable” (xv). Graham Handley, in Geot^ge Eliot: A
Guide Through the Critical Maze, wiites: “The carefiil excision of anything damaging -
some would say humanising -  perpetuated the myth of a sententious, moralising and
Marghanita Lasld, George Eliot and her World (London: Thames and Hudson, 1973). See also Banett,
127
largely hmnomiess George Eliot. In this way Cross unintentionally but undoubtedly 
contributed to her failing reputation” (1)."*^  Banett also blames F. W. H. Myers and 
Charles Bray, because their personal testimonies presented Eliot as being overly serious 
(7).
Whatever the reasons behind the construction of ‘George Eliot’ as a sibyl or
sage, tlie result was that m the years following her death her literary reputation suffered
a decline. Karen Chase in Middlemarch, and Joan Bemiett in George Eliot: her Mind
and her Art, record the decline in critical opinion, citing the negative critical attitudes of
James, Shaw, Ford, Bennett, Forster, T. S. Eliot, George Saintsbury, Sh Leslie Stephen,
and W. J. Dawson."^  ^Two of those quoted by Karen Chase are relevant to my discussion.
Ford Madox Ford, in The Critical Attitude, writes:
Taking herself with an enomious seriousness, she dilated upon sin and its results, 
and so found the easy success of the popular preacher who deals in honors. She 
desired that is to say, to be an influence: she cared in her heart very little whether 
or not she would be considered an artist. (56)"^ ^
This quotation is revealing in that Ford Madox Ford saw Eliot as a “preacher,” an
“influence”, who little cared whether or not she would be considered an artist. In this
vitriolic review Ford describes Eliot as a “debatable writer,” whose books are “without
any foim, her style entirely pedestrian and her solemnity intolerable” (55). He
concludes: “And she has as an artist no existence whatever” (57). The idea of Eliot
being more of a philosopher than an artist is similaiJy present in Henry James’s
Vocation and Desire, 6-7.
Graham Handley, George Eliot: A Guide Through the Critical Maze (Bristol: The Bristol Press, 1990). 
See Karen Chase, Middlemarch, 91, and Joan Bennett, George Eliot: her Mind and her Art (Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 1948).
Ford Madox Ford, “English Literature o fT o -d a y - 1,” The Critical Attitude (London: Duckworth &
Co., 1911), 55-78.
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assessment of her. In “The Life of George Eliot,” in Partial Portraits, he writes that for
Eliot the novel was “not primarily a pictm-e of life, capable of deriving a high value
from its form, but a moralised fable, the last word of a philosophy endeavouring to teach
by example” (50)."^  ^He continues:
We feel in her, always, that she proceeds from the abstract to the concrete; that 
her figures and situations are evolved, as the phrase is, from her moral 
consciousness, and are only indirectly the products of obseiwations. (51)
He argues that for Eliot the novel was a “moralised fable” or an attempt to “teach by
exam ple .T hese  two quotations are indicative of a strand of Eliot criticism that has
attempted to deny her formal achievements. They are quotations that show the lowest
depth of her critical reputation. Only with the publication of Barbara Hardy’s The
Novels o f George Eliot: A Study in Form in 1959 and W, J. Harvey’s The Art o f George
Eliot in 1961 did Eliot achieve recognition for the art of her fiction and its formal
achievements. These works paved the way for critical reassessments of Eliot’s novels in
terms of style and form. Similarly, after the Second World War, Eliot’s literary
reputation was restored on another front. Karen Chase argues tliat a reversal of fortune
in Eliot’s literary reputation began with the work of F. R. Leavis. She writes: “After the
trauma of the Second World War critics began to rediscover the qualities of moral
concern -  radier than didactic moralising -  and intellectual analysis in Eliot’s work.”
Graham Handley agrees that Leavis was transitional in asserting unequivocally Eliot’s
primacy in English fiction (2). Having seen some tensions and seeing problems that
Henry James, “The Life o f George Eliot,” Partial Portraits (Westport, CT.; Greenwood Press, 1970). 
This hook was originally published by Macmillan and Co, in 1888.
In George Eliot: An Intellectual Life, Valerie A. Dodd argues that the awareness that Eliot was an 
'intellectual tuined novelist’ affects the interpretation o f her novels in tinee ways. First, she has been 
lauded as a sage articulating universal tmths. Second, her imagination has been seen to operate in terms o f
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arise when aesthetics and ethics are divorced, we are now going to look at fom* critics 
who view her as a teacher: Suzanne Graver, Marilyn Higuera, Dorothea Banett, and 
David CarToll. Each of these critics recognises that there are extra-textual elements of 
Eliot’s aesthetics, but not the role that religious motifs play.
Eliot and extra-textual ethics
Suzarme Graver, in George Eliot and Community, argues that Eliot achieves the
extension of her reader’s sympathies through collaboration between the reader and the
text. Graver’s interpretation of Eliot might be classified as forming part of the ‘history
of ideas’ approach to Eliot’s texts. Graver situates Eliot’s work amongst a tradition of
social thought that was preoccupied with the rediscovery of community. She compares
Eliot’s work with the writings of Strauss, Feuerbach, Comte, Herbert Spenser, and J. S.
Mill. She wi'ites that Eliot’s aesthetic can be traced back to the Romantic belief
(proposed by Wordsworth and Shelley) that art has the power to enlarge the reader’s
capacities for sympathetic response, and sought to effect so comprehensive a change of
sensibility as ultimately to change society. Graver proceeds to list a number of ways in
wliich Eliot fosters tliis collaboration between the author and the reader:
As an artist, George Eliot attempted to enlarge the experience of her readers and 
to alter their perceptions, in part by creating characters who experienced such 
changes as those she would ideally have her readers undergo, or such failings as 
might bring her readers to a fuller understanding of the human limitations and 
social conditions that inhibit the fellowsliip she wanted her readers to experience 
as a felt need. (10)
a conflict between her intellect and emotions. Third, her novels have been analysed as vehicles for the 
discussion o f philosophical ideas. See Intellectual Life (London: Macmilllan, 1990), 1,
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This is an important interpretation of Eliot’s aesthetics, but Graver does not mention the 
role that incarnation, revelation, and transcendence play in either the characters’ lives, or 
in the interaction between the reader and the text. Graver’s situating of Eliot within the 
context of social theory that seeks to transform society means that religion is neglected 
as a matter of course, since the social theorists with whom she compares Eliot were 
tliemselves anti-Christian, Other ways in wliich Graver sees Eliot fostering the 
collaboration between author and reader include criticism of “conventional ways of 
thinking, acting, and responding,” “not only leading, guiding, and persuading her 
readers to sympathetic assent, but also encouraging, perhaps even provoking, them to 
engage in critical probing and questioning,” and the “nanator’s direct addresses to the 
reader.”
Similarly, Marilyn Higuera, in “Prelude to Vocation,” outlines some of the
methods Eliot uses to extend her reader’s sympathies.^® These involve “musing
questions,” as well as “commentaries on her characters, commentaries on human nature
in general, and direct exhortations to the reader.” Higuera argues:
Examples of her attempts to involve and educate us, directly and indirectly, 
abound. She appeals often to us, urging us to reflect on om* reactions, criticize 
them, possibly alter them. She continually exhorts us to be more sympathetic. 
Most novelists want readers to feel comiected to their characters. Eliot’s narrator 
reaches even beyond the book, though. Her educative task includes getting us to 
perceive sympathy as a moral act, in oui* lives as well as our reading. (24)
Here we see that Eliot wants to have an effect on her reader beyond the confines of her
book. Higuera’s article is thought-provoking in the conclusions that it reaches, but I
believe that more work needs to be done in this aiea. Higuera argues that Eliot finds her
Marilyn Higuera, “Prelude to Vocation,” The St. John‘s Review 44.3 (1998); 1-27.
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“epos” in reforming novel-readers’ sensibilities (26), and in the chapters on 
Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda I hope to show explicitly how Eliot does this, and the 
role that the theological motifs of incarnation, revelation, and transcendence play in this 
process.
Another critic who articulates this extra-textual element to Eliot’s aesthetics is 
David Carroll. In “George Eliot: The Sibyl of Mercia,” CaiToll argues that Eliot’s aim is 
to encomage tlie reader to generalise what is happening in the text into a different and 
larger context. CaiToll argues that tlie nanative commentaiy is essentially a bridge 
between the fictional and real worlds, insisting that the two are adjacent, continuous, 
overlapping, and that their problems are common (19). Canoll says that it is evident 
from Eliot’s writing that she is “fascinated with all the various forms of wisdom 
literatme -  the aphorism, tlie proverb, the adage, the epigiam, the motto, the moral essay 
-  all those attempts to encapsulate the fr uits of experience in a few memorable words” 
(16). But he says that the context in winch they aie placed means that we should not 
read them in abstract, but work out for ouiselves how we are to interpret them in 
different contexts. He wiites: “they are moral hypotheses suspended in the novels, 
interpreting and being tested by the surrounding fictional reality” (19). CaiToll says that 
the pmpose of the following quotation from Felix Holt, “Very close and diligent looking 
at living creatures, even througli the best microscope, will leave room for new and 
contradictory discoveries,” should make it clear that in Eliot’s naiTative the purpose “is 
clearly to encourage an alert and sustained scrutiny in the reader” (19). CaiToll sees a 
tension in Eliot “between a desire to encapsulate truth and an uneasiness about doing so 
in her wiiting and [argues] that it accounts for several veiy significant features of her
132
work” (16). Within the fiction Eliot is constantly contextualising moral issues, and we
should be wai*y of any approach to her novels that aims to decontextualise her ‘ethics.’
Felicia Bonaparte, in The Triptych and the Cross: The Central Myths o f George
Eliot’s Poetic Imagination, wi'ites that Eliot had “fi:ank designs on her readers’ souls.”
She acknowledges a difficulty in talking about this aspect of Eliot’s art, because of the
ridicule suffered by Victorian literature in the last decades of the nineteenth century and
first decades of the twentieth century. But Bonaparte wants to suggest that Eliot’s “great
moral passion” is where her genius lays (31-2).^' Bonaparte also acknowledges that if
one wishes to talk about Eliot and ethical issues, it is necessary to confront whether or
not she is a “preacher” (32). She offers this comment:
If we have thouglit Eliot didactic, it is only because we have not probed her 
moral vision far enough. It is wise to remember that Eliot’s moral vision has 
seemed to us increasingly subtler, less didactic, as we have moved in the past 
hundred years from the surface of her fiction -  where it once seemed to us that 
she was preacliing the simple Christian truisms -  to its less obvious hnplications. 
Hie deeper we go, the clearer it is that it is not maxims and aphorisms that Eliot 
offers us [...]. (33)
I want to discuss how Balditin helps us probe Eliot’s moral vision in chapter four, and 
the moral visions of Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda in chapters five and six.
Dorothea Barrett, in Vocation and Desire, argues that if one comes to Eliot’s 
novels with preconceived ideas that she is moralist, that is what one finds: “Reading 
with the preconceived idea that her work is conservative and didactic, one inevitably 
selects and prioritizes elements that support that preconception.” However, Barrett 
proposes tliat rather than reading Eliot’s novels as “a series of elaborate moral fables” 
we can read them as a “protean vision of the dialectical engagement of human realities
Felicia Bonaparte, The Triptych and the Cross: The Central Myths o f  George E liot’s. Poetic Imagination 
(New York: New York University Press, 1979). This book offers a close study o f Eliot’s Romola.
133
and possibilities.” Barrett argues that Eliot’s novels are “dialectical, turbulent, 
polyphonic, and open-ended in their stmctmros, quite the opposite, in fact, of the 
controlled and didactic masterpieces Üiat the sibyl image has encouraged readers to 
expect” (1).
I agree with much of what Graver, Higuera, Carroll, Bonaparte, and Barrett say, 
but they omit to make any reference to the role that Christian theological motifs play in 
this process. And this, to my mind, constitutes a weakness in their argument. Because of 
their own interest in specific areas of Eliot’s work, or their specific situating of her work 
in comparison to other thinkers of her age, they neglect the religious motifs that are 
current in her fiction.
Conclusion
I began this chapter with a discussion of the dangers involved in divorcing Eliot’s 
aesthetics and ethics. I argued that there were two dangers that need to be avoided. The 
first is to avoid discussing only what happens wiüiin tlie texts because this neglects 
Eliot’s stated aesthetic aim. The second danger to avoid is only discussing the moral 
issues, and divorcing them from their aesthetic context. This route leads to Eliot being 
perceived as an overt moraliser. I looked at how developments in ethical literary theory 
were helping avoid both of the dangers. The work of Martha Nussbaurn advocates an 
ethical literary theory which takes seriously the idea that a reader can be changed by the 
act of reading a literary text, and at the same time offers a sophisticated analysis of 
literary texts.
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One of the connections between Nussbaurn and Eliot is that they both thinlc that 
the act of reading matters, and tliat a change can occur* in the reader as a result of 
reading. Martha Nussbaurn discusses narrative fiction’s ability to change the reader. In 
Love’s Knowledge she writes about novels and the way people are changed through 
reading them, through paying attention to die particularities of an individual situation.^  ^
“Reading for* Life” is a review essay of Wayne Booth’s The Company We Keep: An 
Ethics o f Fiction. Nussbaurn begins the essay with a description of the literary 
friendships that novels offer the fictional David Copperfield, and follows with this 
polemic:
People care for the books they read; and they are changed by what they care for 
-  both during die time of reading and in countless later ways more difficult to 
discer*n. (231)
Here Nussbaum makes very clear her polemic that people are changed by the books they 
read, both dur ing the time of reading, and after the act of readmg has stopped. However, 
it is unfortunate that Nussbaum does not engage with Eliot in her own work. This 
omission is surprising since Nussbaum deals not only with Eliot’s contemporary, 
Dickens, but also with her successor, Hemy James. But more importantly, Nussbaum’s 
own work, and the way it relates to other literary texts, could be enlianced if it engaged 
with Christian theology.The problem with recent ethical literary theory is that it wants 
to suggest that the reader is changed by reading a literar y text, but ignores the concept of
Josephine Donovan says that Martha Nussbaum has enumerated a similar theory in Poetic Justice 
(Boston; Beacon Press, 1995), linldng the novel and the moral sensitivities it encourages to the practice of 
law and the formation o f  public policy. Nussbaum reflects: “our society is full o f refusals to imagine one 
another with empathy and compassion” and considers that this kind of moral imagination can be fostered 
by novels {xvii). See also Donovan, 8.
For further discussion o f Nussbaum’s failure to engage with Christianity, see Fergus Kerr, Immortal 
Longings and Gregory L. Jones, “The Love Which Love’s Knowledge Knows Not.”
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ti'anscendence. However, the idea that a text can have an effect on the reader is 
incoherent without the aid of theological discourse about incarnation, revelation, and 
transcendence. Bakhtin not only allows theological discourse, but his ethic and aesthetic 
theories are based on theological motifs.
In what follows, I argue that the language and conceptuality that Balditin offers 
can help us to understand what Eliot was hoping to achieve. I suggest that Bakhtin’s 
early philosophical essays provide a number of critical tools for analysing Eliot’s 
novels, and for looking at how theological motifs of incarnation, revelation, and 
transcendence function, thematically and stmctuially, in her novels. There are a number 
of similarities between Bakhtin and Eliot: they both thought the act of reading was 
important, both were ethical thinkers, both were anti-theoretical, against there being one 
rule for all, and both believed the novel exemplified this; further, both had a specific 
understanding of the human person in time and space, and both use theological 
concepts. Tliis joint interest in etliics and aesthetics is of crucial importance, and we see 
that there are a number of ways in which Baklitin’s work on ethics and aesthetics 
provides a lens to a reading of Eliot’s novels, providing criteria for assessing the role 
that incarnation, revelation, and transcendence play in Eliot’s ethics and aesthetics. The 
motif of incarnation is central to both their works.
I draw on three concepts found in Baklitin’s early writings, answerabihty, non­
alibi in being, and excess of seeing, and look at how they help us read Eliot’s novels. In 
the introduction we saw that Bakhtin wrote the following:
I have to answer with my own life for what I have experienced and understood in 
ar t, so that everytlring that I have experienced and understood would not remain 
ineffectual in my life.
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In the next chapter I am going to look at thr ee of Bakhtin’s concepts that ar e found in his 
early philosophical essays. They help us make sense of the argument that the novel is 
about particular people. And in connection with Eliot’s aesthetic aim of extending her 
reader’s sympathies, we see that it helps us articulate sometliing of a narrative ethic, or 
ethics of reading.
A responsible critic of Eliot camrot ignore certain emphases in her work together 
with specific comments made by her. New reading techniques have taken us so far in 
appreciation of the relation of Eliot’s ethics and aesthetics. However, I want to argue 
that more needs to be reclaimed of Eliot’s own express intent and ways of writing, in 
order to appreciate these more fully. I want to argue not only that literature can be a 
mode of etliical thinking, nor that what we read can have an effect on us, but also that 
we are answerable for what we read. Thus, a fuller appreciation of Eliot’s ethics and 
aesthetics, best captiued in her use of the term sympathy, entails an active 
response/answerability on the part of the reader. It is difficult to find the critical 
discourse to express this. I argue that the language and conceptuality that Balditin offers 
in his early philosophical essays can help us understand what Eliot was hoping to 
achieve in her ethics of art.
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Chapter Four: Incarnation and non-alibi in being, excess of 
seeing, and seWother relations in Toward a Philosophy o f the Act 
and Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity^
This thesis explores Eliot’s ethics of ait, namely her aim to extend her reader’s 
sympathies tlii'ough his or her engagement with Eliot’s fiction. In the introduction, I 
intimated that a responsible critical approach to Eliot’s novels needs to be sensitive to 
her aesthetic of challenging and changing the reader. In chapter three I gave a detailed 
consideration of Eliot’s aesthetics, with a particular emphasis on her aim of extending 
her reader’s sympathies. I argued that her aesthetic aim was consistent thi'oughout her 
literaiy career; review essays, letters, and her early fiction all attest that Eliot saw that 
her task as an artist was to extend her reader’s sympathies. In the intioduction and 
chapter thi'ee, I suggested that Eliot’s aesthetics presuppose certain things about her 
readers and about human beings. The end goal of extending her reader’s sympathies is 
aimed at combating the essential and fundamental egoism of the human being. Egoism 
manifests itself in wrong thinldng about our position in tlie world, and wrong thinking 
about OUI* relationships with the other. Wrong tliinking with regards to the other involves 
putting yourself and your claims above that of tlie other, or attempting to subsmne the 
other’s interests within one’s own. Eliot’s artistic aim, then, is to lead us towards right 
thinking about our* position in the world, and towards right thinldng about our 
relationships with others. The pmpose of sympathy is to counter our egoism and our 
moral stupidity, and Eliot aims to move us from egoism towards altruism. Eliot’s 
sympathy is, says Karen Chase in George Eliot, Middlemarch, “an overwhelming of
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instinctive egoism” (42). Our egoism is portrayed in visual metaphors and images 
tlii'oughout Eliot’s fiction; egoists look in mirrors, are short-sighted, and interpret events 
from a limited perspective. Eliot has her chaiacters and her readers move from tliis 
limited perspective. Her goal is for her characters and her readers to transcend their 
limited perspective on the world. We are to leani to see things from the perspective of 
the other. Eliot’s aesthetics are both relational and incarnational. They are incamational 
in the sense that they are dependent on the selfs realisation and acceptance of his or her 
unique position in time and space, and the according responsibilities that go with that 
position. Also, the self must recognise and accept that the other is unique in his or her 
position, and act accordingly toward him or her. In the next paragraph I draw out how 
this aesthetic has ethical implications.
This aesthetic is ethical because it is designed to affect the way we understand 
ourselves in relation to the world and in relation to the other. Eliot’s aim is to make her 
reader sympathise with “every-day fellow-men” {Adam Bede), and to stir her reader’s 
“sympathy with commonplace troubles” such as might “live next door to you” (“Amos 
Barton”). Her argument is that art and literatm*e can surprise even “the selfish into that 
attention to what is apart fr om themselves” (“The Natural History of German Life”). She 
wants her art to encourage her reader to “tolerate,” “pity,” and “love” those amongst 
whom our lives are passed {Adam Bede). We are to “accept” people. Sympathy is aimed 
at avoiding “indifference” and “prejudice” {Adam Bede). It is about patience and 
forbearance.
Baklitin’s concept of answerability helps us articulate the ethical dimension of 
Eliot’s aesthetics because he argues that the reader must be responsible or answerable
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for what he or she has read. Eliot’s aesthetic of extending her reader’s sympathy, and 
her desire to avoid didacticism in the process, makes fuller sense when read through the 
lens of Baklitin’s early philosophical essays. In the introduction I argued that Balditin 
and Eliot have a shared interest in etliics and aesthetics. As Marijke Rudnik-Smalbraak 
writes, in “The One and Another: George Eliot’s Dialogic Incarnations,” “both authors, 
Balditin and Eliot, assign a central role to ethics in their thinking and wiiting, and to the 
ways in which ethics and aesthetics are interconnected” (501). Balditin, in “Art and 
Answerability,” says tliat we need to be answerable for what we read. Similarly, Eliot’s 
aestlietics call for her readers to be responsible and answerable for their reading of her 
fiction. In order to facilitate a better understanding of the role that sympathy plays in 
Eliot’s aesthetics and ethics, I propose that we need to pay more attention to the role of 
Christian motifs in Eliot’s novels. In addition, I propose that a study of Baklitin’s 
conceptions of non-alibi in being, excess of seeing, and self/other relations can help 
facilitate this understanding. A detailed study of Baklithi’s ethics and aesthetics, and the 
connections between them, can help us explore the intersection between Eliot’s 
aesthetics and etliics, and tlie extra-textual element of her aesthetics. We will see that 
incarnation is centi al to the aesthetics and the ethics of both authors. Eliot is not a moral 
relativist, but moves towards an incarnational ethics in her fiction.
Eliot’s aesthetic of sympathy operates on an intra-textual and extra-textual level. 
These two are obviously related. Eliot’s aestlietics call for us to be responsible and 
answerable. By getting us to respond to her fiction, she encourages us to respond better 
to those around us; right reading leads to right living. Eliot’s call upon her readers is that 
they have a right perspective on the world, and a right perspective on the other.
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This chapter has two sections, and is stmctured around tlie motif of incarnation. 
The first section reviews why the motif of incarnation has been overlooked in Eliot’s 
novels. The second section focuses on Balditin’s use of the motif of incarnation in his 
understanding of the human person, and the significance of this for Ins ethics and 
aesthetics.
Eliot and incarnation
Eliot was not an Evangelical Clnistian, but the motif of incarnation is present in her 
fiction, and has not been described adequately. Wlien I talk about the motif of 
incarnation in Eliot, I refer to her understanding of the human person, /.e., the human 
person is situated in time and space. The reader is also, for the time of reading, 
incarnated in the text, and is also incarnated in real time and space once the act of 
reading is over. The motif of incarnation foiins a constituent featuie of the design of 
Eliot’s texts both within the text, and beyond the text. This thesis reappraises Eliot’s 
aesthetics of sympathy and the role that theological motifs play in this process. 
Incamation is not an outmoded motif; it is central to her aesthetics. Some of the reasons 
for the critical neglect of religious motifs stem from the cultural climate of ‘Literature 
and Theology’ today, and others horn reading Eliot’s novels tluough a biogiaphical lens 
and seeing them as vehicles for the propagation of the Religion of Humanity. In chapter 
two I argued that literary criticism which focuses on the influence of Strauss, Spinoza, 
Feuerbach, and Comte on Eliot’s life and fiction involves a number of problems. The 
critical neglect of religious and theological motifs in Eliot’s fiction is a result of 
conflating Eliot’s own religious biography with a reading of the novels, i.e., because
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Eliot moved away û'om Evangelical Clnistianity it is sometimes assumed that die novels 
ai'e either not concerned witli religion in any way, or that they can only be read tlnough 
a lens that is dismissive of Christianity. It is easy to overlook the motif of incarnation in 
Eliot’s work if you are intent on proving that she was influenced by someone who 
denied the very possibility of Chiist’s incarnation. In discussions of the influence of 
Strauss, Spinoza, Feuerbach, and Comte on Eliot, there is little discussion about the 
different genres of writing, i.e., little discussion of die fact drat Eliot was a novelist, and 
Strauss, Spinoza, Feuerbach, and Comte were pliilosophical or theological writers. 
Clitics have not examined the structural role that incamation, revelation, and 
transcendence play in the author-reader-text relationship. Religious motifs play a 
significant part in Eliot’s aesthetic aim, on both an intra-textual and an extra-textual 
level.
The nature of Eliot’s emphasis on the individual is one source of the conflict 
between her and the philosophers and theologians she translated. In chapter thr-ee we 
saw that the individual is impoidant in Eliot’s aesthetics. Her aesthetic aim stresses the 
importance of “individual suffering and individual joy.”  ^Literary critics have noted this 
conflict of interest over the natur e and status of the individual in Eliot’s novels and the 
work of Feuerbach and Comte. Much of the criticism of Eliot’s work in relation to 
theology has concentrated on her relationship with these writers, but, once again, not 
enough work has been done on the different styles and what that means for Eliot’s 
aesthetics. In particular, I agree with Peter C. Hodgson’s thinking that Strauss’s 
emphasis on humanity ratlier than individual hmnan beings is mihelpful in reading
' See GEL 2, 402-4.
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Eliot’s novels. The novel is better suited to individual human beings and Bakhtin is 
therefore more help tlian Sti'auss, precisely because of his presentation of the human 
being’s incarnated position in time and space. We also saw that there are important 
differences between tlie geiue and style of Eliot and Feuerbach. Kerry McSweeney, in 
Middlemarch, criticises Feuerbach’s style and says that he is a more “crude” (in the 
sense of less stylistically sophisticated) writer than Eliot (33). Hodgson says 
Feuerbach’s writing is “too predictable,” “too imnuanced,” “too prosaic,” and “too 
insensitive” (160-61). Feuerbach does not give attention to the “concrete and particular,” 
and the details of an individual life. His writing is too systematic and does not pay 
enough attention to the individual. There is a gap between theological and philosophical 
systems and the novel.
The novel has more scope for nuances Üian philosophy, and can give attention to 
the concrete and particular. In chapter tlnee we saw that Martha Nussbauni and his 
Murdoch argue that the individual is important in the novel. Nussbaum argued that the 
novel helps us care for particulars, and for the particular circumstances in which an 
individual finds liim or herself, and Murdoch argued that novel reading and novel 
writing plunges one into the details of life. As a novelist Eliot is able to make us care for 
individuals and particular circumstances in ways tliat are unavailable to philosophers 
and theologians. Hodgson also argues that Eliot was not inclined to worship or idolise 
hiunan beings. She did not want to venerate human beings, but to increase our sympathy 
for one another. Terry Wright and Helena Granlund point out a very useful 
differentiation between Comte and Eliot’s thinking on humanity; Comte did not have 
sympathy for humanity as a whole, whereas Eliot presented mediocre characters, and
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asked for our sympathy. In short, I ai'gue that Eliot’s relation with these thinkers is 
neither the only nor the best way to view the religious and theological motifs in her 
novels.
In section three of chapter two I examined fom* other ways in which Eliot’s 
relationship to Clnistianity has been explored, i.e., her use of biblical language, her 
presentation of Dorothea, her sympathetic treatment of Dissent and Evangelicalism, and 
the way in which contemporary theologians have examined her work. Despite literary 
criticism that examines Eliot’s use of biblical language in general and in specific 
passages, there is still more to be said about her relation to Clnistianity, and the motifs 
of incarnation, revelation, and transcendence. Lisa Balthazar argues that Eliot’s wiitings 
show her high regard for the Bible as an eüncal source, but does not expand on this. I 
want not only to discuss Eliot’s use of biblical language, but also to assess the role that 
theological motifs play in her aesthetics. Hieological motifs form a bridge between 
aesthetics and ethics. Barry Qualls argues that Eliot uses biblical contexts and structui'es 
in the novel and I hope to draw this out in chapters five and six. I argued that criticism 
of these areas does not give a full analysis of the motifs of incarnation, revelation, and 
transcendence that are formd in Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda. Although some 
critics point to Eliot’s sympathetic portrayal of religion, or religious figures in her 
fiction, this is on a thematic level. Religious themes are explored on a superficial level. 
In my discussion of Eliot and theologians, I looked at the work of Hodgson and Mary 
Grey. I argued that they are less interested in examining the religious motifs that are 
found in Eliot’s fiction, than they are in mining her work to help them in their own 
theological reflection. The question of whether literary texts can be mined for
144
theological trutlis is beyond the scope of my discussion. None of these four approaches 
consider the link between Eliot’s aesthetics and ethics, and the role that religious motifs 
play in this. This lack of good critical commentary on Eliot’s use of religious motifs is 
the reason for my Balditinian reading of Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda. I now turn 
to examine in detail the role that the motif of incamation plays in Bakhtin’s early 
philosophical essays.
Bakhtin and incarnation
Balditin scholars have begun to pay more attention to religious motifs in his work in 
general, and to incamation in particular. Previous scholarship in the West has “ignored” 
or “fiercely contested” the religious dimension of Baklitin’s work, say Susan M. Felch 
and Paul J. Contino in Bakhtin and Religion: A Feeling for Faith (1).  ^ The previous 
neglect of religion in Baklitin’s work is another illustration of the unwillingness of the 
academy to engage with Christian thinking. In this section I draw on the recent studies 
by Ruth Coates and Alexandar Mihailovic, which focus on Christian motifs and 
theological discourse in Baklitin. Theh books are Christianity in Bakhtin: God and the 
exiled author, and Corporeal Words: Mikhail Bakhtin's Theology o f Discourse? As 
Baklitin scholars, neither Coates nor Mihailovic are directly concerned either with 
interdisciplinary work between literature and theology, or with critical readings of
" Susan M. Felch and Paul J. Contino, eds. Bakhtin and Religion: A Feeling fo r Faith (Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 2001).
 ^Ruth Coates’s Christianity in Bakhtin: God and the exiled author is reviewed by G. Tihanov in Russian 
Review 59:2 (April 2000): 294-295, and by M. Bveritt in Expositoiy Times 111,1 (October 1999): 35. 
Alexandar Mihailovic’s Corporeal Words: Mikhail Bakhtin’s  Theology o f Discourse is reviewed by Denis 
Cmkovic, in Slavic and East European Journal 42:3 (Fall 1998): 551-552, and by Sidney Monas, in 
Russian Review 57:4 (Oct 1998): 627-628.
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Eliot’s novels. However, their work provides a substantial groundwork for my reading
of Eliot’s novels, and I accept their conclusions and build on them. Their study of the
motif of incamation in Balditin provides a ftamework for my study of the neglected
religious motifs in Eliot’s aesthetics. Incamation is central to Baklitin’s ethics and
aesthetics and central to the thi'ee concepts that I am going to look at in tliis chapter.
Coates begins Christianity in Bakhtin with the premise that the Clnistian motifs
in Balditin’s work have been overlooked. In her nionogiaph she focuses exclusively on
Clnistianity.She writes:
[Ajlthough Bakhtin has been appropriated for a wide variety of critical and 
literary theoretical positions, ranging from Marxism to post-structuralism, it has 
been generally assumed that he is a secular tliinlcer even where it has been 
accepted that he was a religious man. I believe that tliis assumption stands in 
need of some coiTection. (1)^
Coates is not arguing that Baklitin is a theologian, or that he is a Clnistian philosopher
or literary theoretician. She argues tliat he is not a systematic theologian because certain
elements of tlie Chiistian kergyma are Mglilighted by him, while others are neglected.
She identifies the highlighted elements as being Creation, Fall, and Incamation, and
neglected elements as being Resuixection and Judgement. Coates says that because
Bakhtin’s Chiistianity, as it is manifested in his texts, does not conform fully to any of
its traditional systematic-theological renderings, it is “more proper to speak of ‘Chiistian
motifs’ than of ‘Cliristianity’ or ‘Cliristian theology’ in Baklitin’s work” (21). She
argues that he is, rather, a pliilosopher whose work is fed by certain aspects of the
 ^Coates does not engage with Bakhtin scholars who would disagree with her, but she does provide a 
thorough review of secondary material on Bakhtin that has neglected Christianity and Christian motifs, 9- 
20.
 ^Implicit in this observation is the incongr uity that suggests that Bakhtin can be a secular thinker and a 
religious man at one and the same time.
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Chiistian vision of and for the world (21-2). Coates relies on textual rather than
biograpliical evidence as a reason for looking at his writings and Clnistianity. Her
methodology is one of close reading: “I consider certain Clnistian elements to be ‘there’
in Bakhtin’s text and endeavour to make the reader aware of them in what is essentially
an exercise in close reading, an ‘immanent’ exploration of Balditin” (21). She argues
that there is a “coherent theistic framework to Balditin’s aesthetic theory” (84). My
reading of Eliot follows a similar methodology; I consider the motifs of incarnation,
revelation, and transcendence to be ‘there’ in her texts, and I offer a close reading of
Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda in chapters five and six,
Mihailovic has similarly noted the presence of theological motifs in Bakhtin’s
work. Like Coates, Mihailovic also says there is biographical evidence for looking at
Baklitin in relation to Christianity, but he too relies on textual evidence.*’ Both recognise
die importance of incarnation. Mihailovic begins Corporeal Words with this statement:
Although many scholars have speculated about the mfluence of Eastern 
Orthodox religious thought on Mildiail Bakhtin’s life and work, few have been 
moved to examine it in detail. (1)
Mihailovic argues that on the basis of textual evidence there is a compelling reason for
regarding Bakhtin’s relation to theology as being central to his work (4). He says that
“there is much in Bakhtin’s criticism that does lend itself to theological paradigms” (1).
For him, “The reverberations of diction with cMstological overtones are audible in
viitually every piece Baklitin wrote” (7). He wiites about:
[T]he sheer density, paradigmatic clarity, and deliberate orchestiation of 
Balditiii’s theologically inspired terms and conceptual categories [. . .].
 ^Galin Tihanov obsei-ves that one o f  the differences between Coates and Mihailovic is the different 
emphasis that they place on Bakhtin’s relation to Orthodoxy. See his review o f Christianity in Bakhtin in 
The Russian Review  59:2 (April, 2000), 294.
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Theological categories and terms recalling clnistology in general and 
Trinitarianism in particular emerge in almost every essay in Baklitin’s long and 
varied career. (4-5)
Mihailovic suggests that Russian critics of Balditin have traditionally been more attuned 
to religious aspects of liis work than those in the West. However, the work of Coates and 
Mihailovic is beginning to reverse this trend. Balditin scholars are beginning to 
recognise that Christianity is an integral part of Bakhtin’s thiiildng. More specifically, 
incamation is part of his thinking. I will discuss the role that intra-tiinitarian relations 
and the Chalcedon formulation concerning Clirist’s divinity and humanity play in 
Bakhtin’s wiitings. I now discuss tluee of Balditin’s concepts: non-alibi in being, excess 
of seeing, and selfrother relations. I situate this discussion within Balditin’s 
understanding of the human person, as it is presented in his philosophical essays. 
Toward a Philosophy o f the Act and “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity.”^
Non-alibi in being and incarnation
In this section I examine Bakhtin’s understanding and description of the human being in 
time and space. His early essays contain specific descriptions of the human being in 
time and space. Balditin is keen to stress the uniqueness of every human being. I look at 
two lengthy descriptions that aie found in Toward a Philosophy of the Act and unpack 
some of theii* ethical and aesthetic implications. In the course of this discussion of 
Balditin’s understanding of the human person I articulate what he understands by ‘non­
alibi in being,’ ‘excess of seeing,’ and ‘self other relations.’
’ Toward a Philosophy o f the Act. Trans. Vadim Liapunov. Eds. Vadim Liapunov and Michael Holquist 
(Austin: University o f Texas Press, 1993), and “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity,” ytrt and
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Toward a Philosophy o f the Act cenfres on the principle of the individual person
situated in a particular and unique place in time and space. Baklitin writes:
I, too, participate in Being in a once-occmi'ent and never-repeatable manner: I 
occupy a place in once-occuiTent Being that is unique and never-repeatable, a 
place that cannot be taken by anyone else and is impenetiable for anyone else. In 
the given once-occurrent point where I am now located, no one else has ever 
been located in the once-occuiTent time and once-occiment space of once- 
occurrent Being. And it is around this once-occurrent point that all once- 
occurrent Being is arranged in a once-occurrent and never-repeatable manner. 
That which can be done by me can never be done by anyone else. The 
uniqueness or singularity of present-on-hand Being is completely obligatory. 
(40)
This is more than a physical (spatial and temporal) description of the human being. It is
also an ethical and relational description. The uniqueness and responsibility are tied
together, and Clirist is a perfect exemplar of someone who recognises his uniqueness
and acts responsibly in light of that. In Christianity in Bakhtin Coates says:
Wlienever Cluist is mentioned in Bakhtin’s early work [. . .] it is to put him 
foiivard as a perfect model of the ideal wliich Balditin is setting out. In 
‘Philosophy of the Act’ [ /^c] he is said to epitomise the subject aware of his or 
her unique position in being and act responsibly in the liglit of it. (34)
hi the previous quotation from Toward a Philosophy o f the Act we saw that each human
being is unique. In the quotation from Coates we see how the combination of uniqueness
and responsibility is tied directly to Christ. The relation between uniqueness and
responsibility is crucial to Baklitin’s ethics and aesthetics, and is tied directly to the
person and work of Christ. We will see that for Eliot there is a similar relation between
the unique individual and his or her responsibility that moves towards an incamational
ethics. Wliat is of specific interest is not just this uniqueness, but tlie responsibility that
stems from it. Coates discusses coimections between this uniqueness and moral
Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays byM . M. Bakhtin, eds. Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov
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responsibility; “Baklitin’s understanding of moral responsibility is based on the
historical (spaciotemporal) iixeplaceability of the subject” (33). She writes:
Responsibility is crucial to Baklitin’s conception of the act and is based on the 
fact of OUI' uniqueness as an T’, on what Balditin calls oui* ‘non-alibi in being’, 
from which it follows that ‘what can be accomplished by me cannot ever be 
accomplished by anyone else’. Faced with this fact I can either ignore it, or 
acloiowledge it and stiuctme everything around an awareness of my moral 
responsibility for my unique actions. (28)
Coates ties tliis understanding of the individual in time and space with Clnistianity. She
writes:
I believe Bakhtin’s concern with the moral implications for individual human 
beings of their concrete, spatiotemporal and historical existence to be inspired 
primarily by tlie Judaeo-Clnistian world-view [...]. (34)
In the rest of this section we see that this moral responsibility is to the other, and is most
vividly expressed by Bakhtin in visual metaphors. Oui’ actions and responsibilities flow
from this position. We cannot act “as i f ’ we were anyone else, or pretend to be someone
we are not. Because of oui' uniqueness we are morally obligated to act. We are, says
Balditin, answerable for our uniqueness. Tliis line of thinking differentiates Bakhtin
fr om Kant.^ Balditin does not want us to act as if our actions were to be valued the same
in every imaginable context; he wants our act to be specifically related to the time and
place in which we live. His ‘Philosophy of the Act’ arises from the phenomenon of our
situatedness, rather than from any abstract position or abstiact reasoning.
Michael Holquist, in the foreword to Toward a Philosophy o f  the Act,
distinguishes Bakhtin’s writings on ethics from those of Kant, He describes the essay as
(Austin: University o f Texas Press, 1990), 4-246.
 ^Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist discuss the relation between Baklitin and Kant in “The Influence of 
Kant in the Early Work o f M. M. Bakhtin,” Litermy Theoiy and Criticism (Festschrift fo r  René Wellek), 
ed, Joseph P. Strelka (New York: Peter Lang, 1984), 299-313.
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“an attempt to deti'anscendeiitalize Kant, and more paiticulaiiy to think beyond Kant’s
formulation of the ethical imperative” (ix). Holquist writes:
But Kant’s ethic leaves something important out, according to Bakhtin. The 
system is liighly abstiact: it gains in autliority by marking a distance from the 
specific, the local -  anytliing, in other words, that has an odor of the subjective 
about it. Baklitin in this volume is seeking to get back to the naked immediacy of 
experience as it is felt from within the utmost particularity of a specific life, (x)
Rather than act “as i f ’ the same principle applied in every situation, we are to act in light
of om* “non-alibi”; and this is centred on the incarnation of Chiist. Wliat distinguishes
Baklitiii’s thinking from that of Kant is Baklitin’s stress on Chiist’s incamation, and its
significance for the ethical behaviom* of individual human beings. Balditin’s philosophy
is specifically tied to Christ’s incamation, and in tliis way is definitely not abstract. As
Ruth Coates says: “the Incarnation informs and theologically legitimates Bakhtin’s
consistent preference for the concrete world of human experience against abstiact
concepts, for what we may term an ‘incamational’ view of truth. In ‘Philosophy of the
Act’ [jzc], as we have seen, Bakhtin lays gi'eat emphasis on the necessity for tlieoretical
truth to be incoiporated into spatiotemporal reality if it is to become living and binding
upon individuals” (35). Coates says that incarnation in Bakhtin’s work is the antidote to
abstraction (34).
Alan Jacobs, in an essay entitled “Bakhtin and the Hermeneutics of Love,” also 
recognises that the motif of incamation is at the centre of Bakhtin’s concept of 
answerability.^ He argues that recognising that one is unique is a necessary but not 
sufficient step towards answerability. He argues: “answerability is achieved only when I
Alan Jacobs, “Bakhtin and the Hermeneutics o f Love,” Bakhtin and Religion, 25-45.
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recognize that the ‘fact of uniqueness’ imposes a responsibility upon me that I cannot
avert. Wlien I aclmowledge my responsibility and act upon it -  whetlier in a
conversation with a friend or in reading a novel [. . .] this is the incarnated deed” (34).
This answerability can be directed towards the human other and towai'd literary texts.
We will see how non-alibi in being and excess of seeing are concepts that can be as
readily applied to the understanding and interpretation of literaiy texts as they can to the
understanding and interpretation of people.
To understand the link between uniqueness and responsibility and its relation to
Christianity fiuther, it is necessary to quote at length from Toward a Philosophy o f the
Act. Baklitin refers to our ‘non-alibi in Being’:
Furthermore, what is also given here in a non-fused yet undivided form is both 
the moment of my passivity and the moment of my self-activity: [1] I find 
myself in Being (passivity) and I actively participate in it; [2] both that which is 
given to me and that which is yet to be acliieved by me: my uniqueness is given, 
yet at the same time it exists only to the extent to which it is really actualized by 
me as uniqueness -  it is always in the act, in the performed deed, i.e., is yet to be 
acliieved; [3] both what is and what ought to be: I am actual and iixeplaceable, 
and therefore must actualize my uniqueness. It is in relation to the whole actual 
unity that my unique ought arises from my unique place in Being. I, the one and 
only I, can at no moment be indifferent (stop participating) in my inescapably, 
compellently once-occuixent life; I must have my ought, hi relation to 
everything, whatever it might be and in whatever circumstances it might be 
given to me, I must act from my own unique place, even if I do so only inwardly. 
My uniqueness, as compellent non-coinciding with anytliing that is not 7, always 
makes possible my own unique and ineplaceable deed in relation to everything 
that is not 7. That I, from my unique place in Being, simply know and see 
another, that I do not forget him, tliat for me, too, he exists -  that is something 
only I can do for him at the given moment in all of Being: that is the deed which 
makes his being more complete, the deed wliich is absolutely gainful and new, 
and which is possible only for me. This productive, unique deed is precisely 
what constitutes the moment of the ought in it. The ought becomes possible for 
the first time where there is an acknowledgement of the fact of a unique person’s 
being from witliin that person; where this fact becomes a center of answerability 
-  where I assume answerability for my own uniqueness, for my own being. (41- 
2)
152
This extract is extremely important for Baklitin’s understanding of the role of
incamation in ethics and aesthetics. A key phrase is “non-fused yet undivided.” This is a
verbal echo of the Chalcedon formulation that Christ’s human and divine natures exist
in one person, “without confusion, without change, without division, without
separation.” In a rhetorically striking move, Baklitin likens the human being in time and
space, and his or her ensuing responsibility, to the two sides of Christ’s nature. Our
uniqueness and oui' moral responsibility are like the human and divine nature of Christ,
i.e., non-fused, yet undivided. Just as Clnist’s two natures cannot be separated so we can
not separate our uniqueness from our answerability and responsibility. This constitutes
‘oughtness’ or ‘answerability.’ Incarnation is thus at the heart of Balditin’s concept of
answerability. Charles Lock, in “Balditin and Tropes of Orthodoxy,” writes:
the centi'al paradigm of Balditin’s thinking is the Incamation as understood in 
pati'istic and Orthodox theology. The formula affirmed at the Council of 
Chalcedon in 451, that the person of Christ is a hypostasis of two natures, divine 
and human -  “without confusion, without change, without division, without 
separation” -  seiwes Bakhtin as a paradigm for the dialogical: two voices in the 
hypostasis of one word. (98)^ *^
Lock ai'gues that this allusion to the Chalcedon formulation of Chiist’s divinity clearly
linlcs non-alibi in being and the motif of incarnation. Lock says that just as Chi'ist
embraced the limits of time and space, so must each individual embrace his or her own
“unique situatedness” and, in the words of Bakhtin in Toward a Philosophy o f the Act,
“develop humility to the point of participating in person and being answerable in
person” (52).
Charles Lock, “Balditin and the Tropes o f  Orthodoxy,” Bakhtin and Religion: A Feeling fo r  Faith, 97- 
119.
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In chapters five and six I will use non-alibi in being to read Eliot -  and I will use 
it on an intia-textual and extia-textual level. Characters and readers alike learn that they 
do not have an alibi in being. To pretend to have an alibi is wi'ong in Eliot’s world view. 
In paiticular I will look at how non-alibi in being affects our understanding of the 
human being’s position in the world and how it affects self/other relations. We will see 
that non-alibi in being works on intia-textual and extra-textual levels in tlie chapters on 
Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda. Baklitin helps us analyse the importance of 
recognising both one’s uniqueness and one’s responsibilities for both Eliot’s characters 
and Eliot’s readers. By extending the concept of non-alibi in being and answerability to 
a reading of Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda, the implication for the reader is that he 
or she is to be changed by reading the text, and he or she camiot claim an alibi for what 
he or she has learnt and experienced from his or her reading. Eliot’s ethics of ait, her 
aim of extending her reader’s sympathies, works when the reader recognises that he or 
she camiot claim an alibi for his or her reading of Eliot’s novels. Thus Baklitin helps us 
read Eliot on two levels.
Eliot’s novels allow her greater freedom to explore the consequences of trying to 
claim an alibi than do Balditin’s writings. In his wiitings it is the noim that the ethical 
person accepts both his or her uniqueness, and his or her responsibility. Bakhtin does, 
however, concede that there are people who choose not to live like this. It is clear that 
Balditin does not see this behaviour as normal; it is an aberration from the nomi. He 
describes this “non-incamated thought, non-incarnated action” as an “empty possibility” 
(43). Coates says that the Russian prefix of samo (meaning “self’) occurs with 
astonishing frequency tlnoughout Toward a Philosophy o f the Act. Samo, she says in
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“The First and the Second Adam in Balditin’s Early Thought,” is used in the context of 
the false autonomy of human beings who abrogate responsibility for their actions, and 
she says Bakhtin calls these “impostors” or “pretenders.”*^ Coates says that this 
language connotes the bid of Adam and Eve for the autonomy from God, as recounted in 
the Genesis naixative. Coates paraphrases Baklitin: “Wlien one chooses not to interact 
with the world, with others, kenotically, one denies one’s uniqueness and lives a ‘non­
incarnated fortuitous life as an empty possibility’” (70).
One of the differences between Eliot’s novels and Balditiii’s writings is that in 
her novels there are more characters who try and claim an alibi, than there are characters 
who are willing to embrace their uniqueness and their responsibilities. As part of her 
aestlietic aim, Eliot shows us the results of these moral choices. Whereas Balditin asserts 
that claiming an alibi is wrong, Eliot, as a novelist, is able to show us the consequences 
of claiming an alibi. Through her presentation of extreme egoistic behaviour Eliot is 
able to show the consequences of trying to claim an alibi for being: the result is moral 
death.
In Eliot’s novels it is the characters who do try to embrace their uniqueness and 
their responsibilities who are the moral touchstones of the novels. When an Eliot 
character recognises his or her uniqueness and the ensuing responsibility, he or she is 
able to transcend his or her egoism and move towards altruism. An acceptance of one’s 
uniqueness and one’s responsibilities leads to a right understanding of the self in relation 
to the other. A textual example of this will be given in this chapter, with a brief 
explication of Romola and non-alibi in being. More detailed textual examples fr om
” Ruth Coates, “The First and the Second Adam in Bakhtin’s Early Thought,” Bakhtin and Religion: A
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Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda will be given in chapters five and six. Transcendence 
of one’s egoism is possible with an understanding of one’s own incarnation in time and 
space and the understanding that the other is also incarnated in time and space. I will 
argue in chapters five and six that Eliot’s presentation of egoists and the consequences 
of their behaviour in Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda is an integral part of her aim of 
extending her reader’s sympathies. The failures of Rosamond, Casaubon, and 
Grandcomf to accept their uniqueness and its responsibilities are an example for the 
reader of how not to behave.
I will now look at the second of Baklitin’s concepts that help us read Eliot’s 
aesthetics of sympathy. In Bakhtin’s writing, our unique position in the world results in 
a corresponding unique view of the world, what he calls our ‘excess of seeing.’ Unless 
we acknowledge that this unique vision also has unique responsibilities, all we will be 
left with is a solipsistic view of the world. However, if we use our ‘excess of seeing’ 
relationally, then we can be ethically responsible for the other.
Excess o f  seeing and incarnation
In this section I look at how Bakhtin’s understanding of the self as situated in time and
space in a unique and umepeatable manner results in what he calls an ‘excess’ of seeing.
By this he means that om- uniqueness in time and space constitutes a unique way of
looking at the world. In “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity,” Bakhtin writes:
This ever-present excess of my seeing, knowing, and possessing in relation to 
any other human being is founded in the uniqueness and iixeplaceability of my 
place in the world. For only I -  the one-and-only I -  occupy in a given set of
Feeling fo r  Faith, 63-78.
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circumstances tliis particular place at this particular time; all other human beings 
are situated outside me. (23)
This excess of seeing both depends on oui- incamation in time and space and is directed
towards the other. Excess of seeing is always in relation to the other. If we fail to use our
‘excess’ relationally, all that would remain is oui' own limited perspective on the world.
The responsible thing to do with this ‘excess’ is to use it in relating to the other. Wliat
we see and how we see are dependent on our uniqueness. Michael Holquist, in the
Introduction to Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays o f M. M. Bakhtin,
writes:
The a priori from which the rest of Bakhtin’s thought flows is the assumption 
that each of us occupies a situation in existence that, for the time we occupy such 
a space, is ours and ouis alone: what I see is not the same as what anyone else 
sees. Perception, how I “see” the world, is always refracted, as it were, through 
the optic of my uniqueness. Bakhtin calls this uniqueness of vision my “excess 
of seeing” insofai' as it is defined by the ability I have to see things others do not. 
(xxi;)*^
Our unique way of looking at the world is the visual outflowing of our imique position 
in the world, that we saw in the section on non-alibi in being.
Similarly, Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, in Creation o f a Prosaics, 
recognise that excess of seeing is both relational and dependent upon oui* uniqueness. 
They employ the word ‘surplus’ rather than ‘excess,’ but the meaning is tlie same. They 
write:
Here it is worth stiessing that the idea of suiplus is essential for Baklitin’s early 
understanding of the self because it is a way of locating and describing what 
makes each self radically singular and ir-replace-able. In using these spatial 
words, we imitate Bakhtin, who took the simple fact that each of us occupies a 
singular place at a given time as a frguie for (and a consequence of) oui' radical
Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays by M M . Bakhtin. H ie inti'oduction is called 
“Introduction: The Architectonics o f  Answerability.”
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singularity in many other respects. Physical and temporal specificity is a sort of 
synecdoche of oiu larger irreplaceability. (184-85)
In essence, because of our unique position in time and space we have a unique visual
perspective.
Caiyl Emerson takes this discussion about unique vision one stage further in an 
article entitled “Russian Orthodoxy and the Early Bakhtin.”*^ She states explicitly that 
excess of seeing is relational; it has implications for oiu relationship with the other. 
Emerson writes:
Baklitin begins his discussion of self-other relations in his early manuscripts with 
a simple observation: we ar'e distinguished from one another by the quality and 
contours of the “surplus” that each one of us enjoys in relation to every other. I 
can see you, but I cannot see what is behind my own head; from your- position 
you can see me, but only in your own way, not as anyone else sees me. It follows 
that every body in space “finalizes” every other body from a different 
perspective, and thus any image of anyone requires, as a minimum, two concrete 
consciousnesses at work. (116)
Emerson connects Balchtin’s excess of seeing to the Orthodox Cliristian theology of the
icon. She argues that there is a relationship between Balditin’s thought and Russian
Orthodox drought about icons. She argues that the syntax of icons is different fr om the
syntax of western portraiture. She refers to Leonid Ouspensky’s The Tlieology o f the
Icon, and says: “The syntax of the icon is based rather on a dynamic multiplicity of
viewpoints, with its several implied observers set inside the represented world. The
many points of view coexisting within self-contamed icon space constitute a paradigm
Caryl Emerson, “Russian Orthodoxy and the Early Bakhtin,” Religion and Literature 22.2-3 (Summer- 
Autumn 1990): 109-31.
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for plurality of vision.” Emerson argues that unlike a portrait, an icon invites
multiplicity. As a tluee dimensional, physical object, it can be viewed from many
different perspectives. This analysis can be extended to oiu understanding of the human
person. As an icon can be viewed from many perspectives, so can a human person who
is embodied in time and space. The incarnated human being can be looked at
relationally by others.
Emerson says that in Balditin’s later work on Dostoevsky he discovered the
potential of language to embed, communicate, and supplement multiple discrete view
points even more than this visual ‘excess’ or ‘surplus.’ Emerson connects such excess of
seeing back to oui" incarnation in time and space when she writes: “But something like
an “ethics of vision,” an insistence on the irreplaceable responsibility that is generated
by material embodiment in space, remains with Baklitin throughout his life” (118). This
excess of seeing entails as much responsibility and answerability as our incarnated
position in time and space.
We learn more about excess of seeing in “Author and Hero.” Here we read that if
two persons look at each other, one sees aspects of the other person and of the space that
the other occupies that the other does not and cannot. It is important to emphasise that
this dynamic is relational. In the same way that I can see tilings about the other that he
or she cannot see, he or she can see things about me tliat I cannot see. Michael Holquist,
in the Introduction to Art and Answerability, also recognises the other:
The dialogical paradox of this formulation is that eveiy human being occupies 
such a determinate place in existence: we are all unique, but we are never alone. 
Bakhtin’s enterprise is founded on the situatedness of perception and thus the 
uniqueness of the person, but it abhors all claims to oneness. It is not only tlie 
case that from my unique situation in space and time I am able to see things you
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do not: it is also -  and simultaneously -  tlie case that from the vantage of your 
uniqueness you can see things tliat /  cannot. (xx*v/)
We have seen that excess of seeing is related to non-alibi in being; it is the visual
outflowing of it. In the same way that our unique position entails responsibilities, so
does our unique vision. Our unique vision has relational responsibilities. The self can
see things that the other cannot, but the other sees things that the self cannot. We will
see in chapter five that after Dorothea helps Rosamond, the later reciprocates and helps
Dorothea see things that from her own perspective she cannot see.
I will use this concept of excess of seeing in my reading of Middlemarch and
Daniel Deronda in chapters five and six. On an intra-textual level this helps us read
Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda, Eliot is less optimistic about this unique vision than
Balditin. For her, it is unique, but definitely limited. Bakhtin’s excess of seeing can help
us understand the way that moral egoism is often expressed in visual tenus. Dorothea,
Casaubon, Rosamond, and Bulstiode all have unique ways of looking at the world. On
an extia-textual level, the reader also has a limited perspective, but the encounter with
the other that is Middlemarch or Daniel Deronda can change the way we look at the
world. On tlie other hand, Eliot is more willing than Bakhtin to explore the
consequences of what happens when we do not use this excess properly.
Self/other relations and incarnation
In this section I look at how Baklitin’s understanding of self/other relations is informed 
by the Cliristian concept of incamation. The argument in this section builds on the work 
of section one. In that section we saw that the motif of incamation was centi'al to 
Balditin’s understanding of the unique position in time and space of each human being
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and the consequent responsibilities of that uniqueness. We saw that the unique position
of each human being and the responsibilities that that entailed were likened by Baklitin
to the two sides of Chiist’s natui'e, and were thus described as “non-fused yet
undivided.” This understanding of the human being has consequences for the selfs
interaction with the other. Our self is situated and embodied and so we have
responsibilities not just absti'actly, or in general, but with paiticular people. We interact
specifically with other human beings.
Coates argues that Chiisf s incarnation is important for Bakhtin’s understanding
of self/other relations. She argues that the theological dimension of Balditin’s work on
self/other relations needs to be taken seriously. She highlights two passages in “Author
and Hero” in which Bakhtin makes it explicit that Christianity provides a model for his
thinldng. Balditm aigues that there is a radical distinction between the way one relates to
the self and the way one relates to the other. In “Author and Hero” we read:
This radical difference is of essential significance not only for aesthetics, but 
also for ethics. It should suffice to recall the inequality in principle between the I  
and the other with respect to value in Cliristian ethics: one must not love oneself, 
one must love the other; one must not be indulgent toward oneself, one must be 
indulgent toward the other; and in general, we must relieve the other of any 
burdens and take them upon ourselves. (38)
Baklitin refers here to a passage in Galatians where Christ commands his disciples to
take up the burdens of others. In this essay, the other is described vividly in physical
terms:
[I]t is only the other who can be embraced, clasped all around, it is only the 
other’s boundaries that can all be touched and felt lovingly. The other’s fragile 
finiteness, consummatedness, his here-and-now being -  all are inwardly grasped 
by me and shaped, as it were, by my embrace in this act, the other’s outward 
existence begins to live in a new manner, acquires some sort of new meaning, is 
bom on a new plane of being. Only the other’s lips can be touched with our own, 
only on the other can we lay our hands, rise actively above the other and
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“overshadow” all of him totally, “overshadow” him in every constituent feature 
of his existence, “overshadow” his body and within his body -  his soul. (41-2)
For Baklitin, the other is a physical reality, wliich must be borne in mind when we
respond ethically and aesthetically to him or her. In ray readings of Middlemarch and
Daniel Deronda I will show that Eliot’s egoists often fail to respond to the other who is
physically before them, and thus fail to lead a morally responsible life.
In “Author and Hero” there is a direct reference to the Christian God, and the
way in which his Incarnation offers a paradigm for embodied human aestlietic and
ethical acts. We read:
No one can assume a position toward the I  and the other that is neutral. Tlie 
abstract cognitive standpoint lacks any axiological approach, since the 
axiological attitude requires tliat one should occupy a unique place in the unitary 
event of being -  that one should be embodied. Any valuation is an act of 
assurning an individual position m being; even God had to incarnate liimself in 
order to bestow mercy, to suffer, and to forgive -  had to descend, as it were, 
from die abstiact point of justice. Being is, as it were, once and for all, 
iiTcvocably, between myself as the unique one and everyone else as others for 
me; once a position has been assumed in being, any act and any valuation can 
proceed only fr om that position. (129)
In this quotation we see that self/other relations are once again linked to the Christian
God, and specifically to his incamation. Self other relations are dependent on our unique
place in being, a uniqueness that stems fr om our being made in the image and likeness
of God.
In this chapter I have detailed the centiality of the motif of incamation to 
Balditin’s concepts of non-alibi in being, excess of seeing, and selfrother relations. 
Tliese concepts have not only moral and ethical implications, but also hemieneutical and 
aesthetic implications. It is possible to employ these concepts as criteria for the act of 
reading. We are incarnated in the text for the duration of the reading process, and we
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have no alibi for what we have read. Tliese three concepts allow for an answerable act of 
reading. In the chapters on Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda I will explore how these 
concepts can help us read Eliot’s aesthetics. I will use them to show that Eliot’s 
sympathy has both intra-textual and extia-textual dimensions. In the next section I offer 
a brief textual analysis of selected incidents in Romola, in order to show how I will 
proceed with a Balditinian analysis of Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda.
Romola and non-alibi in being
The pui'pose of this section is to ease the transition from the theory of Balditin’s 
concepts to the textual analysis of Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda. In Romola there is 
a very clear example of how non-alibi in being works on an intra-textual level in Eliot’s 
fiction, and it is worth pausing to examine this.*"*
In chapter 36 Romola commences her preparations for leaving Florence. She is 
embittered by her relationship with her husband Tito. He has sold her late father’s 
library, thus breaking his promise not to. She feels that their relationship is “barren” and 
so decides to leave Florence and their maniage (chapter 36, 320). In chapter 40, “An 
Aixesting Voice,” Romola is rebuked by Savonarola and called back to Florence to take 
her place as a citizen of that town, and to return to her maiiiage. At this point in her life, 
Romola is attemptmg to excuse her decision to flee. She claims to have an alibi for her 
behaviour, i.e., she claims that Tito’s behaviom* excuses her own. Also, at this point she 
is pretending to be a nun. We saw that Balditin dislikes those who pretend to have an
George Eliot, Romola, ed. Andrew Brown (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). All subsequent references 
are to this edition.
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alibi, who disclaim the responsibilities tliat their uniqueness entails. Savonarola implores
Romola to accept the responsibilities that stem from her unique and incarnated position.
His words to her are simple, and full of ethical significance: “You are Romola de’ Bardi,
the wife of Tito Melema” (chapter 40, 360). In this sentence Savonarola situates her
relationally and reminds her of where and to whom she has responsibilities. He says,
“You are fleeing from Florence in disguise” (chapter 40, 360). Both the disguise and the
act of fleeing are wrong. He continues: “You have put on a religious garb, and you have
no religious purpose. You have sought the garb as a disguise” (chapter 40, 360). The
repetition shows how important this pretence is to Savonarola. He is not happy about the
pretence itself, or her chosen form of pretence. He rebukes Romola:
It was declared to me who you were: it is declared to me that you are seeking to 
escape fr om die lot God has laid on you. You wish your tme name and your tme 
place in life to be hidden, that you may choose for youiself a new name and a 
new place, and have no rule but your own will. And I have a command to call 
you back. My daughter, you must return to your place, (chapter 40, 360)
The idea of returning to her true place is more than geographical; it is relational and
ethical. When Savonarola calls her back to Florence, he is also calling her back to her
marriage. He says that she has “debts,” the debt of a Florentine woman and the debts of
a wife (chapter 40, 361). These are her duties and Savonarola says that she cannot turn
her back on the lot appointed to her. He says that she cannot choose her duties.
Savonarola Icnows that she is not happy in her married life. But he says that even as a
pagan she is “breaking a pledge” (chapter 40, 362). He tells her she is “committing one
of the gieatest wrongs a woman and a citizen can be guilty o f’ in attempting to flee her
responsibilities (chapter 40, 362). She claims she has her reasons, and he says it is not
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enough. He again draws her attention to Hie pledge she has given in the face of God and 
her fellow men. He claims that she should be faithful to the spoken word.
Romola is “shaken by the suggestion in the Prate’s words of a possible affinity 
between her own conduct and Tito’s” (chapter 40, 362). At this point Romola does not 
see that she has a duty as a citizen of Florence, only the duty of a daughter to her father, 
and that is gone now. In Eliot’s moral vision, the behaviour of Romola, her attempt to 
claim an alibi, is also wrong. It is a move towards egoism. Savonarola rebukes Romola 
for her aloofiiess:
There is hunger and misery in our streets, yet you say, T care not; I have my own 
sorrows; I will go away, if peradventure I can ease them.’ The servants of God 
are stmggling after a law of justice, peace, and charity, that the hundied thousand 
citizens among whom you were bom may be governed rigliteously; but you thinlc 
no more of this than if you were a bird, tliat may spread its wings and fly whither 
it will in search of food to its liking, (chapter 40, 363)
Savonarola says that Romola is proud, and does not hold herself as one of common
blood or common thoughts. He presents her with a stark ethical challenge;
“If you forsake your place, who will fill it? You ought to be in your place now, 
helping in the great work by wliich God will purify Florence, and raise it to be 
the guide of the nations. Wliat! The earth is full of iniquity -  full of groans -  the 
light is still struggling with a mighty darkness, and you say, T camiot bear my 
bonds; I will burst them asunder; I will go where no man claims me’? My 
daughter, every bond of youi* life is a debt: tlie right lies in the payment of that 
debt; it can lie nowhere else. In vain will you wander over the earth; you will be 
wandering forever away from the right.” (chapter 40, 365)
Savonarola says that Romola has no “heart for the neighbours” among whom she dwells
(chapter 40, 365). He says that she cannot claim to escape from these debts by taking up
a religious life, because unlike her brother Dino, she has no vocation for it: “You have
no vocation such as your brother had. You are a wife. You seek to break your ties in
self-will and anger, not because the higher life calls upon you to renounce them”
165
(chapter 40, 365). At tills stage in the nairative Romola does acquiesce with Savonarola, 
and returns to Florence and her maiiiage.
As I said above, Romola is fleeing Florence because of her failing marriage. 
Tito, her husband, is one of Eliot’s gieat character studies in egoism. He betrays his 
adoptive father Baldassarre, betiays Romola and her father when he sells their library, 
and he has a second wife and family. We see his character in the process of decline, as 
he makes moral choices that lead him further towards narcissism. Romola is shocked by 
the Frate’s suggestion of a possible affinity between her conduct and that of Tito. She 
thinlcs that because her filial and marital duties are lessened, she can leave. Savonarola 
challenges her to see her wider duties, as a citizen of Florence. Savonarola wants 
Romola to embrace her responsibilities as a Florentine woman, and not to try and escape 
them. He say that it is in Florence alone that she can discharge her debts. On this 
occasion Romola returns to Florence.
The second occasion on which Romola escapes Florence is when she becomes 
disillusioned not only with her maniage, but also with Savonarola himself. She quaiTels 
with Savonarola over the fate of her godfather, Bemado del’ Nero. She flees Florence in 
a boat. She lands on a plague-infested island, and becomes immediately involved in 
helping and strengthening the islanders. Wlien the immediate danger is past, tlie nanator 
writes:
She had felt herself without bonds, without motive; sinldng in mere egoistic 
complaining that life could bring her no content; feeling a right to say, “I am 
tired of life, I want to die.” That thought had sobbed within her as she fell asleep, 
but from the moment after her waking when tlie cry had drawn her, she had not 
even reflected, as she used to do in Florence, that she was glad to live because 
she could ligliten sorrow -  she had simply lived, with so energetic an impulse to 
share the life around her, to answer the call of need and do the work which cried
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aloud to be done, that the reasons for living, enduring, labouiing, never took the 
foim of ai'gument. (chapter 69, 567)
The significance of this is that Romola is able to recognise the tmth of this for herself.
The first time she flees she returns because Savonarola calls her back. Tliis time her
return is self-initiated. She realises that she cannot claim an alibi. She accepts her
relational ties and answers their call. Romola accepts that her incarnation in time and
space ensui es unique responsibilities and she willingly embraces them:
And then the past arose with a ft esli appeal to her. Her work in this green valley 
was done, and the emotions that were disengaged from the people immediately 
around her rushed back into the old deep channels of use and affection. That rare 
possibility of self-contemplation which comes in any complete severance from 
our wonted life made her judge herself as she had never done before: the 
compunction which is inseparable from a sympathetic nature keenly alive to the 
possible experience of others, began to stir in her with growing force. She 
questioned the justness of her own conclusions, of her own deeds: she had been 
rash, arrogant, always dissatisfied that others were not good enough, while she 
herself had not been true to what her soul had once recognized as the best. She 
began to condemn her flight: after all, it had been cowardly self-care; the 
gi'ounds on which Savonarola had once talcen her back were tiuer, deeper than 
the gi'ounds she had had for her second flight. How could she feel the needs of 
others and not feel above all the needs of the nearest? (chapter 69, 567-68)
In this brief Baklitinian analysis of Romola we see that Bakhtin’s concept of non-alibi in
being enables us to articulate something of Eliot’s moral vision. Romola’s decision to
accept her uniqueness and its responsibilities is what enables her to transcend “mere
egoistic complaining.” Romola is able to transcend her egoistic behaviour when she
accepts both her uniqueness and its responsibilities. Tito, on the other hand, slides
fiuther into egoism and moral decline because he seeks constantly to claim an alibi for
his behaviour. In the following chapters I will offer a reading of Middlemarch and
Daniel Deronda that uses Bakhtin’s concepts. I employ them to help me articulate the
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role that incarnation, revelation, and transcendence have in Eliot’s aim of extending her 
reader’s sympatliies.
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Chapter Five: A theological reading of Middlemarch
"If I help others to see at all it must be tluough that medium of art.”*
hi chapter fom-1 wrote that in order to facilitate a better understanding of the role that 
sympathy plays in Eliot’s aesthetics and ethics, we need to pay more attention to the role 
of Clnistian motifs in her novels. The Oxford English Dictionaiy defines motif as a 
"constituent featuie of a composition,” or as an object “forming a distinct element of a 
design.” In this chapter I will show that the motifs of incarnation and tianscendence are 
constituent featmes of Middlemarch, and that they form a distinct element of its design. 
In addition, I proposed in chapter four that a study of Balditin’s concepts of non-alibi in 
being, excess of seeing, and selfrother relations can help facilitate the role that Christian 
motifs play in Eliot’s aesthetics. A detailed study of Bakhtin’s aesthetics and ethics, and 
the connections between them, can help us to explore the intersection between Eliot’s 
aesthetics and ethics, and the extra-textual dimension of her aesthetics. Bakhtin’s 
concepts of non-alibi in being and excess of seeing can help us to articulate the extra- 
textual dimerrsion of Eliot’s aesthetics, her desire that her reader be changed by the 
act of reading her novels. In this chapter I review Eliot’s aesthetics of sympathy and the 
way in wliich she wants her aesthetics to have an effect on die reader beyond the act of 
reading. I discuss the centrality of the motif of incarnation in each of Bakhtin’s 
concepts, before applying non-alibi in being and excess of seeing to a reading of
’ In a letter to Dr, Joseph Frank Payne, 25 January 1876, Eliot wrote: “I become more and more timid -  
with less daring to adopt any formula which does not get itself clotlied for me in some human figure and 
individual experience, and perhaps tliat is a sign that if  I help others to see at all it must be through that 
medium o f art.” GEL 6, 216-7.
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Middlemarch. In particular, I look at how these concepts can help us articulate both the 
intra-textual and the extra-textual element of Eliot’s aesthetics.
Eliot and the aesthetic o f sympathy
In chapter tliree we saw that Eliot’s aesthetic aim is to extend her reader’s sympathies, 
i.e., that dui'ing and after reading Eliot’s novels a change would occur in the reader. 
Eliot expressed tliis aim in literary criticism, essays, letters and her early fiction, over a 
period of twenty year s. The presupposition entailed in this aesthetics of sympathy is that 
we are all egoists, with a limited perspective on the world. Eliot’s moral vision is that a 
human being is situated somewhere on the egoist/altiuist continuum, and that he or she 
has a coiTesponding limited perspective on the world. In visual terms, our egoism 
expresses itself in a limited perspective on the world. Our egoism, our* inlierent 
selfishness, results in an inability to see things from another’s point of view. Eliot’s aim 
of extending her reader’s sympathies is directed to meet this need in her reader. As 
Helena Granlund writes in The Paradox o f Self-Love: Christian Elements in George 
Eliot’s Treatment o f Egoism: "To Eliot, moral growth entails a widened vision, the 
ability to move outside one’s own point of view and observe the world from a different 
perspective” (153). In the words of an early essay by Eliot, the task of the artist is to 
surprise tire selfish into attention to that which is other than themselves.^ The aim of 
Eliot’s aesthetics, then, is to counter our inherent egoism and our limited perspective on 
the world. Her aesthetics is aimed at moving her reader furtlier towards altruism, and 
towards the transcendence of his or her egoism.
‘The Natural History o f German Life,” Essays o f  George Eliot, 270.
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Eliot’s aesthetic invites a response from the reader. Eliot’s aesthetic aim is to 
produce an effect in tlie reader that goes beyond the encounter with the text. Once the 
act of reading is over, the reader will sympathise with the neighbours among whom he 
or she lives. In the quotation that begins this chapter Eliot talks about the possibility of 
helping others see tilings differently, and this is a constant in her aesthetics. She wants to 
correct our* faulty vision and empower* us to see things from the perspective of another. 
Her* ethics are an ethics of incarnation, and also an ethics of transcendence. The 
characters and reader move toward transcendence of egoism only tlirough an acceptance 
of their position as incar*nated in time and space. The goal of Eliot’s aesthetics in 
Middlemarch is the same goal as of the earlier fiction -  namely to change the way the 
reader relates to those among whom he or she lives. In this chapter I draw on the work 
of the previous chapters to examine the aesthetics of Middlemarch, and the way that 
religious motifs operate within the structure of the novel. Eliot’s aesthetic aim is an 
integral par*t of Middlemarch. As I mentioned earlier, althougli Eliot does not herself use 
the words ‘ethics’ or ‘etliical’ in connection with the aesthetics of sympathy, this change 
in the way we relate to the other is inlierently ethical.
Middlemarch and extra-textual aesthetics
In chapter three we saw that Eliot commented on her aesthetics in letters that she 
composed, but she also received letters attesting to her success in achieving these 
aesthetic aims. This is further evidence that Eliot wants to affect a change in individual 
readers, and she is pleased to hear that it is happening. After the publication of 
Middlemarch, Eliot received letters which proved that her aesthetics were having the
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desired effect on her reader. Although she did not often read critical reviews of her 
work, she was aware of the response of individuals who wrote to her. In her journal of 1 
January 1873, Eliot wi*ote: “I have received many deeply affecting assurances of its 
Middlemarch] influence for good on individual minds.” Similarly, Karen Chase, in 
Middlemarch, quotes from a letter written by Eliot as she was beginning Middlemarch, 
in which she claims that a book’s power depends on “its reception by a few appreciative 
natures,” and the “radiation” outward from group (86). In a letter to Charles Ritter, 11 
Febraary 1873, Eliot says: “Indeed, after my husband’s sympathy letters'from those 
personally unknown to me are the only testimonies to the effect on my writing on which 
I thoroughly rely.”  ^As Suzanne Graver, in George Eliot and Community, wiites: “To 
judge fi’om her readers’ letters to her and contemporary reviews, she often evoked the 
kind of response she intended” (11).
Felicia Bonaparte, in The Triptych and the Cross, suggests that one failure of 
Eliot scholarship is that it has not probed Eliot’s moral vision far enough. I agree that 
there is a need to fill this omission. Bonaparte says that Eliot is not simply offering her 
reader maxims or aphorisms, and that her moral vision is less didactic and more subtle. 
Bonaparte says that at one point readers of Eliot would have assumed that “she was 
preaching simple Clnistian traisms” (33). We saw in chapter tliree that Eliot expressed 
disdain for Kingsley’s tendency to preach, and she wanted to avoid it in her own 
aesthetics. In Eliot’s letters she wrote that she wanted her readers to be moved toward 
the ends she sought by her works as wholes, rather than as an “assemblage of extracts.” 
She wanted to avoid “preaching” and aimed to affect her reader through the stmcture of
 ^ GEL 5, 373-4.
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her works. She wanted to avoid her work being separable into ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ 
teaching."* I intend to probe Eliot’s moral vision through a Baklitinian analysis and to 
assess the role that theological motifs play in Eliot’s moral vision. To read Eliot in an 
accui’ate way we must navigate this tension between her desire to teach and her desire to 
avoid preacliing or didacticism; the theological motifs of incarnation, revelation, and 
transcendence help us do this. Critical work has been written which says that Eliot has 
aims on her reader, but the religious dimension of this process has been ignored. It is for 
•this reason that I use the concepts found in Bakhtin’s early philosophical essays to read 
Eliot’s novels.
Eliot scholars have articulated her moral vision and her desire to move her reader 
away from egoism toward altmism: what has not been studied is the role that theological 
motifs play in this aesthetics. In this section I review the work of literaiy critics who 
suggest that there is an extra-textual element to Eliot’s aesthetics. We saw in chapter 
three that a number of contemporary Eliot scholars have ar gued that there is an extr a- 
textual element to Eliot’s aesthetics. Suzanne Graver, in George Eliot and Community, 
for example, argues that Eliot acliieves the extension of her reader’s sympathies thr ough 
collaboration between the reader and the text (11). Graver says that one way in which 
Eliot fosters this collaboration is to create characters who experience such changes as 
those she would ideally have her readers undergo. However, in this chapter I will argue 
that the relationsliip between the reader and text is better understood through the 
concepts of answerability and responsibility, than it is through collaboration. The reader 
has, in Bakhtinian tenns, no alibi for his or her reading of Middlemarch.
 ^GEL 5, 459.
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Marilyn Higuera, in “Prelude to Vocation,” also discusses the extra-textual 
dimension of Eliot’s wilting, and focuses specifically on Middlemarch. Higuera’s aificle 
is a close reading of the Prelude of Middlemarch. Higuera argues tliat it is not Dorothea 
who achieves reform, or even she who is the most like St Theresa. Rather, says Higuera, 
it is the nanator of Middlemarch who finds her vocation and achieves reform; the 
reform of her reader’s sensibilities. Higuera says that the writing of a novel which, to 
quote from Middlemarch, transforms “the frozen stare with which we look at our 
unintroduced neighbour*” qualifies as a full-fledged vocation (25).  ^Higuera claims that 
Eliot not only wants her reader to feel connected to her characters, but that she wants 
also her reader “to perceive sympathy as a moral act in our lives as well as our reading” 
(24). I concur* with Higuera that Eliot does want her reader to perceive sympathy as a 
moral act in our lives as well as our* reading. The first verb of the Middlemarch is 
“cares” (Prelude, 3) and it is Eliot’s aim to help us care not only for those we meet 
within the confines of the text, but also for tliose we meet beyond the confines of the 
text. Similarly, in the Finale, the naraator suggests that we have cared for* those whom 
we have encountered in the text, and we will care for those whom we shall meet once 
the last page is read (Finale, 818). Sympathy is thus tied to the aesthetics of 
Middlemarch. Eliot’s sympathy does, as Higuera says, go “beyond the book.” The extra- 
textual element or ethical dhnension of this aesthetic is recognised by Mary Ellen Doyle 
in The Sympathetic Response: George Eliot’s Fictional Rhetoric. In chapter three we 
saw that Doyle writes: “[Eliot] wishes to influence the intellectual and emotional
See Middlemarch, chapter 11, 93.
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attitudes of real readers toward other real people in tlie real world outside her books” 
(1). This is an explicit and clear statement of Eliot’s ethical practice.
Higuera and Carol S. Gould both recognise that an important part of Eliot’s 
aesthetics is to help the reader transcend his or her idiosyncratic perspective. That we 
have a unique perspective is given; it is an inlierent part of our nature. Higuera compares 
the careful obseivation of the nan ator of Middlemarch to the “common eyes” who judge 
people (Prelude, 3). This phrase means both ‘common to all,’ and also common as in 
unsophisticated or undiscerning. Higuera expands on what Eliot is trying to achieve by 
this plnase. Higuera tells us that visual motifs are important in Middlemarch', implicit in 
this observation is the idea that tlirough the act of reading Middlemarch oui* common 
eyes are transformed.
Similarly, Carol S. Gould, in “Plato, George Eliot, and Moral Naroissism,” 
argues that the literary artist, or nanative fiction, can help us transcend oui* idiosyncratic 
perspective.^ Gould argues that our ability or inability to transcend oui* own 
idiosyncratic perspective increases or decreases oui* happiness. This ability to transcend 
our idiosyncratic perspective, to see the world from the perspective of another, is a 
necessary condition for our well-being. Gould says that the puipose of Middlemarch is 
not to pohit to our limited perspective on die world and leave it at that -  its aims is to 
help us hanscend it. She argues that according to Eliot, literatuie can be “an effective 
instrument for our moral improvement” (25). I agree with Gould’s arguments, but there 
is more to be said about how Eliot achieves this, and the role that theological motifs play
® Carol S. Gould, “Plato, George Eliot, and Moral Narcissism,” Philosophy and Literature 14.1 (April 
1990): 24-39.
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in tliis process. Om* idiosyncratic perspective is a symptom of our egoism, and it needs 
to be altered if Eliot is to extend her reader’s sympathies.
Bakhtin and Incarnation
In chapter four we saw how Baklitin scholars argue that Clnistianity is an important pait 
of his thinking. We saw that the incarnation of Christ was formative in Bakhtin’s 
understanding of the human person in time and space. In Balditin’s writings his 
understanding of the human person involves a number of givens: (1) the human person 
is incarnated in time and space; (2) each human being is uniquely situated; (3) unique 
responsibilities stem from this unique position; (4) the moral person does not claim an 
“alibi” for this uniqueness; (5) oui* unique position entails a unique perspective on the 
world; (6) each “self’ can see things that the “other” cannot see; (7) a relation of 
reciprocity exists between the “self’ and the “other.” This understanding of the human 
person helps us read Middlemarch. We saw tliat the motif of incarnation is central to 
tlii’ee of Bakhtin’s concepts that emerge from his understanding of the human being in 
time and space. These tlnee concepts are non-alibi in being, excess of seeing, and 
self/other relations. I argue that these three concepts can help us understand the 
dynamism of Eliot’s intra-textual and extra-textual aesthetics. The implications and 
influence of these thi'ee concepts can be extended and applied to the act of reading.
We saw in chapter four that the motif of incarnation was central to each of 
Baklitin’s concepts. Incarnation was important for non-alibi in being in the way in which 
OUI* unique position in time and space is like the uniqueness and particularity of Chiist. 
His uniqueness and particularity guarantee our uniqueness. Moreover, Christ’s unique
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nature (as fully human and fully divine) entailed unique responsibilities; he came to save 
sinners and was crucified as the atoning sacrifice for the sins of the world. His 
uniqueness as God-man meant a unique work. Thus part of human beings being made in 
the likeness and image of God (Genesis 1:27) is that Clirist guarantees our uniqueness, 
but tliis uniqueness has responsibilities, in the same way that Chiist’s uniqueness had 
responsibilities. Clearly, oui* uniqueness and oiu responsibilities are not of the same 
magnitude as those of Christ, but it is this relationship between uniqueness and the 
ensuing responsibilities that means human beings are like Cluist. Baklitin, as we saw, 
takes the Chalcedon doctrine of the two natures of Cluist, human and divine, “without 
confusion, without separation,” and ties our uniqueness and oui* responsibilities in the 
exact same way.
Incamation was important for excess of seeing in that our unique position in time 
and space ensured a unique view of the world. Oui* embodied position in time and space 
means that we see things that other people, in their embodied position, do not see. Tliis 
visual excess is a synecdoche for oui* larger iiTeplaceability. Again, the incarnation has a 
role in our uniqueness and particularity. However, not only does the T’ see things that 
the other does not, but the other also and at the same time, sees things that the self does 
not. The self and the other are therefore in a relationship of reciprocity and both are in a 
position to offer and receive help. The motif of incarnation is important for oui* 
understanding of selfrotlier relations, because in the same way that we are to understand 
that each unique person is situated in a unique time and space, in our interactions with 
the other, we must realise that he or she is also unique.
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I want to ai'gue that each of these tlnee concepts not only has ethical 
implications, particularly with regards to how we tieat those amongst whom we live, but 
they also have implications for the way in which we read literary texts. These concepts 
are at once ethical and aesthetic. Because of the way that they combine the ethical and 
the aesdietic, they offer a way of reading Eliot’s novels which transcends any division 
between ethics and aesthetics that other interpretation of her novels has resulted in. I 
will use Balditin’s concepts of non-alibi in being and excess of seeing to explore Eliot’s 
portiayal of egoism in Middlemarch, and to explore how this relates to Eliot’s aesthetic 
aim of extending her reader’s sympathy.
In this chapter I will relate Eliot’s presentation of the problem of egoism in 
Middlemarch to her aesthetic aim of extending her reader’s sympathies in three ways. 
Her aesthetic aim is to move her reader away from egoism toward altmism. I have 
defined egoism not just as self-regarding action, but as the whole way in which one 
thinlcs about the world and other human beings in relation to oneself. Tlie reader of 
Middlemajxh enjoys a privileged perspective, or multiple perspectives, in relation to the 
characters in the text. The reader enjoys an ‘excess of seeing’ in relation to the 
characters. The extension of the reader’s sympathies involves not just a recognition of 
this outsideness, this ‘excess’, but also the need to use this excess responsibly. In this 
way excess of seeing works on the extra-textual level of Middlemarch. It also works on 
the intra-textual level and I will discuss this below. Not only is our individual 
perspective widened as a result of reading Middlemarch, but also, and as part of the 
process, we learn to use oui* excess of seeing relationally, for the good of the other. The 
moral climax of Middlemarch is Dorothea’s transcendence of her egoism, which enables
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her to rescue morally Rosamond, Lydgate, and Ladislaw. Her action toward them 
depends entirely on her acceptance of her unique position and the responsibilities which 
it entails. Similarly, the reader of Middlemarch must embrace his or her outsideness to 
the characters, to the text as a whole, and to those amongst whom he or she lives. In my 
analysis of the ways in which Eliot relates the poi*ti*ayal of egoism to her aesthetic aims, 
I will show the centrality of the motifs of incamation and transcendence to tliis process.
In section one I will discuss Eliot’s portiuyal of the egoistic behaviour and 
thinking of Rosamond and Casaubon. I will argue that their egoism results in a lack of 
response to the other. This is wiong in both Eliot and Balditin’s moral world view. Eliot 
nudges her reader to responding to her aesthetic by the negative example of 
umesponsiveness and its bad results. In section two I will discuss how Eliot encoui'ages 
her reader to sympathise with dislikable egoistic characters. The reader is not asked to 
approve of their behaviom, but to accept these char acters despite their faults. I will focus 
my discussion on the characters of Bulstiode and Casaubon. As a reader, we have an 
excess of seeing in relation to tliese characters. Otlier characters have excess of seeing in 
relation to these characters, but do not use it in a charitable way. As reader, we are 
encouraged to use our excess of seeing in a charitable way. As reader of Middlemarch 
we should not claim an alibi for what we have read. This is made all the more clear in 
section thr ee. This section focuses on the scenes that form the moral climax of the novel; 
Dorothea’s resolution following her night of anguish, and her conversation with 
Rosamond. Here Dorothea accepts her uniqueness and her responsibility. She transcends 
her egoism, accepts she has no alibi, and acts for the good of others. Through a
179
Balditinian analysis of these scenes we can see how the motifs of incarnation and 
transcendence are central to Eliot’s aesthetic aim.
'‘The candle o f  egoism”: egoism in the behaviour and thinldng o f  
Rosamond and Casaubon^
In this section I discuss Eliot’s portrayal of the egoistic behaviour and thinking of 
Rosamond Vincy and Edward Casaubon. This behaviour* is commended neither by the 
narrative comments nor by its consequences for the marriage partners of these 
characters. In the introduction I quoted from Bakhtin’s essay “The Problem of the Text”: 
“For the word (and, consequently, for a human being) there is nothing more terrible than 
a lack o f response {121)1 Marijke Rudnik-Srnalbraak suggested that in the etliics and 
aesthetics of both Eliot and Bakhtin human beings and words require a response. In my 
discussion of Rosamond and Casaubon I will show the consequences of their failure to 
respond to Lydgate and Dorothea respectively. Rosamorrd and Casaubon, in the words 
from “Author and Hero,” love themselves rather than the other; they are self-indulgent 
and not indulgent to their partners, and they add to, rather than relieve the burdens of 
their* respective partners. We saw that in “Author and Hero” the other is described in 
vividly physical terms, and in larrguage of love and embrace. It is a sign of their lack of 
relationality tliat both Rosamond and Lydgate fail to respond to the physical affections 
of Lydgate and Dorothea.
 ^The phrase “candle of egoism” is adapted from the opening paragraph o f chapter 27, 258. 
 ^“The Problem of the Text,” Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, 103-131.
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Both Rosamond and Casaubon have a very full sense of themselves and of their 
uniqueness, but they do not associate it with any responsibility. We will see that they are 
unable to transcend their egoism and move towards altruism precisely because they fail 
to aclaiowledge that Üreir uniqueness entails responsibility. The consequence of their 
failm*e to aclaiowledge both imiqueness and responsibility is that they do not have a 
coiTect understanding of their place in the world or tlieir relation to others.
Rosamond’s egoistic behaviour is shown in a number of incidents in her 
maniage; the loss of her baby, her writing to Sir Godwin against the expressed wishes of 
Lydgate, and her taking their house off the market. In chapter 58 Rosamond’s baby is 
born prematurely. The narrator tells us: “This misfortune was attributed entirely to her 
having persisted in going out on horseback one day when her husband had desired her 
not to do so” (chapter 58, 566). The reason for Rosamond’s decision to go riding is the 
visit of Lydgate’s relative. She is impressed by his rank and wants to be in his company 
as much as possible, whereas her husband thinks he is a “conceited ass” (chapter 58, 
568). The difference between their opinions of Captain Lydgate is just one indicator of 
their different characters and differing levels of egoism. At Captain Lydgate’s request, 
Rosamond joins him in riding without infbiming Lydgate. When he finds out, Lydgate 
is furious and forbids her to ride again, but she does not give her word not to ride agam. 
The narrator talks of her “victorious obstinacy” (chapter 58, 570). In one paragraph 
there are thirteen personal pronouns representing her egoistic thinking (chapter 58, 570- 
1). She does not take her husband’s request seriously, and does as she pleases. The 
naiTator infomis us that a tiee falls and the horse takes fright, leading Rosamond to 
loosing her baby. Lydgate is profoundly shocked at her “terrible tenacity” (chapter 58,
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571). He knows that she sets aside all his thinldng, and realises that she is not all 
receptive to him. The narrator says: “she believed in her own opinion more than she did 
in his” (chapter 58, 571). It is not only in the riding incident, but in “numberless trifling 
matters” that she sets aside Iris will (chapter 58, 572). Lydgate is aware of the “blank 
unreflecting sm'face” that her mind presents to his aidoui* for his study (chapter 58, 572), 
Rosamond does not act lovingly toward her husband. In “Author and Hero” Balditin 
commends bearing the bm*dens of the other, but Lydgate ends up caiTying Rosamond as 
a burden. In chapter 73 we read that Lydgate is “in a bad mood for bearing her dumb 
mastery” (chapter 73, 730-1), and in chapter 81 the narrator says: “Lydgate had accepted 
liis naiTowed lot with sad resignation. He had chosen this fr agile creatine, and had taken 
the hmthen of her life upon his aims. He must walk as he could, canying that buithen 
pitifully” (chapter 81, 789). There is no reciprocal bearing of one another’s bui'dens in 
this relationship; instead, Rosamond actually becomes Lydgate’s bui'den because she 
will not accept any responsibility for her incarnated position in time and space.
A second incident in which Rosamond exhibits her egoistic behaviour is when 
Lydgate informs her they are in financial difficulties. Lydgate tells Rosamond that they 
are in debt, and says “we must thinlc together about it, and you must help me” (chapter 
58, 580). Her response to this is: “What can I  do, Tertius?” She speaks in a tone of 
“neutral aloofness” (chapter 58, 580). She treats liim like one of another species. 
Lydgate mentally contrasts Rosamond’s behaviour* to him with that of Dorothea’s to 
Casaubon. He recalls that Dorothea cr*ied to be taught what would best comfort 
Casaubon. Whereas Dorothea is fully responsive to Casaubon’s needs, Rosamond is 
completely uinesponsive to Lydgate. We saw in chapter four that for both Eliot and
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Balditin words and persons demand a response. Therefore tliis failui'e to respond to her 
husband is a moral failure. In chapter 69 we read: “He went up and found her stretched 
on the bed pale and silent, without an answer even in her face to any word or look of 
his” (chapter 69, 689). This lack of response is due to Rosamond’s egoism, her inability 
to thinlc of the other. The narrator is cleaily not in support of this behaviour. The 
significance of this lack of response is that it is tme not only of people, but also of texts. 
Just as Rosamond’s lack of response to Lydgate is seen to be morally wi'ong, so the 
reader’s lack of response to Middlemarch would be equally wrong.
As readers, we are outside the maniage of Rosamond and Lydgate and have the
excess of seeing of which Bakhtin speaks. Eliot further dissects their marital problems.
We read: “It seemed that she had no more identified herself with him than if they had
been creatures of different species and opposing interests” (chapter 58, 583). All these
incidents are symptomatic of Rosamond’s egoism, but its all-pervasiveness is expressed
in a powerful metaphor in chapter 27:
An eminent philosopher among my friends, who can dignify even your ugly 
furniture by lifting it into the serene light of science, has' shown me this pregnant 
little fact. Your pier-glass or extensive smTace of polished steel made to be mbbed 
by a housemaid, will be minutely and multitudinously scratched in all directions; 
but place now against it a lighted candle as a centre of illumination, and loi the 
scratches will seem to arrange themselves in a fine series of concentric circles 
round that little sun. It is demonstrable that the scratches are going everywhere 
impaitially, and it is only your candle which produces the flattering illusion of a 
concentiic arrangement, its light falling with an exclusive optical selection. These 
things are a parable. Tlie scratches are events, and the candle is the egoism of any 
person now absent -  of Miss Vincy, for example, (chapter 27, 258)
Rosamond is unable to use her excess of seeing relationally since she is only capable of
interpreting what she sees in light of her own preferences and needs. She does not see
things from the perspective of the otlier. She is aware of her uniqueness, but not of the
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responsibilities that it entails. This metaphor at once illuminates Rosamond’s egoistic 
behaviour and warns the reader that he or she needs to be responsible for his or her act 
of reading if he or she does not want to make this same mistake. The candle is not only 
the egoism of Rosamond, but potentially also that of the reader, if he or she does not 
learn from his or her reading of Middlemarch. Wliereas Rosamond does not change, the 
reader’s encounter with the text of Middlemarch can help the reader transcend his or her 
egoism, if he or she accepts his or her uniqueness and the responsibility that it entails. 
The reader learns to see that die act of reading is an act for which he or she can accept 
ethical responsibility. In accepting ethical responsibility for his or her reading of 
Middlemarch the reader can embrace his or her uniqueness and hanscend liis or her 
egoism.
Casaubon’s egoism is similarly manifested in both his behaviour and his 
thinking. In this section I discuss Casaubon’s egoism in relation to his marriage to 
Dorothea, and how his behaviour affects their relationship. Casaubon’s egoism directly 
affects his marriage. His egoism is most clearly expressed in connection with his 
ongoing stmggle with the Key to all Mythologies. Tliis is a manuscript project that 
Casaubon has been working on for a number of years, and he views all things in light of 
their connection to this book. We see how his studies affect his relation with Dorothea; 
they set the pace and timing of the relationship, the content of his proposal, the 
destination of their honeymoon, their daily schedule when they return, and his supreme 
act of egoism is to eimeat, or emotionally blackmail, Dorothea to continue working on 
his manuscript after liis death. Even this, however, is not liis final act of egoism; his
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egoism even has a posthumous effect on Dorothea because his will entails that if she 
marries Will Ladislaw she will loose her fortune.
The first hint of Casaubon’s egoism comes in chapter 2 when he says he is 
“fastidious” about readers (chapter 2, 17), but it is expressed quite clearly in his letter of 
proposal in chapter 5. Here Casaubon expresses his impression of Dorothea’s fitness to 
supply the need in his life; he even says that her fitness to supply this need is what 
evokes his affections for her. He describes his work as “too special to be abdicated” 
(chapter 5, 42). He likes Dorothea’s “capability of devotedness,” and her ability to 
“supply aid in giaver labours and to cast a chann over vacant hours” (chapter 5, 42-3), 
Casaubon thinks of his courtship to Dorothea as a “hindrance” to his “great work,” and 
looks foi-ward to its “termination” (chapter 7, 62). In manying Dorothea he hopes to 
secure “the solace of female tendance for his declining years” (chapter 7, 62). Even at 
this stage of their relationship Casaubon does not think of how Dorothea thinks or feels.
hi chapter 10 we ai*e told that the Casaubons’ wedding jouimey will be extended 
to Rome, so that Casaubon can “inspect some manuscripts in the Vatican” (chapter 10, 
85). Casaubon wants Dorotliea to have a companion on her honeymoon, so that he can 
study manuscripts! The nanator says that Dorothea dislikes Casaubon’s “aloofness” 
(chapter 10, 86). This word is always significant in Eliot’s ethical vocabulary, and is a 
sign of egoistic thinking and behaviour. In chapter 11 we read: “He took a wife, as we 
have seen, to adorn the remaining quadrant of his coui'se, and be a little moon tliat would 
cause hardly a calculable perturbation” (chapter 11, 93). We have seen so far that 
Casaubon relates liis courtsliip of Dorothea and choice of honeymoon destination to his
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authorship of tlie Key to all Mythologies. Just how deep-seated tliis egoism is only 
becomes appaient on their honeymoon.
Chapters 19-22 record details of the Casaubons’ time in Rome. Casaubon spends 
their honeymoon reading in the Library of the Vatican eveiyday, and is “usually away 
almost from breakfast till dinner” (chapter 21, 199). Chapter 20 tells us that Dorothea’s 
reactions to Casaubon have undergone some change since their marriage. The nanator 
admits that Casaubon had not actively created any illusions about himself, but says that 
“whatever else remained the same, the light had changed, and you cannot find the pearly 
dawn at noonday” (chapter 20, 190). Dorothea’s recognises a “blank absence of interest 
or sympathy” in Casaubon (chapter 20, 191). There is no physical affection between 
them, even on their honeymoon; he does not hold her hand, gives her no intimacy, and 
gives no sign of accepting her (chapter 20, 192). We read: “Having made his clerical 
toilette with due care in the morning, he was prepared only for those amenities of life 
which were suited to the well-adjusted stiff cravat of the period, and to a mind weiglited 
with unpublished matter” (chapter 20, 192). We have already seen that a lack of physical 
affection was symptomatic of a lack of receptiveness in the Lydgates’ marriage, and the 
same economy of imageiy and motif is operative in the Casaubons’ maniage. Neither 
Rosamond nor Casaubon are answerable to their unique relations with their spouses. 
They do not see that the fact of their being incarnated in a specific time and place 
ensures tliat they are answerable for this, and do not act ethically toward their spouses.
In chapter 20 Dorothea and Casaubon quanel over his scholarly work. Dorothea 
attempts to apologise for her behavioui* in the next chapter, and Casaubon ungiaciously 
accepts. Dorothea remembers the day as an epoch in then relationship. We read:
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To-day she had begun to see that she had been under a wild illusion in expecting a 
response to her feeling from Mr Casaubon, and she had felt the waking of a 
presentiment that there might be a sad consciousness in his life wliich made as 
gi'eat a need on his side as on her own. (chapter 21, 205)
It is this lack of response that eventually desti’oys their maniage. Casaubon is unable to
respond to Dorothea because of his egoism. His treatment of her reveals his moral
failings. In the introduction I quoted from Baklitin’s essay “The Problem of the Text”:
“For the word (and, consequently, for a human being) there is nothing more terrible than
a lack o f response (127). The lack of response between Dorothea and Casaubon goes
beyond a lack of physical response. It constitutes Casaubon’s moral failings. It is to
claim an alibi for his responsibilities as a spouse.
Chapter 21 contains an important narrative comment about “moral stupidity,” and
includes not only the moral stupidity of Casaubon and Dorothea in their relations with
one another, but also implicates the reader:
We are all of us bom in moral stupidity, taking the world as an udder to feed our 
supreme selves: Dorothea had early begun to emerge from that stupidity, but yet it 
had been easier to her to imagine how she would devote herself to Mr Casaubon, 
and become wise and strong in his strength and wisdom, than to conceive with that 
distinctness which is no longer reflection but feeling -  an idea wrought back to the 
directness of sense, like the solidity of objects -  that he had an equivalent centre of 
self, whence the lights and shadows must always fall with a certain difference, 
(chapter 21, 205)
Dorothea is able to transcend her egoism because she recognises and responds to 
Casaubon’s “equivalent centre of self.” In order for Eliot to extend her reader’s 
sympathies, it is important that we do not take the text of Middlemarch as an “udder.” 
There are rhetorical clues in the text as to how we should respond to the text, and these 
depend on oui* aclmowledging our imiqueness, and accepting the responsibilities that 
stem from it. If Eliot claims that her aim is to have an affect on her reader, her
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presupposition is that in the encounter between the reader and the text some kind of 
meaning is transfeixed. There must be some meaning in the text, if the reading of the 
text is to change the reader; the reader alone cannot be in control of the fonnulation of 
meaning. If the reader were to be the one in control, such as radical reader response 
criticism would suggest, then the reader would only bring his or her own biases and 
perceptions to the text, and nothing in tlie encounter between the reader and the text 
would affect a change. The reader would simply find reflected his or her biases, taking 
the text as a mirror for what he or she already knows. This would be contiary to Eliot’s 
aesthetic aims, as she frequently warns against seeing our own desires reflected 
everywhere. We camiot just project things onto the text. We have to answer for our 
readmg of the text in order to change.
In chapter 42 Casaubon’s egoism is expressed in thi'ee ways. The first is in a 
comment made by the narrator: “Will not a tiny speck very close to om* vision blot out 
the glory of the world, and leave only a margin by which we see the blot? I know no 
speck so troublesome as self’ (chapter 42, 409). Tliis is a very clear example of how 
excess of seeing alone is not enough to ensure that we are acting ethically toward the 
other. In Eliot’s novels and in her moral worldview, each human being has a unique 
perspective on the world. But if this unique perspective is not used relationally then it is 
simply another manifestation of om- egoism. Eliot does not just want to point this out to 
us; as Cai'ol S. Gould says, Eliot wants us to transcend this idiosyncratic perspective. 
The way in which this goal can be acliieved is to show the reader that the uniquely 
incarnated human being not only has this miique vision, but that this vision entails 
responsibilities toward the other. We have already seen how Rosamond’s egoism is
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expressed visually in chapter 27; both Rosamond and Casaubon are only able to look at 
the world in egoistic ways; it is the characters like Dorothea who recognise that their 
unique vision entails responsibilities that are tmly ethical.
The second way in which Casaubon’s egoism is expressed in chapter 42 is 
tlnough his soliloquising about Dorothea’s future (chapter 42, 410-11). In Bakhtinian 
terms soliloquising is ethically ambivalent because the word or the utterance would not 
be directed toward the response of another. So again, tliis soliloquising is another 
illustration of Casaubon’s desire not to interact with others.^
Tlie third way in wliich his egoism is expressed is in his treatment of Dorothea. 
In this chapter Casaubon has Lydgate call on him, because he wants to laiow about his 
own life expectancy. Dorothea is concerned for her husband and wants to comfort him, 
but when she attempts to show Casaubon physical attention he does not respond to her. 
The narrator refers to his “unresponsive hardness” (chapter 42, 416). Casaubon does not 
respond to Dorothea, and we feel her honor. She tries to place her hand on liis, and he 
simply does not allow it. Om* readeiiy excess of seeing extends our moral vision because 
we see that such behaviour is wrong. We have to respond to Eliot’s aesthetic aim if we 
do not want to minor tliis umesponsiveness in om own lives,***
hi chapter 48 Casaubon expresses his desire to have Dorothea work on his 
manuscripts after his death. His “request” is this: whether, in the event of his death, 
Dorothea will cany out his wishes, and apply herself to do what he should desire 
(chapter 48, 468). She does not think that his request is right, since she does not know to
® A similar example is found in Milton’s Paradise Lost; it is only fallen creatures who exhibit the 
tendency towards soliloquising.
Eliot takes seriously the failure to act graciously towards the other because o f  one’s own egoistic fears.
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what it would bind her. She promises to do what affection would prompt, but tliis is not 
enough for Casaubon; he does not want her to use her own judgment, but to obey his 
(chapter 48, 469). She is quite sure that Casaubon is referring to his work. The nanator 
says that Dorothea has a clearer judgment on this work than Casaubon because he has 
“risked all his egoism” on it (chapter 48, 469); indeed, “his heart was bound up in his 
work only” (chapter 48, 471). Dorothea is saved from answering this request by 
Casaubon’s death. It is significant, however, that Dorothea is prepared to “answer” him, 
in light of his continued lack of response to her (chapter 48, 473). In section thi'ee we 
will see that it is Dorothea’s acknowledgement of her unique position and unique vision 
and the responsibilities that these entail that make her the moral touchstone of the novel, 
and the exemplar for the reader to follow. But this action of hers can be fuller 
understood in comparison with tlie behavioui' of Rosamond and Casaubon, and as we 
shall see in the next section, of Bulsti ode.
Hie nanative works to move us beyond oui" egoism when we see the tragic 
consequences of the egoism of Rosamond and Casaubon; both have failed maniages, 
both make their partner suffer. Casaubon does not move beyond egoism. Rosamond 
does temporarily, and we will look at this in section tlnee of this chapter. Both 
Rosamond and Casaubon have a very frill sense of themselves, of their uniqueness, but 
do not associate it with any responsibility. The problem with Rosamond and Casaubon 
is not that they are not aware of their uniqueness; tliey are all too awaie of their 
uniqueness and they make sure everyone else is too. The problem is that Üiey do not see 
that this entails any responsibility. They do not “participate” in life, to boiTOw from 
Balditin, so much as want to control it. They do not act responsibly in light of their
190
uniqueness. To not act responsibly for one’s uniqueness is, in the moral universe of 
Middlemarch, a failui*e. We find tliem internally excusing their behaviour, either in 
soliloquies or free indirect discourse. We saw in chapter four that Alan Jacobs, in 
“Balditin and the Hermeneutics of Love,” says that recognising that we are unique is a 
necessary, but not sufficient step, towards answerability. Answerability is only achieved 
when I recognise the “fact of uniqueness” imposes a responsibility on me that I cannot 
avert. Rosamond moves towards this is her response to Dorothea’s visit, but it is only 
Dorothea who really achieves this. As we saw in chapter four, the bond or relation 
between uniqueness and answerability is based on the Chalcedon formulation of Christ’s 
two natures, human and divine, existing “without confusion, without change, without 
division, without separation.” Casaubon and Rosamond are unable to transcend their 
egoism, and move toward altiaiism precisely because they fail to acknowledge that their 
uniqueness entails responsibility. The consequences of their failure to acknowledge both 
uniqueness and responsibility is that they do not have a correct understanding of their 
place in the world or their relation to others.
The naiTative of Middlemarch does not let us enjoy just one perspective on 
things. Ah'eady in this comparison of two egoists we have two different perspectives on 
the world. Already we are moving away fi*om tlieir solipsistic behaviour. However, even 
though we judge this behaviour as wrong, we camiot condemn either Rosamond or 
Casaubon. The second way in which Eliot extends oui* sympathies is to have us 
sympatliise with unsympathetic characters.
In the way in which Casaubon’s egoism affects his relationship with Dorothea, 
we see nothing to commend his behaviour*. We see that Casaubon does not use his
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excess of seeing relationally, and ends up with a solipsistic view of the world. This is
precisely what Eliot’s aesthetic aim is meant to counter. A further way in which Eliot
extends oui* sympathy is to show us how other characters similarly do not use their
excess of seeing in relation to Casaubon in a charitable way.
In chapter 2 Eliot shows us how two people can look at the same person, and get
very different views. The epigraph of this chapter is from Cervantes’s Don Quixote\
“‘Seest thou not yon cavalier who cometh toward us on a dapple-gi'ey steed, and 
weareth a golden helmut?’ ‘What I see,’ answered Sancho, ‘is nothing but a man 
on a grey ass like my own, who carries something shiny on his head.’ ‘Just so,’ 
answered Don Quixote: ‘and that resplendent object is the helmet of Mambrino.’” 
(chapter 2,15)
This is a clear example of how two people can look at the same object and see different
things. In practice it works out that different people judge Casaubon and see very
different things. The immediate context of this is how Dorothea and Celia see very
different things in Casaubon. Dorothea thinlcs Casaubon “resernble[s] the portrait of
Locke,” but her sister thinks differently. We read:
When the two girls were in the drawing-room alone, Celia said -  
“How very ugly Mr Casaubon is!”
“Celia! He is one of the most distinguished-looking men I ever saw. He is 
remarkably like tire portrait of Locke. He has the same deep eye-sockets.”
“Had Locke those two white moles with hairs on them?”
“Oh, I dare say! when people of a certain sort looked at him,” said Dorothea, 
walking away a little.
[. . .] “It is so paiirful in you, Celia, that you will look at human beings as if they 
were merely animals with a toilette, and never see the gr eat soul in a man’s face,” 
“Has Mr Casaubon a great soul?” Celia was not without a touch of naïve malice. 
“Yes, I believe he has,” said Dorothea, with the full voice of decision. “Everything 
I see in him cortesporrds to his pamphlet orr Biblical Cosmology.” (chapter 2, 20)
But it is not only Dorothea and Celia who differ in their opinions of Casaubon. Many
people have an excess of seeing in relation to Casaubon, but they do not use it in a
charitable way: Mrs Cadwallader calls Casaubon the “Lowick Cicero” (chapter 6, 52),
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and says he “he looks like a death’s head skinned over for the occasion” (chapter 10,
89), and Sir James thinks he is a “parchment code” (chapter 8, 68), “a dried bookworm”
(chapter 2, 22), and that “He is no better than a mummy!” (chapter 6, 57), Humphrey
Cadwallader is more charitable: “Casaubon is as good as most of us. He is a scholarly
clergyman, and creditable to the cloth”:
He is very good to his poor relations: pensions several of the women, and is 
educating a young fellow at a good deal of expense. Casaubon acts up to his sense 
of justice. His mother’s sister made a bad match -  a Pole, I think -  lost herself -  at 
any rate was disowned by her family. If it had not been for that, Casaubon would 
not have had so much money by half. I believe he went himself to find out his 
cousins, and see what he could do for them. Every man would not ring so well as 
that, if you tided his metal, (chapter 8, 68)
In chapter 10 the narrator steps into the discussion on Casaubon’s character. She
cautions us about making a “too hasty judgment” about Casaubon:
If to Dorothea Mi* Casaubon had been the mere occasion which had set alight the 
fine inflammable material of her youthful illusions, does it follow that he was 
fairly represented in the minds of those less impassioned personages who have 
hitherto delivered their judgments concerning him? I protest against any absolute 
conclusion, any prejudice derived from Mi*s Cadwallader’s contempt for a 
neighboui'ing clergyman’s alleged gieatness of soul, or Sir James Chettam’s poor 
opinion of his rival’s legs, -  hom Mr Brooke’s failure to elicit a companion’s 
ideas, or horn Celia’s criticism of a middle-aged scholar’s personal appearance, 
(chapter 10, 82)
Hie naiTator rebukes us for oui* lack of charity towards Casaubon:
Suppose we turn fi*om outside estimates of a man, to wonder, with keener interest, 
what is the report of his own consciousness about his doings or capacity: with 
what liindrances he is carrying on his daily labours; what fading of hopes, or what 
deeper fixity of self-delusion the years are marking off within liim; and with what 
spirit he wrestles against universal pressuie, which will one day be too heavy for 
him, and bring his heart to its final pause. Doubtless liis lot is important in his own 
eyes; and the chief reason that we think he asks too large a place in our 
consideration must be oui* want of room for him, since we refer him to the Divine 
regard with perfect confidence; nay, it is even held sublime for our neighbour to 
expect the utmost there, however little he may have got from us. Mr Casaubon, 
too, was the centre of his own world; if he was liable to think that others were 
providentially made for him, and especially to consider them in the light of their
193
fitness for the author of a Key to all Mythologies, tliis trait is not quite alien to us, 
and, like the other mendicant hopes of mortals, claims some of our pity, (chapter 
10, 83)
Casaubon is wi'ong to thmk that the world revolves around die author of the Key to all 
Mythologies, and we have already seen the consequences of his being the “centre of his 
own world,” but the “outside estimates” of him are limited too. We see others judging 
Casaubon from their own point of view, but the narrator does not encourage this. We are 
to be more charitable. Each of the individual views expressed about Casaubon is limited; 
by presenting us with a number of views of Casaubon Eliot helps us see diat we need to 
be answerable for what we see.
In the next section I will show how Baklitin can help us read the character and 
actions of Bulstrode, and how his behaviom* proves to be another negative example for 
the reader of Middlemarch^ i.e., Bulstrode behavioui" is presented as an example of how 
to behave.
''Selfish Passions'': the moral failings o f  Bulstrode^^
In section one we have seen the egoistic drinking and behaviour of Rosamond and 
Casaubon, and how it affects their relationships with Lydgate and Dorothea. Another 
example of a character who recognises his miiqueness but fails to appreciate that this 
uniqueness entails responsibility is the evangelical banker, Nicholas Bulstiode. In this 
analysis of Bulstrode’s behaviour, I will focus particularly on how he attempts, to 
borrow from the language of Baklrtin, to claim an alibi for his existence.
Middlemai'ch, chapter 70, 693.
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Bulstrode is a moral failme. In chapter 61 we learn that in his early life Bulstrode 
has claimed an alibi for being, i.e., he was in a unique position and was not answerable 
to it. He acted ignobly and immorally; he is not in “danger of legal punisliment,” but he 
realises that he would face “scorn” from his neighbour's if “certairr facts of his part life” 
are revealed (chapter 61, 601). He is forced to confront his “blameworthy past” (601). 
He had been a bairker’s clerk, and a irrember of a “Calvinistic dissenting chm*ch” (601). 
He was called “Brother Bulstrode,” took part iir prayer meetings, and considered the 
mirristry or the mission field as his vocatrorr (chapter 61, 602). Wlrile at this dissenting 
chur ch he is invited to the villa of the “richest man in the congr egation,” Mr Dmrkirk 
(602). He becomes “irrtimate” there, the wife honouring his piety, and the husband his 
business acrmren (602). When a busirress partner dies, Bulstrode becomes an accountant 
of a pawrrbroker. Bulstr ode tries to justify to God his choice of business, He blames his 
failings on a “train of causes” (chapter 61, 603). He becomes involved in “trouble” at 
the villa (603). The only daughter in the family had run away years ago. Tlie only son 
dies, followed shortly by the father (chapter 61, 604). A rnariiage is proposed between 
Bulstrode and the widow, but before she manies she wishes to seek out her daughter, 
with the aim of possibly giving her some property. After advertisements fail, the mother 
believes the daughter is not to be foimd, and so consents to marry Bulstrode. Then we 
read: “The daughter had been found; but only one man besides Bulstrode knew it, and 
he was paid for keeping silence and carrying himself away” (604).
Bulstrode has the unique knowledge and does not act responsibly. He gets away 
with the scam for about thirty years. We do not learn about the effect that his actions 
have on Mrs Dunkirk. What is of interest with Bulstrode is how he attempts to justify
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his behaviour, even to God. Bulstrode has, in the words of Caleb Garth, “led a harmful 
life for gain, and kept others out of their rights by deceit, to get the more for [himselQ” 
(chapter 69, 684). Bulsti'ode projects his own desires on to everyone, even God. We are 
given the “bare fact” of what Bulstrode has done in his past (chapter 61, 604). But later 
in the narr ative we see Bulstrode agam disclaim responsibility for Ms actions when he is 
watcMng the dying Raffles. It is significant that Raffles is the only man who knows that 
Bulstrode has acted dishonourably in the past, and pays a price for this larowledge. In 
Romola, Eliot shows Tito in the process of disclaiming his actions, and she employs the 
same teclmique in her presentation of Bulstrode.
Raffles appears at Bulstrode’s home on Christmas Eve, exMbiting signs of 
“mental restlessness” and “habitual intemperance” (chapter 68, 674). Bulstrode is able 
to pay him to go away on this occasion, but shortly after he returns to Stone Comt and is 
very ill. Caleb Garth informs Bulstrode that he took Raffles there himself, and informs 
Mm that he needs a doctor. Bulstrode calls for Lydgate, who tells him that Raffles 
should be “well watched and attended to” (chapter 69, 687). Wlien Bulstrode insists that 
he will stay and tend to Raffles, Lydgate says that he will give his directions to him 
alone. These include no alcohol to be given. In Balditiman terms tMs information that 
Lydgate gives Bulstrode puts Bulstrode in a unique position in relation to Raffles; he 
alone knows Lydgate’s precise instructions. He does not respond to this information in 
an ethically responsible way, and tries to claim an alibi for tlris larowledge.
In chapter 70 we see Bulstrode’s egoistic reasoning why he should not wish for 
the death of Raffles: “there was no sin in contemplating death as the desirable issue -  if 
he kept his hands from hastening it -  if he scrupulously did what was prescribed”
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(chapter 70, 692). Bulstrode reduces his responsibilities to this man to the lowest 
denominator, and starts to question Lydgate’s orders for treatment, and whether or not 
he should obey them. On Lydgate’s second visit, Bulstrode insists that he alone will 
look after Raffles. He says the “responsibility” of looking after Raffles is not included in 
the Abels’ service of him (chapter 70, 694). Lydgate’s new instructions are a little 
opium, with advice about when it should cease, and still no alcohol. Bulstrode further 
demonstrates his egoism in his thinking about Lydgate. He has just refused Lydgate the 
loan of a tlrousand pounds, but he now begins to think that it would be useful to have 
Lydgate in his debt.
Bulstrode decides not to sit with Raffles for the second rright. He shows Mrs 
Abel how to administer the opium. After some time he realises that he has not told Mrs 
Abel when the doses of opiimi must cease. He then thinlcs that she might have already 
given too much. He deludes liimself that it is “excusable” he should have forgotten to 
give her complete instructions (chapter 70, 697). Eliot portrays Bulstrode hovering 
between his own room and that of Raffles, and questioning whether it is better to obey 
or disobey Lydgate’s prescription. Wlien Mrs Abel asks if Bulstrode has any brandy to 
give Raffles, twice he does not answer (chapter 70, 698). This failure to answer mirrors 
Bulstrode’s moral failure. Bulstrode allows Mrs Abel to give Raffles brandy, and he dies 
during the early hours of the next moriring. Bulstrode hides the brandy bottle and the 
opium phial. Bulstrode reasons thus: “And who could say that the death of Raffles had 
been hastened? Wlio laiew what would have saved him?” (chapter 70, 700). Once again, 
Bulstrode alone has infomiation about another person, and uses it to Raffles’s 
disadvantage. In Baklitin’s meaning of the teim, he is not answerable for the knowledge
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that he has. Bulstrode does not kill Raffles, but he does not hinder his death. He 
disobeys Lydgate’s order. He is the only person who Lydgate trusted with the orders. 
Even if he is not a murderer in deed, his is morally culpable for the death of Raffles.
Bulstrode’s failure to acknowledge his uniqueness and its responsibilities has an 
adverse effect on the career of Lydgate. Middlemarch gossip construes the event to be 
one in which Lydgate acted on behalf of Bulstrode, due to the money he had received 
from him. The suspicion is that Bulstrode had the motive and gave Lydgate the money 
to participate in some malpractice. It cannot be disproved. Lydgate does not know how 
his orders came to be disobeyed. Bulstrode miglit not have had anytliing to do with the 
disobedience. It is not possible to prove the guilt or the innocence of either man, and 
they are both morally tarnished. A Baklitinian analysis of these events is that Bulstrode 
does not act responsibly. He is not acting according to Lydgate’s instructions. He will 
not even admit to himself that he has done anything wrong. His behaviour disgmces 
Lydgate too. To borrow from Baklitin’s language in Toward a Philosophy o f the Act we 
can say that this is where Bulstrode fails to “participate in Being in a once-occurent and 
never repeatable manner,” No one else can act in this situation, except Bulstrode; he has 
no alibi for his responsibility. Again, this echoes Baklitin’s statement: “That which can 
be done by me can never be done by anyone else. The uniqueness or singularity of 
present-on-hand Being is completely obligatory” (40). As I wrote in chapter four, this is 
more than a physical description of the human being; it is also an ethical and relational 
description. Bulstrode has separated his uniqueness fr'om his responsibility. In tlie third
We read: “He had not confessed to himself yet that he done anything in the way o f contrivance to this 
end; he had accepted what seemed to have been offered. It was impossible to prove that he had done 
anything which had hastened the departure o f that man’s soul” (chapter 71,706).
section I will discuss the behaviour of Dorothea, and how she contrasts with Rosamond, 
Casaubon, and Bulstrode, and answerably accepts her uniqueness and its 
responsibilities.
The "peculiar influence ” o f  Dorothea^^
In this section I offer a Baklitinian reading of the scene in which Doroüiea awakens 
from her night of emotional distress upon finding Rosamond and Will together. I 
consider how the concepts non-alibi in being, excess of seeing, and self/other relations 
help us to read this scene, and point to the extia-textual aesthetic of Middlemarch. It is 
difficult to divorce non-alibi in being and excess of seeing in the analysis of this 
passage. Tliis is tlie moral climax of the novel.
Dorothea’s long night of emotional struggle, with its inescapable “anguish” and 
the “unslii'inking utterance of despair” occurs in chapter 80 (775). The provocation for 
this anguish and despair is Dorothea seeing Rosamond and Will Ladislaw in a 
compromising position in chapter 77. Dorothea finds them seated side by side on a sofa, 
with Rosamond in some emotional distress and Will holding her hands and speaking in 
a low voice (chapter 77, 764). Dorotliea suspects an extra-marital affair. The reason for 
Dorothea’s visit can be traced back to the conversation between herself and Lydgate in 
chapter 76. Lydgate takes up Dorothea’s offer of going to explain his position to 
Rosamond. It is with this charitable inclination in mind that Dorothea sets out to see 
Rosamond.
Middlemarch, chapter 81, 784.
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Dorothea is concerned for the moral well-being of Lydgate. He is facing public 
disgrace because he is implicated in a mui’der, and he hints at trouble in Ins marriage. In 
chapter 76 Lydgate asks Dorothea to do him a “great kindness” by going to see his wife 
and explain to her the situation that he himself cannot explain (chapter 76, 758). There 
has been a breakdown in communication between Lydgate and Rosamond and so he 
asks Dorothea to help. Dorothea wants to help by showing “the manifestation of respect 
for Lydgate and sympathy with her” (chapter 77, 763). She thinks that Rosamond will 
be glad of the news of Farebrother’s support, and that they might be friends. She is 
aware that Rosamond’s social position is likely to be affected by the “suspicions cast on 
her husband,” and wants to offer friendship (chapter 77, 763). Dorothea is “moved to 
show her human fellowship” (chapter 76, 750) and wants to “clear” Lydgate (chapter 
76, 751). According to Balchtin’s sense of perspective, she has a unique perspective on 
these events and relationships. Her view is highly specific and highly relational.
Dorothea’s immediate reaction to finding Will and Rosamond together is to 
consider how it affects her alone. However, she gradually begins to consider how this 
event might touch on tlie lives of Rosamond, Will, and Lydgate. Initially Dorothea only 
sees how tliis event affects her, and is aware only of her own injuied feelings, but she 
gradually begins to consider how tliis event might touch on the lives of Rosamond, Will, 
and Lydgate. Eventually Dorothea sleeps, and it is upon awaking that she begins to 
relate this event to others. She beings to thinlc of the event, to “dwell on every detail and 
its possible meaning” (chapter 80, 776). She thinks about it relationally and asks: “Was 
she alone in that scene? Was it her event only?” (776). Dorothea accepts both her 
uniqueness and its ensuing responsibilities; she acknowledges her incarnated being and
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acts in light of it. Thus, on an inti'a-textual level, non-alibi in being and the connection
between uniqueness and responsibility that stems from a Chalcedon idea of incarnation
shows how the motif of incarnation is present in Eliot’s aesthetics in Middlemarch.
After this dark night of the soul, Dorothea comes to the following thinldng:
And what sort of crisis miglit not tliis be in tlnee lives whose contact with hers laid 
an obligation on her as if they had been suppliants bearing the sacred branch? The 
objects of her rescue were not to be souglit out by her fancy: they were chosen for 
her. She yearned towards the perfect Right, that it might make a tlirone within her, 
and rule her eiraiit will. “What should I do -  how should I act now, this very day if 
I could clutch my own pain, and compel it to silence, and thinlc of those three?” 
(chapter 80, 776-7)
Thematically this is a moment of transcendence for Dorothea, in which she moves 
beyond her egoism. At this moment Dorothea recognises and accepts that she alone can 
act in this situation. To bonow from Bakhtin’s language we can say that this is where 
Dorothea realises that she participates in Being in a once-occurent and never repeatable 
manner -  no one else can act in this situation but she. She has no alibi for her 
responsibility to the other three characters, and her uniqueness obligates her to act. The 
people she is to act towards are not general or abstract, but highly specific and 
individual. She acknowledges and acts upon her responsibility to these three other 
chai'acters. In tins moment of choice the “indefiniteness” which had bothered her before 
is gone (chapter 3, 27), and she acts on her obligation. It is only Dorothea that knows 
about the crisis in the Lydgates’ marriage, and only she who saw Will and Rosamond 
together. Dorothea needs to answer this question, and accept her answerability. The 
motif of incarnation is part of this dynamic and transcendence of egoism is part of this. 
There is an essential link between Dorothea’s acceptance of her embodied position and 
her transcendence:
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It had taken long for her to come to that question, and there was light piercing into 
the room. She opened her cmtains, and looked out towards the bit of road that lay 
in view, with fields beyond, outside the entmnce-gates. On the road there was a 
man with a bundle on his back and a woman canying her baby; in the field she 
could see figures moving -  perhaps the shepherd with his dog. Far off in the 
bending sky was the pearly light; and she felt the largeness of the world and the 
manifold wakmgs of men to labour and endurance. She was a part of that 
involuntary, palpitating life, and could neither look out on it from her luxurious 
shelter as a mere spectator, nor hide her eyes in selfish complahiing. (chapter 80, 
777)
The last lines of this passage show Dorothea’s participation in tlie world. In the BBC 
production of Middlemarch Dorothea is portrayed as responding to these people. In this 
quotation Dorothea is situated physically and in teims of point of view. Througli visual 
and physical images Eliot shows us how Dorothea has a unique perspective on the word. 
There are many references to point of view and vision in this quotation: “she opened her 
curtains,” “looked out,” “the road that lay in view,” “she could see,” “pearly light,” 
“wakings,” “look out,” “spectator,” and “hide her eyes.” Previously in Middlemarch 
Dorothea has been described as “short-sighted” (chapter 3, 30); Eliot employed this 
description to tell us about Dorothea’s moral life as well as the condition of her eyesight. 
If Dorothea did not leani to see things relationally, to use her excess of seeing 
relationally, it is clear that she would, morally speaking, remain short-sighted. It is her 
acceptance of the fact that her miiqueness entails responsibilities that enables her moral 
growth. In this scene Dorotliea exhibits moral clear-sightedness. She transcends her 
egoism and her limited perspective on the world when she looks at tilings from the 
perspective of the other. Dorothea assumes answerability for her own miiqueness at this 
point. She does not evade her responsibilities to the other.
Baklitin’s concepts of non-alibi in being and excess of seeing help us articulate 
the significance of Dorothea’s actions on behalf of Rosamond, Lydgate, and Will. We
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have seen in the passage above how Dorothea uses her excess of seeing relationally,
thereby ti'anscending her egoism. She also does not try and claim an alibi. We read
further about her conversation with Rosamond:
The fragile creature who was crying close to her -  there might still be time to 
rescue her from the misery of false incompatible bonds; and this moment was 
unlike any other: she and Rosamond could never be together again with the same 
tlnilling consciousness of yesterday witliin them both. She felt the relation 
between them to be peculiar enough to give her a peculiar influence [.. .]. (chapter 
81,784)
In this passage Dorothea realises that it is she alone who is able to help Rosamond, and 
she does not shiink from doing so. She recognises that she has a “peculiar influence,” 
and willingly embraces all that this entails. We aie told that the “vivid sympathetic 
experience” she has gained through her relations with Casaubon will not let her see as 
she saw in the days of her ignorance (chapter 80, 776). Her marriage to Casaubon 
helped increase her ability to see things from the perspective of another, and here she 
puts this into practice. Dorothea’s “peculiar influence” enables Rosamond to respond to 
her, both at that moment and later. Rosamond ‘answers’ for her position in laiowing 
how Dorothea feels about Ladislaw, and sends him a note to say that she has not ruined 
his reputation in the eyes of Mis Casaubon (chapter 82, 792). As Ellen Argyios says in 
“Without Any Check o f Proud Reserve, " this action does not occm- in the “passion of her 
exchange with Dorothea, but in a more rational moment afterwards” (173). Rosamond is 
temporarily able to transcend her egoism, and react to Dorotliea. In the same way that 
Dorothea is in a unique position to help Rosamond, Rosamond is in a imique position to 
help Dorothea because it is to Rosamond that Will has confessed his love to Dorothea.
In this chapter I have offered a Baklitinian reading of Middlemarch in order to 
show how the motifs of incarnation, revelation, and tianscendence are linked to Eliot’s
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aesthetics aim of extending her reader’s sympathies. I have shown how Bakhtin 
provides us with conceptual tools to articulate how religious motifs foim a part of 
Eliot’s ethics of art. The motif of incarnation is central to Balditin’s concepts of non­
alibi in being, excess of seeing, and selEodier relations; these concepts in turn help us to 
articulate Eliot’s study of egoism in Middlemarch. In this reading of Middlemarch I 
have suggested that Eliot’s egoists ai'e those who do not accept that their uniqueness 
entails any responsibilities. It is fair to say that Eliot’s egoists have a highly developed 
sense of their uniqueness, but an underdeveloped sense of what tliis uniqueness entails. 
They do try and claim an alibi, they do not use their excess of seeing relationally, and 
fail to act lovingly toward the other. Eliot does not offer tliis behavioui* as the exemplar 
to follow. Eliot approves of those who are able to hanscend their egoism, those who do 
not try and claim an alibi, who use their excess of seeing relationally, and act lovingly 
toward the other. A Balditinian reading of Middlemarch suggests that the reader of the 
novel must siniilai'ly use their experience of reading and answer for it in the way in 
winch they encounter the other beyond the text.
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Chapter Six» A theological reading of Daniel Deronda
In chapter five I explored the ways in which Eliot’s study of egoism in Middlemarch 
relates to her aim of extending her reader’s sympathies, and moves her reader beyond 
egoism toward altmism. In chapter thr ee we saw that the purpose of Eliot’s aesthetics is 
to help us appreciate better and tolerate the people we live amongst, and that in order to 
achieve this aim she needs to counter the inherent egoism of her readers and their 
limited perspective on the world. In chapter five we saw that the motifs of incarnation 
and transcendence form a constituent part of Eliot’s aesthetics in Middlemarch, and we 
have also seen that Balditin’s concepts of non-alibi in being and excess of seeing help us 
to recognise the role that incarnation and transcendence play in Middlemarch. Tlnough 
positive and negative examples Eliot helps us see the importance of recognising om* 
imiqueness and its ensuing responsibilities, hi the first section of the textual analysis in 
chapter five I discussed the egoism of Rosamond and Casaubon, and how they were 
unable to relate to others because of their egoistic thinking and behaviour. We saw that 
they both claimed an alibi for their relational duties. I also showed how various 
characters did not use their excess of seeing charitably in their understanding of 
Casaubon. The narrative of Middlemarch neither approves of the behaviour of 
Casaubon, nor of any inclination to judge him too harshly. In the second section I 
examined how Bulstrode’s failure to respond etliically toward Raffles is symptomatic of 
his attempt to claim an alibi for his existence. In the third section, a Baklitinian analysis 
of the moral climax of the novel revealed how the motifs of incarnation and 
ti’anscendence are present in Eliot’s aesthetics. Dorothea’s transcendence of her egoism
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is dependent on her acknowledging that she is incarnated in time and space, and that she 
is unique and has ensuing responsibilities. Dorothea accepts that she has no alibi for 
being, and uses the excess of seeing she enjoys in relation to Rosamond, Lydgate, and 
Ladislaw for their advantage. For Eliot’s aesthetics to have an affect on the reader 
beyond the act of reading, the reader of Middlemarch must similarly not claim an alibi 
for Ms or her reading of the text. The process of reading Middlemarch alters his or her 
perspective on the world and his or her understanding of Ms or her position in the world. 
One result of Eliot making us see tilings differently is the understanding that we must be 
responsible for what we see. TMs is not didacticism anew, but a relational and 
incamational etliic wMch depends on the uniqueness of each individual.
In this chapter I offer a Balditinian reading of Daniel Dei^oiida} I explore how 
Eliot’s treatment of egoism in this novel relates to her aim of extending her reader’s 
sympathies. In the first section I will explore the egoistic behaviour and thinking of 
Grandcourt and Gwendolen. Grandcourt is Eliot’s most extensive portrayal of an egoist, 
and is her most umedeemed character. In many ways his egoism is so peivasive tliat he 
is actually treated as sub-human and animalistic. His behavioiu* is an example of how 
not to behave. Grandcomt is almost non-relational; his egoism is expressed in terms of 
empire, tyranny, and will-to-power. This conies out most vividly in his marital relations 
with Gwendolen, and I explore this in detail. Gwendolen is also an egoist in her thinking 
and her behaviour. Her behaviour does not have narmtive approval, but Gwendolen has 
more narrative sympathy because it is not clear what vocational choices are open to her
* Daniel Deronda, ed. Graham Handley (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). All subsequent references are to 
tins edition. Daniel Deronda is Eliot’s last novel, and was published in eight monthly parts between 
February and September 1876.
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other than marriage. In the second section I discuss the difference between how 
Gwendolen is perceived by Grandcourt and Deronda. Both men have excess of seeing in 
relation to her, but they use it in very different ways. Grandcourt uses his excess of 
seeing to control and manipulate Gwendolen, whereas Deronda uses his excess of seeing 
to encourage Gwendolen towards moral growth, from egoism to altruism. Deronda is 
responsive to Gwendolen and teaches her to adopt a more relational, incamational ethic. 
Gwendolen is able to respond to Deronda. For the reader of Daniel Deronda, part of 
learning that we have excess of seeing is learning how to use it properly. The experience 
of reading Daniel Deronda teaches us to use our unique vision in a responsible way. In 
the tliird section I look at non-alibi in being. This concept is important for Gwendolen, 
but it is also important for Deronda. At the beginning of the novel, Deronda has a vague 
desire to be of use but he feels tliat his lack of clear relational ties is hindering him 
deciding on a line of action or a vocation. He is aware of the need to do something 
specific, but lacks the knowledge of what tliat should be. In this section I trace how 
Deronda becomes answerable to Mordecai and to his Jewish destiny, hr employing 
Baklitin’s concepts of non-alibi in being, excess of seeing, and selfrother relations to a 
reading of the aesthetics of the novel, I argue that incarnation, revelation, and 
transcendence are constituent features of Daniel Deronda, and form a distinct element 
of its design. The ethics of Eliot’s art are again best interpreted by these religious motifs.
Baklitin’s understanding of the human person helps us to read Daniel Deronda 
and understand how the motifs of incarnation, revelation, and tr anscendence form a part 
of its aesthetics. As I have already said, in Bakhtin’s writings his understanding of the 
human person involves a number of givens: (1) the human person is incarnated in time
207
and space; (2) each human being is uniquely situated; (3) unique responsibilities stem 
from this unique position; (4) the moral person does not claim an “alibi” for this 
uniqueness; (5) our unique position entails a unique perspective on the world; (6) each 
“self’ can see things that the “other” caimot see; (7) a relation of reciprocity exists 
between the “self’ and the “other.” In chapter five I suggested that a parallel can be 
drawn between Eliot’s egoists and those who claim an alibi, and between Eliot’s 
alü'uists and those who do not claim an alibi; we see tliis same pai'allel at work in Daniel 
Deronda.
As we have seen, the puipose of Eliot’s aesthetic aim of extending her reader’s 
sympathies is to move the reader beyond egoism towards altruism. This aesthetic aim is 
consistent throughout Eliot’s literary career, but in Daniel Deronda it takes on a new 
emphasis. In Daniel Deronda the same aesthetic of sympathy is directed to extending 
Eliot’s reader’s sympathies toward Jewish people. Eliot wrote explicitly about her 
aesthetic aims for the novel. In a letter addressed to Harriet Beecher Stowe, 29 October 
1876, Eliot wi'ote;
Because I felt tliat the usual attitude of Christians towards Jews is -  I hardly 
laiow whether to say more impious or more stupid when viewed in the light of 
their professed principles, I therefore felt urged to treat Jews with such sympathy 
and understanding as my natuie and knowledge could attain to. Moreover, not 
only towards the Jews, but towards all oriental peoples with whom we English 
come in contact, a spirit of aiTogance and contemptuous dictorialness [.y/c] is 
observable which has become a national disgrace to us. There is nothing I should 
more care to do, if it were possible, than to rouse the imagination of men and 
women to a vision of human claims in those races of their fellow-men who most 
differ from them in customs and beliefs.^
 ^Ellen Argyios, in "Without Any Check of Proud Reso-ve Sympathy audits Limits in George Eliot’s 
Novels, argues that Stowe’s Uncle Tom‘s Cabin “provided a concrete example for Eliot o f how one might 
employ one’s own most active imaginative powers to make society more tolerant towards its marginalized 
others” (49). In her preface to Uncle Tom's Cabin (1851), Stowe writes: “The object o f  these sketches is 
to awaken sympathy and feeling for the African race, as they exist among us [ . . . ] ” (Argyros, 41).
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Elsewhere in her writings Eliot is at pains to point out that egoism is central to her
miderstanding of the human being. In this letter she highlights the egoism that is part of
a national identity as opposed to a personal, individual identity. A number of characters
in Daniel Deronda exhibit a lack of sympathy for Jewish people and have to move
beyond this national egoism, Eliot also hopes that her readers would be changed by their
experience of reading Daniel Deronda. Eliot’s letter to Stowe hints at two aspects of
Eliot’s aesthetic of sympathy in Daniel Deronda. First, the sympathy that she, as an
author, has for her characters, particularly the Jewish characters.^ Second, the rousing of
the imagination of her readers to a vision of the claims of others.
In chapter five we saw that Eliot was pleased that Middlemarch was having an
effect on her readers. Eliot was also aware that Daniel Deronda was having an effect on
her readers. Once again, this provides evidence that Eliot’s aesthetic aim was consistent
tlnoughout her career, and that she knew that it was producing the effect that she
desired. Eliot records her pleasure that Daniel Deronda is mfluencing both Jews and
non-Jews alike. In her journal she records; “Words of gratitude have come from Jews
and Jewesses, and there are certain signs that I may have contributed my mite to a good
result.”'^  Similarly, on 15 December 1876 we read:
At the beginning of tins week I had deep satisfaction from reading in the Times 
die report of a lectur e on Daniel Deronda [szc] delivered by Dr. Herman Adler to 
the Jewish Worldng Men, a lecture showing much insight and implying an 
expectation of serious benefit. Since then, I have had a delightful letter from the 
Jewish Theological Seminary at Breslau written by an American Jew named 
Isaacs, who excuses himself for expressing his feeling of gratitude on reading
Ellen Argyios discusses the sympathy tliat Eliot as author and/or nairator has for her characters. My aim 
is different; I want to look at how Eliot directs the reader toward sympathising with those we meet beyond 
the confines o f the text.
The Journals o f  George Eliot, 146.
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Deronda [jzc], and assures me of his belief that it has even already had an 
elevating effect on the minds of some among his people -  predicting that effect 
will spread.^
And again, on 22 April 1877, we read: ‘T have had some delightful evidence of the
effect wi'ought by ‘Deronda’, especially among Jews.”  ^ These tlnee journal extracts
reflect Eliot’s personal awareness that her writings were having an effect on people.
External verification comes in the form of letters Eliot received. On 25 September 1876
Eliot received a letter from Haim Gudella thanking her for representing the Jews in a
favomable light, and in an attractive and scholarly marnier.^ On 3 November 1876 Eliot
wrote to Jolm Blackwood:
I am saved from concluding that I have exhibited my faculties in a state of decay 
by very delightful letters from unknown readers and reported judgments from 
considerable authorities. A statesman who shall be nameless has said that [...] I 
have kindled in him a quite new understanding of Jewish people. This is what I 
wanted to do -  to widen the English vision a little in that direction and let in a 
little conscience and refinement. I expected to excite more resistance of feeling 
tliari I have seen the signs of, but I did what I chose to do -  not as well as I 
should have liked to do it, but as well as I could.®
In these letters and jomnal entries we see Eliot not only expressing her aesthetic aim, but
also her awareness that her novels were having the desired effect on her readers.
Edmimd Wliite, in “The great issues: George Eliot, Zionism, and the novel,” notes: “The
Cliief Rabbi of London wrote to Eliot soon after publication and thanlced her for
depicting so faithfully some of the best qualities of the Jewish char acter.”^
^JGE, 146. 
^JGE,\A1.
 ^ GEL 6, 288 
® GEL 6, 302.
 ^Edmund White, “The great issues: George Eliot, Zionism, and the novel” {Times Litermy Supplement, 
18 January 2002), 6.
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Eliot undeniably had specific aims of extending her reader’s sympathies toward 
Jewish people. However, the simplicity of the above comments and reflections is not 
mirrored in the critical reception of the novel. Daniel Deronda has elicited readings that 
propose dividing the novel into ‘Jewish’ and ‘non-Jewish’ parts. Some critics of Daniel 
Deronda seem to thinlc the text is like a granite block, and that their role as critic is to 
take a cliisel and sculpt it into a shape that pleases them. They would strip away its 
perceived flaws, leaving a perfected text for others to enjoy. This would be a dubious 
process at best, and a usurpation of the critic’s role -  even if it were possible for critics 
to agree on what were Daniel Deronda's good bits and what were its flaws. For some 
critics the Jewish bits need to be stripped away, for others the Deronda/Mordecai 
naiTative is its strength. It seems that Eliot herself anticipated such division among her 
readers, for she wrote to Barbara Bodichon: “I meant everything in the novel to be 
related to everything else.” °^ It is not my intention to rehearse tlie debates of whether 
there are two halves to the novel because that material has been discussed elsewhere.^‘ I 
do not tlnnlc that the novel can be divided into two halves and argue that the aesthetic of 
the text calls the reader to response to tlie other.
Eliot’s aim of rousing the imagination of men and women to a vision of the 
himian claims of those who differ is a vital component of her ethics of art. Without
See GEL 6, 290, The letter is dated 2 October 1876.
For further discussion o f this issue see Joan Bennett, George Eliot: Her Mind and Her Art, David 
Carroll, “The Unity o t Daniel Deronda"' Essays in Criticism 9 (1959): 369-80, Harold Fisch, “Daniel 
Deronda or Gwendolen }iarleth.7" Nineteejtth-Cetttuty Fiction 19 (1965): 345-356, F. R. Leavis, The 
Great Tradition: George Eliot, Hemy James, Joseph Conrad, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1948), Ruth 
Levitt, George Eliot: The Jewish Connection (Jerusalem: Massada, 1975), Anne ArestyNaman, The Jew 
in the Victorian Novel: Some Relationships Between Prejudice and Art (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 
1980), and Alice Shalvi, ed. Daniel Deronda: A Centenaty Symposium (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Academic 
Press, 1976). For postcolonial readings of Daniel Deronda see The Oxford Reader's Companion to 
George Eliot, 70-71.
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wishing to detract from Eliot’s desire to extend her reader’s sympathies for Jewish 
people, I intend to focus on how Eliot rouses tlie imagination of her readers toward a 
vision of the human claims of the other. Eliot’s aesthetic is not limited to extending her 
reader’s sympathies towards Jews; it is to extend them to all who aie different, to all 
who are other. I relate this aesthetic aim of extending her reader’s sympathies not only 
towards Jews but to the people that the reader meets beyond the confines of the text. The 
aesthetics of the text can be understood through the framework of Balditin’s self/other 
relations. Daniel Deronda interrogates our essential egoism. I will argue that 
Gwendolen’s moral education begins when she learns to tliink of others. Gwendolen has 
to learn to move away from egoism. She has to learn, as Helena Granlimd holds, that 
self-love does not lead to happiness. The choice of self does not lead to greatest 
happiness for the self. In the first section of this chapter we will see that egoism is being 
unable to recognise the claims of the other. Grandcourt cannot recognise the claims of 
others, wliile Gwendolen learns to recognise them. In order to move the reader beyond 
egoism we need to recognise tlie claims of others. Conversely, Deronda has to leam not 
to sympathise with everyone, but to recognise tliose with whom he should sympathise.
In the last chapter we saw that a number of literaiy critics argue tliat there is an 
extra-textual dimension to Middlemarch. Similarly, Garrett F. Stewart in Dear Reader: 
The Conscripted Audience in Nineteenth-Centuiy British Fiction, articulates the extra- 
textual element of Eliot’s aesthetics in Daniel Deronda.^^ Stewart makes tlie bold claim 
that Eliot’s aesthetics, or as he terms it in explicitly ethical terms, her ‘ethic of reading,’
See Granlund, The Paradox o f  Self-Love, chapter one.
Garrett F. Stewart, “Mordecai's Consumption: Afterlives o f  Interpretation m Daniel Deronda," Dear 
Reader: The Conscripted Audience in Nineteenth-Centwy British Fiction, 301-328.
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is directed to what happens beyond the act of reading. He ties tliis ‘etliic of reading’ to 
the narrative of Daniel Deronda itself (and not only from Eliot’s review essays, letters, 
or early fiction). He says that Eliot and the narrative of Daniel Deronda call us to 
respond. He says the one literary device Eliot employs is to directly address the reader; 
Garrett calls this an “enjoined response” (304). This is an interesting phrase and I think 
suggests something akin to Balditiri’s idea of answerability. Eliot’s call on the reader is 
that he or she be embodied in the very nanative itself and in the nanative ethics. Stewart 
argues that Eliot calls us to respond to Mordecai. He says that the reader is conscripted 
to respond to the text.
Stewart discusses Eliot’s various uses of reading within the novel, and the way in 
which they give us clues as to how we should read Daniel Deronda. In chapter 41 
Deronda starts to fictionalise Iris own meeting with Mordecai. Stewart discusses the 
ways in which Deronda’s reading has affected him. Stewart says that Deronda draws on 
his own experience of interpretation of texts to help him decide how to live. We read:
If he had read of this incident as having happened centuries ago [..,] to some 
young man as himself, dissatisfied with his neutr al life, and wanting some closer 
fellowsliip, some more special duty to give him ardour* for the possible 
consequences of his work, it would have appear ed to him quite natural that the 
incident should have created a deep impression on that far-off man [. . .]. 
(chapter 41, 473)
The aesthetics of reading that ar e present in Daniel Deronda are the intra-textual clues 
that show the way tire text can have an extra-textual effect on the reader. Stewart 
summarises this: “The event of reading thus promotes as well as enacts its role as a 
prepar ation for living” (305).
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Daniel Deronda offers not only the positive example of the effect that reading 
has on Deronda, however, but also the negative example of how Gwendolen’s reading 
of the wrong types of fiction does not help her face life. Unlike Deronda, Gwendolen 
has read the wrong sort of books and they do not equip her for encounters witli reality. 
In fact, she reads the types of novels that Eliot critiques in “Silly Novels by Lady 
Novelists.” Stewart compares Gwendolen’s reading with that of the Meyrick girls. 
Mab’s response to Erckmann-Chatrians’s Histoire d ’un Consent is that it makes her 
“want to do something good, something grand. It makes me so sorry for everybody” 
{Daniel Deronda, chapter 18, 181). Stewart says that this is the effect tliat Eliot wants 
her novels to have on her reader. Stewart undoubtedly touches upon an important part of 
the aesthetics of Daniel Deronda in this conti'ast between good and bad literature and 
tlie effect that it has on the reader, and the way in which it prepares them for living. 
However, my critique of Stewart’s method is similar to my critique of Higuera and 
Carol S. Gould in chapter five; his work does not take into account the role that the 
theological motifs of incarnation, revelation, and transcendence play in the process or, 
indeed, of any religious or Christian ideas that informed Eliot’s work.
The "egoistic desire” o f  Grandcourt and Gwendolen^"^
In the first section of the textual analysis of Middlemarch I looked at Eliot’s presentation 
of the egoistic behavioui* and thinking of Rosamond and Casaubon. In tliis section I look 
at the egoistic behaviour and tliinking of Grandcourt and Gwendolen.
Daniel Deronda, chapter A, 36.
214
Eliot expresses the egoism of Grandcomt in language of empire, tyranny, and in 
the ways in wliich he thinks of others as animals that are subsei*vient to liim. His will-to- 
power is inscribed in his thinking about others. Grandcouit’s egoism is implicit even 
before the dissection of his maiital relations with Gwendolen. For ten years Grandcourt 
has had a mistress, Lydia Glasher. Lydia left her husband and son for Grandcourt, and 
has borne him four children. Upon her husband’s death, Lydia thinlcs that Grandcourt 
will many her; instead he pursues Gwendolen. His egoism is also exhibited in his 
relations with Lush, and in his tr eatment of his dogs. He conceives all relations in terms 
of power, and insists that he is the one that has mastery of the situation. He does not see 
that his uniqueness entails any relational responsibility to the otirer.
Before her maniage to Grandcourt, Gwendolen exhibits egoism in her thinldng 
and her actions. Gwendolen is “thoughtless” to her mother, in that she does not let her 
mother know her whereabouts (chapter 2, 11). We read of the “sense of superior claims 
which made a large pail of her consciousness” (chapter 2, 12). She has “implicit 
confidence” that her destiny would be one of “luxurious ease” (12). She thinks she is the 
“chief object” of her mother’s anxiety (12). At the loss of their fortune, she does not feel 
pity for her mother, only for herself. The naixator talks of her “core of egoistic 
sensibility” (chapter 2, 14). She thinks she is an “exceptional” person (chapter 3, 19), 
with a “peculiar sensitiveness which was a mark of her general superiority” (chapter 3, 
20). She thinks her four half-sisters are “superfluous” and “utterly unimpoitant” (chapter 
3, 27). The narrator tells us: “In Gwendolen’s habits of mind it had been taken for 
granted that she knew what was admirable and that she herself was admired” (chapter 1,
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7). Gwendolen is “kindly disposed towai'ds any one who could make life agreeable to 
her” (chapter 5, 38). She is said to have “common egoistic ambition” (chapter 6,47).
Gwendolen’s egoistic behaviour is first introduced in chapter 1 when Deronda 
observes her gambling. Brief incidents reveal other egoistic action; kissing her own 
reflection in the minor (chapter 2, 14), not getting out of bed to fetch her mother’s 
medication (chapter 3, 20), strangling her sister’s canary-bird (chapter 3, 20). Wlien she 
sings for Klesmer, he says that the music she chooses lacks “any breadth of horizon” 
(chapter 5,43). This comment about music also reflects tlie lack of horizon in her moral 
life. She has no breadth of horizon because she is an egoist. Her heart sinks at this 
“width of horizon” (43). Daniel Deronda contains an important series of images about 
horizons. Gwendolen needs to have her horizons widened and not to be so self-centred. 
In chapter 4 the narrator offers to account for some of this egoism and to develop her 
character. We read:
Always she was the princess in exile, who in time of famine was to have her 
breakfast-roll made of the finest-bolted flour fi*om the seven thin ears of wheat, 
and in a general decampment was to have her silver fork kept out of the baggage, 
(chapter 4, 35)^^
The narrator asks: “How was this to be accounted for?” and gives a thiee-fbld answer. 
The first reason is her “beauty,” “graceful movements,” “clear uniiesitating tones,” and 
her “potent charm” (chapter 4, 35). The second is the fact that she was an eldest 
daughter of a timid mother, who is apologetic for inflicting a step-father on her. But the 
naiTator says that she has seen those who are not beautiful or unusual accorded the same 
“assiduous, apologetic attention” (chapter 4, 36). The narrator puts it down to a “strong
This passage contains a number of biblical allusions, including the story o f Joseph’s exile in Egypt, and 
to the famine.
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deteiTnination to have what was pleasant, with a total fearlessness in making themselves 
disagreeable or dangerous when they did not get it” (chapter 4, 36). She concludes: 
“Hence I am forced to doubt whether even without her potent charm and peculiai* filial 
position Gwendolen might still not have played the queen in exile, if only she had kept 
her inborn energy of egoistic desire, and her power of inspiring fear as to what she 
might say or do” (chapter 4, 36).
Gwendolen’s supreme egoistic action is her decision to many Grandcourt. It is 
not a decision that Gwendolen makes easily, but she gambles on what she Imows of 
Grandcouit’s past life and his present behaviour. In chapter fourteen, Gwendolen is 
hoiTified to find out that Grandcourt has a mistress and four children (chapter 14, 136), 
and so leaves for Leubromi. However, her family is then ruined financially. She consults 
Klesmer about the possibility of becoming a singer or actress, but he says that she does 
not have the talent or discipline for this. Faced with the only other option of becoming a 
governess, Gwendolen decides to marry Grandcourt. It is a complex decision, partly 
motivated by the desire to help her family financially, partly by her confidence that she 
can manipulate Grandcourt after maniage. In her decision to marry Grandcourt, 
lorowing what she does about his relationship with Lydia Glasher, Gwendolen 
unwittingly puts herself in the hands of a sadist. Gwendolen does not act in a responsible 
way to the revelation about Grandcomt’s past that comes in the person and message of 
Lydia Glasher, and tliis is her mistake. In the attempts to excuse her behaviour, she 
pretends to have an alibi for what she knows.
Gwendolen naively believes that as Grandcourt’s wife she will be able to 
manage or manipulate hhn into doing good for Lydia Glasher and her children. She
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reasons thus: “she had drawn on all the loiowledge she had for grounds to justify her
maniage. And what she most dwelt on was die detennination, that when she was
Grandcourt’s wife, she would urge him to the most liberal conduct towards Mrs
Glasher’s children” (chapter 28, 288). Before Gwendolen flees to Leubronn, her uncle
Gasgoine says that it is her “responsibility” to marry Grandcourt (chapter 13, 127). After
warning her against caprice, coquetry, and folly, he says that he hopes Gwendolen will
find in marriage a “new fountain of duty and affection” (chapter 13, 127). He says “you
will have probably an increasing power, both of rank and wealth, which may be used for
the benefit of others” (chapter 13, 127-8). There is a tragic irony in these words.
Gwendolen’s belief before her marriage is that she will be able to influence
Grandcourt; she does not consider what her own marital duties will be: “It was
characteristic that, with all her debating, she was never troubled by the question whether
the indefensibleness of her maniage did not include the fact that she had accepted
Grandcourt solely as the man whom it was convenient for her to marry, not in the least
as one to whom she would be binding herself in duty” (chapter 29, 307). Gwendolen
does not thinlc of her relational duties as she enters marriage, but only of what is
convenient for her. Thus she exhibits her egoism in her decision to many Grandcourt,
and in her thinking about what their marriage will be lüce.
Gwendolen realises the consequences of her actions on her wedding night, when
she receives Grandcourt’s diamonds and a letter from Lydia. The letter reads:
“These diamonds, which were once given with ardent love to Lydia Glasher, she 
passes on to you. You have broken your word to her, that you might possess 
what was hers. Perhaps you tliink of being happy, as she once was, and of having
In chapter 44 Gasgoine talks about a wife’s “great influence with her husband,” and Gwendolen feels 
these words to be a “bitter comedy” (512).
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beautiftil children such as hers, who will thrust hers aside. God is too just for 
that. The man you have married has a withered heart. His best young love was 
mine; you could not take that from me when you took the rest. It is dead; but I 
am the grave in which your chance of happiness is buried as well as mhie. You 
had youi- warning. You have chosen to injure me and my children. He had meant 
to marry me. He would have married me at last, if you had not broken your 
word. You will have your punisliment. I deshe it with all my soul.
“Will you give him this letter to set him against me and ruin us more -  me 
and my cliildren? Shall you like to stand before your husband with these 
diamonds on you, and these words of mine in his thoughts and yours? Will he 
thinlc you have any right to complain when he has made you miserable? You 
took him with your eyes open. The willing wrong you have done me will be your 
curse.” (chapter 31, 330)
Lydia’s complaint that Gwendolen has broken her word is taken seriously in Eliot’s
moral world view. As I mentioned earlier, Gwendolen should have been responsible to
the advice and knowledge that she received from Lydia. Lydia believes that only
Gwendolen stands between her and Grandcourt. Morally speaking, Gwendolen’s
decision to marry Grandcourt does inflict an injury on Lydia and her childien. Her
failure to respond to the claims of Lydia Glasher is a result of her egoism and of her
circumstances. In Bakhtin’s terms, Gwendolen claims an alibi for the knowledge that
she has about Lydia and Grandcourt, but the narrative makes it clear that there can be no
alibi for this sort of information. The outcome of Gwendolen’s marriage to Grandcourt
serves as a warning to the reader of what can happen when one attempts to avoid the
responsibilities that come from one’s unique position in time and space. Lydia’s letter is
prophetic in that Gwendolen’s relationship with Grandcouit is a curse and a punishment.
Gwendolen’s hope for moral growth is dependent on the self-dissatisfaction that she
feels as a result of her actions. It is only as she turns away fr om pleasing her self that her
moral growth can begin. The naiTative makes it clear that very eai'ly in her relationship
with Grandcourt does she begin to me her actions.
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One of the first descriptions of the marital relations of Gwendolen and
Grandcourt is found in chapter 35. Their maniage is described as Grandcourt’s “empire
of fear” (chapter 35, 395). We read:
Already, in seven short weeks, wliich seemed half her life, her husband had 
gained a mastery which she could no more resist than she could have resisted the 
benumbing effect fi*om the touch of a torpedo. Gwendolen’s will had seemed 
imperious in its small girlish sway; but it was the will of a creature with a large 
discourse of imaginative fears: a shadow would have been enough to relax its 
hold. And she had fomid a will like tliat of a crab or a boa-constrictor which goes 
on pinching or crushing without alarm at thunder. Not that Grandcourt was 
without calculation of the intangible effects which were the chief means of 
mastery; indeed he had a surprising acuteness in detecting that situation of 
feeling in Gwendolen which made her proud and rebellious spirit dumb and 
helpless before him. (chapter 35, 394-5)
Their relationship is described in terms of power relations, but Grandcourt clearly has
the “mastery.” Gwendolen is powerless to resist his will, and his egoism and will-to-
power are more potent than hers. Eliot employs contrasting descriptions of their wills,
Gwendolen’s being described as “small” and “girlish” and Grandcourl’s like a boa-
constrictor.
Chapter 48 similarly records how Grandcourt’s egoism is worked out in his
relationship with Gwendolen. This chapter details a nmnber of incidents in which
Grandcourt is seen exerting his power and influence over Gwendolen, iircluding his
response to her relationship with Deronda, his implication drat Deronda has an indecent
relationship with Mirah, his scheme to let her Icnow Iris provisions for Lydia Glasher and
her clrildien in the event of his deatlr, aird his command that she join him for sailing in
the Mediterranean. We read:
No movement of Gwendolen in relation to Deronda escaped him. He would have 
denied that he was jealous; because jealousy would have implied some doubt of 
Iris own power to hinder what he had deteimiired against. That Iris wife should 
have more inclination to another man’s society than to his own would not pain
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him: what he required was tliat she should be as fully aware as she would have 
been of a locked hand-cuff, that her mclination was helpless to decide anytliing 
in contradiction with his resolve. However much of vacillating whim there might 
have been in his entrance on matrimony, there was no vacillating in his 
inteipretation of the bond. He had not repented of his marriage; it had really 
brought more of aim into liis life, new objects to exert his will upon; and he had 
not repented of his choice, (chapter 48, 543)
Grandcourt sees that maniage is an oppoitimity for increasing the number of people he
can exert his will upon. Although he makes no attempt to physically restrain
Gwendolen, he imprisons her will in his. Eliot’s portrayal of the psychological abuse
imposed on Gwendolen is a chilling representation of the possible misappropriation of
personal ties. Only her husband is capable of inflicting such psychological abuse on
Gwendolen, and in tliis Grandcourt is clearly abusing their relationship. Grandcourt has
supreme confidence that he will get his own way in his relationship with Gwendolen.
In this chapter Grandcourt tries to imply that Deronda’s relations with Mirah are
mdecent and improper. Gwendolen is distraught, and ends up going to see Mirah to ask
her if she knows any ill of Deronda. When Grandcour t finds out that she has been to see
Mirah he forbids for her ever to do so again, saying that she is compromising her
position as his wife. We read of die effect that Iris speech has on her:
Every slow sentence of that speech had a terrific mastery in it for Gwendolen’s 
natiue. If the low tones had come fr om a physician telling her that her symptoms 
were those of a fatal disease, and prognosticating its course, she could not have 
been more helpless against the argument tliat lay in it. But she was permitted to 
move now, and her husband never again made any reference to what had 
occuned this morning. He knew the force of his own words. If this white-handed 
man with the perpendicular profile had been sent to govern a difficult colony, he 
might have won reputation among his contemporaries. He had certainly ability, 
would have understood that it was safer to exterminate than to cajole superseded 
proprietors, and would not have flinched from making things safe in that way. 
(chapter 48, 552)
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Implicit in this naiTative comment is tlie fact that Grandcouil conceives of liis relation to 
Gwendolen as being lilce the relation between a governor of a colony and people within 
that colony who need to be brouglit to order. He knows that making false accusations 
about the character of Deronda is exactly what will distress Gwendolen the most. In 
addition, he wants Gwendolen to Icnow that he knew she knew about Lydia Glasher 
before their marriage, and commands her to join Irim yachting. In chapter 54 the 
narrative records what happens when the Grandcourts go yachting. Once again 
Grandcourt expresses his egoism in liis behaviour toward his wife: “[H]e wanted to feel 
more securely that she was his to do as he liked with, and to make her feel it also” 
(chapter 54, 622). He is described as “leading his wife captive” and enjoying his 
“despotism” (chapter 54, 626).
Tlie marriage of Gwendolen and Grandcourt is ended upon his death. Gwendolen 
feels tremendous guilt and remorse upon his death, and questions whether her 
mmderous thoughts were instrumental in his death. The narrative of Daniel Deronda 
leaves it open to interpretation whether or not Gwendolen is cornplicit in Grandcourt’s 
death. In his will, he leaves the bulk of his estate to Lydia Glasher and her family.
In tliis section I have analysed how the egoism of Grandcourt and Gwendolen 
manifests itself in their tliinking and their behaviour. In BaMitinian terms, both of them 
try to claim an alibi for their marital relations. In the next section I will look at how 
Gwendolen’s guilt and remorse over her actions, together with her relationship with 
Deronda, allow her to transcend her egoism, and move toward altrmsm.'^
“But her remorse was the precious sign of a recoverable nature; it was the culmination o f that self­
disapproval which had been the awakening o f  a new life within her” (chapter 56, 649).
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‘'His opinion .  . .  may be our virtue in the making'*^^
In this section I compare the way in which Grandcourt and Deronda use their respective 
excess of seeing in relation to Gwendolen. According to Baklitin, excess of seeing is die 
visual, perspectival working out of a person’s uniqueness in time and space, i.e., each 
human being has a unique way of looldng at the world that is dependent on his or her 
incarnated position in time and space. Excess of seeing is a relational phenomenon and 
is part of the way in which a human being works out his or her non-alibi in being. We 
need, as human beings, to learn to use the excess of seeing that we have in relation to the 
other, for his or her advantage. Only by accepting tliat our non-alibi in being and excess 
of seeing ensue responsibilities can we be answerable for our miiqueness. Grandcoui t 
uses his excess of seeing in relation to Gwendolen for his own advantage. In the last 
section we saw how his egoism manifested itself in his tyrannical and despotic 
behaviour' toward her. hi tliis section I will compare his treatment of Gwendolen with 
the way in which Deronda uses his excess of seeing in relation to her for her advantage 
and for her moral growth.
I wrote in chapters four and five that the novel form gives Eliot scope to explore 
the consequences of trying to claim an alibi and of not using our* excess of seeing in a 
way that is helpflil toward the other. In Bakhtin’s wi'itings we saw how he holds that the 
moral person does not try and claim an alibi and uses liis or her excess for die advantage 
of the other. He does allow for the person who does try and claim an alibi, but this 
behaviour* is seen as deviating from the norm. For Balditin excess of seeing is good, but 
in our reading of Daniel Deronda we need to question power relations and the gaze.
Daniel Deronda, chapter 64, 709.
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How do we use this excess? In Eliot’s moral universe to recognise that we have excess
of seeing is not enough; we have to learn to use it relationally.
As part of Eliot’s ethics of art she exposes the consequences of non-incamated
action and the damage that it does to the self and the other. In this way Eliot’s novels
extend Balditin’s wilting, and extend the sympatliies of her reader. In Daniel Deronda
we see that we can use the excess of seeing we enjoy for the good or the ill of the other.
Through the contrasting behaviour of Grandcomt and Deronda Eliot encourages us to
use our excess of seeing for the advantage of die other. In this section I will show how
Deronda does use his excess of seeing to Gwendolen’s advantage, and how he helps her
see diings differently, how he helps her to see things relationally. Hie motif of
incarnation is pertinent to this discussion: the excess of seeing that Grandcourt and
Deronda have in relation to Gwendolen is because of their incarnated position outside
her. They see her in a miique way that coiTesponds to their unique position.
Deronda’s physical outsideness and Ins excess of seeing in relation to
Gwendolen are apparent in the opening lines of the novel:
Was she beautifril or not beautiful? and what was the secret of form or 
expression which gave the dynamic quality to her glance? Was the good or the 
evil genius dominant in those beams? Probably the evil; else why was die effect 
diat of unrest rather than that of undistmbed charm? Wliy was the wish to look 
again felt as coercion and not as a longing in which die whole being consents? 
(chapter 1, 3)
This opening paragraph is very important. The phrases “beauty,” “secret of form,” 
“good,” and “evil” suggest both aesthetics and ethics, and the comiection between them. 
The word “coercion” introduces the theme of power that we have seen already in the 
relationship between Grandcomt and Gwendolen. It is important to note that the 
dominance and the coercion refer to Gwendolen and not Deronda. He is not the one
224
manipulating power; rather, it is she. In section one we saw that before her marriage to
Grandcourt, Gwendolen attempted to exert her power over everyone. We saw in the last
section that she tried to be a princess and a queen. She tries, unsuccessfully, to be the
one in control of the relationship with tlie sadistic Grandcourt.
As chapter 1 continues Gwendolen begins to feel uneasy with Deronda’s gaze.
Gwendolen thinks that his gaze is unflattering and condescending.^^ Deronda is
measuring her in terms of moral behaviom*. He dislikes gambling. She is aware of the
spatial difference between them. He is “outside” her (chapter 1, 6). It is this outsideness
that allows him to help her. His “measuring” gaze makes her wince; this anticipates the
way she will physically and morally wince in Grandcour't’s presence (chapter 1, 6). At
tliis point in her story, Gwendolen dislikes Deronda looking at her, and his moral
judgment on her, but as the novel develops, and she suffers not only personal remorse
for her own actions, but psychological abuse from Grandcourt, she appreciates more the
way in which Deronda is able to help her.
A textual example of the way in which Grandcourt uses his excess of seeing to
manipulate Gwendolen can be found in chapter 28. We read:
It was characteristic tliat he got none of his satisfaction from the belief that 
Gwendolen was in love with him; and that love had overcome the jealous 
resentment which had made her mn away from liim. On the conti ary, lie believed 
that this girl was rather exceptional in the fact that, in spite of his assiduous 
attention to her, she was not in love with him; and it seemed to bim veiy likely 
that if it had not been for the sudden poverty which had come over her family, 
she would not have accepted him. From the very first there had been an 
exasperating fascination in the tricksiness with wliich she had -  not met his 
advances, but -  wheeled away fr om them. She had been brought to accept him in 
spite of everything -  brouglit to kneel down like a horse under training for the 
ai'ena, though she might have an objection to it all the while. On the whole, 
Grandcourt got more pleasuie out of this notion than he could have done out of
Some feminist critics would agiee.
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winning a girl of whom he was sure that she had a strong inclination for him 
personally. And yet this pleasure in mastering reluctance flourished along with 
the habitual persuasion that no woman whom he favoured could be quite 
indifferent to his personal influence; and it seemed to him not unlikely that by- 
and-by Gwendolen might be more enamour ed of him than he of her. In any case 
she would have to submit; and he enjoyed thinking of her as his future wife, 
whose pride and spirit were suited to command every one but himself. He had no 
taste for a woman who was all tenderness to him, full of petitioning solicitude 
and willing obedience. He meant to be master of a woman who would have liked 
to master him, and who perhaps would have been capable of mastering another 
man. (chapter 28, 293-4)
In Grandcourt’s tliinking about Gwendolen there is no question of love, no respect, no
tenderness, no affection. There is a lack of physical affection and responsiveness
between them. Grandcomt’s excess of seeing is encoded with power, the desire to make
Gwendolen submit to him, and the urge to master her. In Grandcourt’s excess of seeing
there is no pretence of helping Gwendolen. Wliereas in Bakhtin’s writings excess of
seeing is a grace-bestowing act, Grandcourt uses his excess of seeing to make
Gwendolen dumb before liim.^  ^He certainly does not love her as he loves liimself, nor
is he indulgent toward her (“Author and Hero,” 38). He treats her like a horse that is to
be tamed. It is during the course of her maniage with Grandcomt that Gwendolen
begins to appreciate the detachment that Deronda brings.
Dming the com se of Daniel Deronda, Gwendolen and Deronda have a series of
one on one conversations tliat help her transcend her egoism. His graciousness is
instrumental in moving her on from selfishness. Following his observation of her
gambling in chapter one, we find that he redeems the necldace that she pawns after
hearing of her family’s financial loss (chapter 2). She is horrified by his actions, and
does not look forward to their meeting again. In chapter 29 Gwendolen notices tliat
Feminist critics have also criticised Bakhtin’s writing for not attending to the issue o f power.
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Deronda’s eyes are “fixed on her with a look so gravely penetrating that it had a keener
edge for her than his ironical smile at her losses” (chapter 29, 303). She is beginning to
respond to his “critical glance” (chapter 29, 304). Gwendolen begins to look for
opportunities of private discussions with him, and wants to know how and what he
thinks about tilings. Tliis need for an other is a good sign, as she is moving away from
smug self-satisfaction. Her ability to express the need for another person’s opinion is a
sign of moral gr owth.
In Daniel Deronda there are a number of occasions in which the narrative pauses
and has us consider the way in which Deronda views Gwendolen. The first is in chapter
36, when he hears of Grandcourt’s relationship with Lydia Glasher. At first he thinlcs
that Gwendolen could know nothing of this situation, and then he considers that
possibly she did know. This is liis reflection on her situation:
Since the early days when he tried to construct the hidden story of liis own birth, 
his mind had perhaps never been so active in weaving probabilities about any 
private affair as it had now begun to be about Gwendolen’s marriage. This 
unavowed relation of Grandcourt’s, -  could she have gained some knowledge of 
it, which caused her to shrink fi'om the match -  a shrinking finally overcome by 
the ur gence of poverty? He could recall almost every word she had said to hin^ 
and in certain of these words he seemed to disceru that she was conscious of 
having done some wrong -  inflicted some injury. His own acute experience 
made him alive to the form of injury wliich might affect the imavowed children 
and their mother. Was Mrs Grandcourt, under all her determined show of 
satisfaction, gnawed by a double, a treble-headed grief -  self-reproach, 
disappointment, jealousy? He dwelt especially on all the slight signs of self- 
reproach: he was inclined to judge her tenderly, to excuse, to pity. He thought he 
had found a key now by which to interpret her more clearly: what magnifying of 
her misery might not a young creature get into who had wedded her fresh hopes 
to old secrets! [. . .] Gwendolen Imowing of that woman and her children, 
marrying Grandcourt, and showing herself contented, would have been among 
the most repulsive of beings to him; but Gwendolen tasting the bitterness of 
remorse for having contributed to their injury was brought very near to his 
fellow-feeling. If it were so, she had got to a common plane of understanding 
with him on some difficulties of life wliich a woman is rarely able to judge of 
with any justice or generosity; for, according to precedent, Gwendolen’s view of
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her position might easily have been no other tiian that her husband’s marriage 
with her was his entrance on the path of viitue, while Mrs Glasher represented 
his forsaken sin. (chapter 36, 404-5)
Grandcourt is only capable of imagining that Gwendolen is jealous, he does not consider
that she might be reproaching herself. The signs of self-reproach that Deronda perceives
are an essential step in Gwendolen’s moral growth. Self-satisfaction would indicate
undisturbed egoism, and so this rmease is a sign that she is capable of tr anscending her
egoism. Wliereas Grandcourt uses the knowledge that he has about Gwendolen’s
meeting with Lydia Glasher to squash her spirit, Deronda’s impulse is to excuse or pity
her. He does not use the knowledge that he has of her to her disadvantage. He is aware
that her tnrst in him means responsibility for liim.
Deronda realises that his act of redeeming Gwendolen’s pawned necklace means
tiiat he has assumed a responsibility toward her. hi chapter 48 we read:
She was something more than a problem: she was a lovely woman, for the turn 
of whose mind and fate he had a caie which, however fütile it might be, kept 
soliciting him as a responsibility, perhaps all the more that, when he dared to 
tliink of his own future, he saw it lying far away fi'om this splendid sad-hearted 
creature, who, because he had once been impelled to arrest her attention 
momentarily, as he might have seized her arm with warning to hinder her from 
stepping where there was danger, had turned to him with a beseeching persistent 
need, (chapter 48, 545-6)
hiitially Gwendolen is only able to conceive of Deronda as he relates to herself, and not
as a separate person. She is conscious of her intense need of him, and yet she needs to
glow fuitlier than that and recognise him as a separate person. Gwendolen does not see
Deronda’s other life: “the phi'ase ‘reading Hebrew’ had fleeted unimpressively across
her sense of hearing, as a stray stork might have made its peculiar flight across her
landscape without rousing any surprised reflection on its natural history” (chapter 48,
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553).^  ^ In the passage quoted above, we see that Deronda once again uses liis excess of
seeing for her advantage. In the quotation above there is the hint of Deronda’s
uncertainty about his futui’e. Wlien he does become aware of his Jewish identity, he is
aware that Ms relationship with Gwendolen will be significantly changed. He is afraid to
tell her of this change.
The theological motif of revelation is crucial to our understanding of how
Gwendolen learns to perceive of Deronda as a person who has a separate existence. The
moral climax of the novel occurs when Deronda reveals to Gwendolen his Jewish
identity, and she recognises fully the implications of this for their relationship. When
she returns to England, after Grandcouit’s drowning, she wishes to see Deronda:
Gwendolen [. . .] lived througli and tMough again the tenible Mstoiy of her 
temptations, fr'om their first form of illusory self-pleasing when she struggled 
away from the hold of conscience, to their latest form of an urgent hatred 
dragging her towards its satisfaction, wMle she prayed and cried for the help of 
that conscience which she had once forsaken. She was now dwelling on every 
word of Deronda’s that pointed to her past deliverance from the worst evil in 
herself and the worst infliction of it on others, and on every word that carried a 
force to resist self-despafr. (chapter 69, 740)
Gwendolen no longer resents Deronda’s moral gaze upon her; indeed, she recognises
how essential it is to her well-being. She is fully aware of Ms importance to her moral
growth. However, a fmther stage is necessary: she needs to recogmse him as a separate
other with his own separate life. In chapter 69 we read:
[S]he was also upborne by the prospect of soon seeing Mm again: she did not 
imagine him otherwise than always within her reach, her supreme need of him 
blinding her to the separateness of his life, the whole scene of which she filled
See also chapter 44: “She was thinking o f  Deronda much more than he was thinking o f  her — often 
wondering what were his ideas “about things,” and how his life was occupied. [ . . . ]  it was as far from 
Gwendolen’s conception that Deronda’s life could be determined by the historical destiny o f the Jews, as 
that he could rise into the air on a brazen horse, and so vanish from her horizon in the form o f a twinkling 
star” (508).
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with his relation to her -  no unique preoccupation of Gwendolen’s, for we are all 
apt to fall into this passionate egoism of imagination, not only towards our 
fellow-men, but towards God. And the futur e wlrich she turned her face to with a 
willing step was one where she would be continually assimilating herself to 
some type that he would hold before her. Had he not first risen on her vision as a 
corrective presence which she had recognized in the beginning with resentment, 
and at last with entire love and trust? She could not spontaneously think of an 
end to that reliance, which had become to her imagination like the frrinness of 
the earth, the only condition of her walking, (chapter 69, 740)
At this moment Gwendolen is still blirrd to Deronda’s separate life. She cannot imagine
him in any other terms than those that relate to her. Even the experiences of her
marriage have not led her to thinlc this way. Deronda’s presence in her life is described
as her “spiritual breath” (chapter 65, 716). A further jolt needs to come; and it is a
revelation from beyond herself.
In chapter 69 Deronda tells Gwendolen that he is a Jew, and that he will
probably leave England for a number of years. This revelation of Deronda’s separate
identity paves the way for Gwendolen’s transcendence of her egoism. Gwendolen
transcends her egoism when she recognises and accepts the claim of Deronda’s
Jewishness on his life, and realises that he will not always be there as her mentor. She is
shocked out of her egoism. The narrator tells us that her “memory had been stunned” -
that due to the shock of Grandcourt’s death she had ceased to think that the “little
Jewess and her brother” could make a difference to her destiny (chapter 65, 718). The
tianscendence of her egoism results in a change in the way she perceives the world and
her place in the world. It involves recognising the Jewish clahns on Deronda. It is a
move away from moral stupidity. She no longer thinlcs that the world revolves around
her.
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When Gwendolen hears Deronda’s news she is stunned:
There was a long silence between them. The world seemed getting larger round 
poor Gwendolen, and she more solitary and helpless in the midst. The thouglit 
that he might come back after going to the East, sank before the bewildering 
vision of these wide-stretching purposes in which she felt herself reduced to a 
mere speck. There comes a tenible moment to many souls when the great 
movements of the world, the larger destinies of mankind, which have lain aloof 
in newspapers and other neglected reading, enter like an earthquake into their 
own lives [ .. .] .  Then it is as if the Invisible Power that has been the object of 
lip-worship and lip-resignation became visible, according to the imagery of the 
Hebrew poet, making the flames liis chariot and riding on the wings of the wind, 
till the mountains smoke and the plains shudder under the rolling, fiery 
visitation. Often the good cause seems to lie prostrate under the thunder of 
umelenting force, the martyr s live reviled, they die, and no angel is seen holding 
forth tire crown and the palm branch. Then it is that the submission of the soul to 
the Highest is tested, and even in the eyes of frivolity life looks out firorn the 
scene of human struggle with the awful face of duty, and a religion shows itself 
which is something else than a private consolation.
That was the sort of crisis which was at this moment beginning in 
Gwendolen’s small life: she was for the first time feeling the pressure of a vast 
mysterious moment, for the first time being dislodged fiom her supremacy in her 
own world, and getting a sense that her horizon was but a dipping onward of an 
existence with which her own was revolving. All the troubles of her wifehood 
and widowhood had still left her wMi the implicit impression which had 
accompanied her since childhood, that whatever sunrounded her was somehow 
specially for her, and it was because of this that no personal jealousy had been 
roused in her in relation to Deronda: she could not spontaneously think of him as 
rightfully belonging to others more than to her. But here had come a shock 
wliich went deeper than personal jealousy -  something spmtual and vaguely 
tremendous that thrust her away, and yet quelled all anger into self-humiliation 
(chapter 69, 747-8).
Here the motif of revelation is extremely important. Gwendolen is jolted out of her 
moral stupidity by a revelation fiom someone outside her self. Only at tliis point is 
Gwendolen learning to have the right perspective on the world. We are told that not 
even the terror of marriage to Grandcourf shook her out of egoism. The language in this 
passage is powerful because of the grandeur of the imagery. It is as though Gwendolen 
is undergoing a cosmic shift in her imderstanding of her own position in the world, and 
in the way in wliich she relates to others. Previously Deronda has advised her to “try to
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care about something in tliis vast world besides the gi'atification of small selfish desires” 
(chapter 36, 416); in tliis scene the vast world seems to be crowding in on Gwendolen, 
squeezing out her small selfish desires. She is forced to look at tilings from Deronda’s 
perspective, and she wants to understand his position. Her moral growth culminates in 
her letter to him on his wedding day, and her resolution that she will be better because 
she has known him. The climax of Gwendolen’s redemption is the moment when she is 
shocked out of her self-obsession by the revelation of Deronda’s other life. The 
language of asti'onomy is used tluoughout Daniel Deronda to express the state of 
Gwendolen’s thinking about the world and her position in it.^  ^It is therefore significant 
that her understanding of the world is changed by tliis revelation from Deronda. In her 
relationship with Deronda, Gwendolen learns to see people in their wider relations, and 
not to relate everything to herself. Deronda’s excess of seeing leads her to moral growth. 
The theological motifs of incarnation, revelation, and transcendence have been 
important in understanding how this process works, hi the next section I will focus on 
how Deronda similarly learns of his need for the odier. His lack of a sense of vocation is 
only countered when he discovers his Jewish identity, and the responsibilities that this 
position holds for him.
For example, in chapter 6 we read: “What she unwillingly recognized and would have been glad for 
others to be unaware of, was that liability o f hers to fits o f spiritual dread, though this fountain o f awe 
within her had not found its way into connection with the religion taught her or with any human relations. 
[ . . . ]  Solitude in any wide scene impressed her with an undefined feeling o f  immeasurable existence aloof 
fr om her, in the midst o f which she was helplessly incapable o f asserting herself. The little astronomy 
taught her at school used sometimes to set her imagination at work in a way that made her tremble; but 
always when some one joined her she recovered her indifference to the vastness in which she had seemed 
an exile [ . . . ] .  With human ears and eyes about her, she had always hitherto recovered her confidence, and 
felt the possibility o f winning empire” (chapter 6, 56-7).
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Deronda *s "duteous bond”^^
Daniel Deronda is a quite different novel from its inunediate predecessor, and has 
suffered from comparisons. With the exception of Daniel Deronda, all of Eliot’s novels 
show their protagonists in conflict with a society. For example, in Middlemarch 
Dorothea feels “hemmed in by a social life which seemed nothing but a labyrinth of 
petty coui'ses, a walled-in maze of small paths that led no whither” (chapter 3, 28), and 
Lydgate feels “the hampering tlireadlike pressure of small social conditions, and their 
frustrating complexity” (chapter 18, 176). In chapter five we saw that Bakhtin’s 
concepts of non-alibi in being and answerability provided us with an ethic that helps us 
understand how people can cope and be responsible within this closed community, i.e., 
that it is an acknowledgement of one’s unique, incarnated position in time and space that 
enables one to lead an ethical life. We saw that this enabled Eliot’s characters to 
ti'anscend their egoism and help them better relate to the other. However, in Daniel 
Deronda, the problems of Deronda and Gwendolen are not due to the sense of being 
stifled or held hack by the society in which they live.
The problems of Deronda and Gwendolen stem, in part, from their rootlessness. 
A lack of a sense of belonging hinders their moral growth, hi the circumstances we find 
the characters at the beginning of the novel, it is not possible for them to know what are 
their full responsibilities. Although they are unique in time and space, they do not know 
of the responsibilities this position entails. In chapter 3 we are told that one of the 
possible reasons for Gwendolen’s egoism is her lack of rootedness. The knowledge of 
his responsibilities is also hidden from Deronda. Joan Bennett, in George Eliot: Her
Daniel Deronda, chapter 63, 692.
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Mind and Her Art, articulates the difference betv^een Daniel Deronda and Eliot’s earlier 
fiction: “In this book the absence of an enveloping society for either Gwendolen or 
Daniel is a part of the author’s central conception. Both characters are incomplete 
because they have been deprived of such a soil in which to grow” (83). Bennett says that 
in Eliot’s earlier novels the “central drama” sprang fiom the tension between the 
individual and the community, but in Daniel Deronda Eliot attempted to embody it by a 
reverse process, Le., to articulate the tensions that occur when one is unsure of one’s 
place in society. I think that Bennett’s assessment of Daniel Deronda is correct. In 
George Eliot and the Landscape o f Time: Narrative Form and Protestant Apocalyptic 
History, Mary Wilson Carpenter discusses Eliot’s use of the motif of exile. She argues 
that the motif is used in relation to botli Jewish and non-Jewish characters. Caipenter 
summarises Jean Sudrann’s argument in ‘Daniel Deronda and the Landscape of Exile,” 
and writes that both Gwendolen and Deronda are exiles who are deprived of “a spiritual 
inheritance that would give shape and moral significance to their own lives” (139).^ ^^  
This luiincamated aspect of their lives is expressed in the language and images of 
rootlessness and exile. But despite the differences between Middlemarch and Daniel 
Deronda in the conception and portrayal of the individual and his or her relation to 
society, Bakhtin’s concepts of non-alibi in bemg, excess of seeing, and selfiother 
relations can help us articulate how this difference relates to Eliot’s aesthetic aim of 
extending her reader’s sympathies. Balchtin’s concepts of answerability and non-alibi in 
being help us understand not only how chaiacters like Dorothea need to be answerable
See Mary Wilson Carpenter, George Eliot and the Landscape o f Time: Narrative Form and Protestant 
Apocalyptic Histoiy (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 1986), and Jean Sudrann, ‘Daniel 
Deronda and the Landscape of Exile,” English Literaiy Histoiy 37.3 (September 1970): 433-55.
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for their uniqueness, but also how Gwendolen and Deronda can find a way out of their 
moral apathy. The characters in Daniel Deronda are more ‘unincarnated’ than their 
counteiparts in Middlemarch. Nonetheless, it is the recognition and acceptance of their 
uniqueness and its ensuing responsibility that gives them the opportunity for moral 
gi'owth.
Gwendolen and Deronda are at opposite ends of Eliot’s moral spectrum of 
egoism and altmism, but the solution to both Üieir problems is to accept their uniqueness 
and the responsibilities that it entails. For Deronda tliat is to accept and embrace fully 
liis Jewish inlieritance and, as we saw in the last section, Gwendolen moves from 
egoism to learn better ways of relating to and recognising the claims of the other.
In Daniel Deronda the hero needs to figure out his vocation and responsibilities. 
In this section I will examine in detail the inteipersonal relations between Deronda and 
Mordecai. I will trace how, in die ffiendsliip with Mordecai, we see Deronda move fiom 
a longing to do something useful, to willingly embracing his Jewish inlieritance and 
futuie. Both Deronda and Mordecai are aware of their need of the other. Through an 
analysis of their relationship we can see how religious motifs form part of Eliot’s ethics 
and aesthetics.
When we are first inti'oduced to Deronda he does not know who is his mother, 
but he suspects that his father is Sh Hugo Mallinger. Deronda has been given the 
“education of an English gentleman,” first at Eton and then at Cambridge (chapter 16, 
157). A number of caieers are open to him, including law, writing, and politics (chapter 
16, 161). Deronda does not need to get an “immediate income,” or to “fit himself in 
haste for a profession” (chapter 16, 164); he exists in a “state of social neutrality”
235
(chapter 16,165). We read: “Other men, he inwardly said, had a more definite place and 
duties” (165). He leaves Cambridge with no clear direction, except he desires to go 
overseas and “understand other points of view” (chapter 16, 168). In short, his future 
vocation is unclear to him. Deronda is not an egoist, but he is extremely passive. In 
Baklitin’s terms Deronda is not trying to claim an alibi, but he does not know what to 
do.
In deference to Sir Hugo Deronda begins to study law, but this decision merely
deepens “the roots of indecision” (chapter 17, 169). The narrator infomis us that
Deronda is in a “sort of contemplative mood” -  “questioning whether it were worth
while to take part in the battle of the world” (169). The narrator says this is often done
on the back of the capital that others have earned, and expresses her disapproval of this
indecision. It is not morally good. In Balditin’s terms, everything in Deronda’s history
prepares liim for the meeting with Mordecai, and Mordecai’s call on his life. Deronda is
willing to embrace his uniqueness and its ensuing responsibility.
Deronda’s lack of a sense of vocation is expressed in chapter 32.1 list a number
of Eliot’s descriptions, and then offer a commentary:
His early-wakened sensibility and reflectiveness had developed into a many- 
sided sympathy, which tiueatened to hinder any persistent course of action [...]. 
(335)
His imagination had so wrought itself to the habit of seeing things as they 
probably appeared to otliers, that a strong partisanship, unless it were against an 
immediate oppression, had become an insincerity for him. His plenteous, flexible 
sympathy had ended by falling into one ciment witli that reflective analysis 
wliich tends to neutralize sympathy. (335-6)
A too reflective and diffusive sympathy was in danger of paralysing in him that 
indignation against wi'ong and Üiat selectness of fellowship which aie the 
conditions of moral force; and in the last few years of confirmed manhood he 
had become so keenly aware of tliis that what he most longed for was either
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some external event, or some inward light, that would urge him into a definite 
line of action, and compress his wandering energy. (336).
Deronda is not trying to avoid his responsibilities, he just does not know what tliey are.
Sympathy is an important word in Eliot’s moral vocabulary, and is central to her ethics
of art. However, she implies tliat it needs to be directed. It is not good enough to be
sympatlietic by nature; one has to act upon it. Sympatliy for Deronda, as for the reader,
needs to be an act rather than an emotion. It is not enough to be “reflective,” one also
has to be active. The problem for Deronda is that he just does not loiow what he should
do:
But how and whence was the needed event to come? -  the influence that would 
justify partiality, and make him what he longed to be yet was unable to malce 
liimself -  an organic part of social life, instead of roaming in it like a yearning 
disembodied spirit, stirred with a vague social passion, but without fixed local 
habitation to render fellowship real? To make a little difference for the better 
was what he was not contented to live without; but how make it? (chapter 32, 
336-7)
Deronda has “no special demands on him,” and “no fixed relationship except one of a 
doubtful kind” (chapter 32, 337). Deronda is not a pretender in Baklitin’s terms; he does 
not want to lead an unincarnated life. He wants to be answerable, but does not know 
how. In chapter 33 we read: “Was it not his secret complaint against the way in which 
others had ordered his own life, that he had not open daylight on all its relations, so tliat 
he had not, like other men, the full guidance of primary duties?” (chapter 33, 354). It is 
his relationship witli Mordecai and Mirah that eventually clarify this for him.
From Deronda’s perspective the event which precipitates his meeting with 
Mordecai is liis rescuing Mirah from drowning in chapter 17. Deronda takes on this 
“responsibility” of finding Mirah’s mother and brother, not lorowing what will be the 
result (chapter 17, 178). His attempts to find Mirah’s relatives lead him to Mordecai.
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Deronda meets Mordecai when he calls in to a secondhand bookstore to make a 
purchase (chapter 33). From Mordecai’s perspective, however, he interprets Deronda in 
light of his five-year sear ch for someone to take on his ideas. Upon meeting Deronda he 
inquires if he is a Jew. Wlien Deronda gives a negative, Mordecai immediately loses 
interest in him (chapter 33, 357-8). Deronda and Mordecai meet agahi when Deronda 
joins the Cohens for the Sabbath meal, and realises that Mordecai is a house-guest of 
theirs. On tliis occasion he asks Deronda if he Icnows Hebrew (chapter 34, 369). 
Deronda thinlcs that he is “remarkable man” and is intrigued by him (chapter 34, 370), 
but on this occasion they do not get to know one anotlier better. We leam about 
Mordecai’s expectations of their relationship in chapter 38.
Mordecai needs Deronda because he is dying, and he wants to pass liis work on 
to others. Mordecai is conscious of “ebbing physical life” and “widening spiritual 
loneliness” (chapter 38, 439-40). He is searching for a man who will accept the 
“spiritual product” of Mordecai’s life as a mission (chapter 38, 440). He is looking for 
an “intellectually cultured” Jew, who is materially well-off (440). He is loolcing for a 
“Being answering to his need” (chapter 38, 441), a “deliverer” (chapter 38, 443).
In chapter 40, Deronda sets out once again to talk to Mordecai. Deronda hopes 
that “their conversation should not again end speedily with that drop of Mordecai’s 
interest which was like the removal of a drawbridge, and threatened to shut out any easy 
communication” (chapter 40, 458). Deronda wants there to be a communication between 
them. Wliile he rows along, he looks at things from Mordecai’s point of view: “he 
experienced, as was wont with him, a quick change of mental light, shifting his point of 
view to that of the person whom he had been thinking of hitherto chiefly as seiwiceable
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to his own purposes” (458). Deronda is aware that Mordecai has some kind of
“expectation” of him, but does not know what it could be; he wonders if there is a
“peculiar tie” between them (chapter 40, 459).
At this point in the narrative, Deronda is considering only what he can do to help
Mordecai, without conceiving that Mordecai will be able to help him. We read: “It
accorded with his habitual disposition that he should meet rather than resist any claim on
liim in the shape of another’s need” (chapter 40, 461). Deronda wonders what the nature
of the “strong relation” between them is, since Mordecai feels it so strongly (chapter 40,
462). He does not really have “belief in the validity of Mordecai’s impressions
concerning him,” but he does have “a profound sensibility to a cry from the depths of
another soul; and accompanying that, the summons to be receptive instead of
superciliously prejudging” (chapter 40, 463). Mordecai tells Deronda of the great studies
he has made, which he has written in Hebrew. He is conscious that he does not have the
energy left to re-wiite them in English. Deronda offers to publish it, but Mordecai wants
more from him. He has such hope in Deronda, but Deronda has to remind him that he is
not a Jew. Deronda finds himself in the double bind of not wanting to disappoint
Mordecai, nor wanting to feed any illusions tliat he might later have to shatter. Deronda
is forced to confess that he does not know his parentage -  he is conscious of the danger
of refusing “some task that belonged to him, some act of due fellowship” (chapter 40,
467). He longs to be answerable and responsible to something, but he does not know
what is the call on his life. Deronda confesses:
“What my birth was does not lie in my will,” he answered. “My sense of claims 
on me caimot be independent of my Icnowledge there. And I camiot promise you 
that I will try to hasten a disclosure. Feelings which have stmck root tlnough half 
my life may still hinder me from doing what I have never yet been able to do.
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Everything must be waited for. I must know more of the tmth about my own life, 
and I must know more of what it would become if it were made a part of yours.” 
(chapter 40,468)
Deronda reflects on their meeting in the following chapter. We have already seen how
Garrett Stewart interprets Deronda’s reaction to this event, and the way in which his
reading has prepared Deronda to think imaginatively into the experience of others. Since
the age of thirteen Deronda has been “used to thinlc of some revelation that might
influence his view of the particular duties belonging to him” (chapter 40, 476). Deronda
begins to reflect on the influence that Mordecai might have on him; and not just on what
he can do for Mordecai:
[I]t was conceivable that as Mordecai needed and believed that he had found an 
active replenisliment of himself, so Deronda might receive from Mordecai’s 
mhid the complete ideal shape of that personal duty and citizenship which lay in 
his own thought like sculptured fragments certifying some beauty yearned after 
but not traceable by divination, (chapter 40, 476)
We have already seen that Deronda is longing to know precisely what he should do, and
he begins to tliink that his fiiendsliip with Mordecai might provide him with some
guidance. Deronda, as I have already said, is not looking for an alibi, or an excuse not to
act; but he is unaware of what is demanded of liim. He wonders whether Mordecai will
have some “determining effect” on him (chapter 41, 477). Deronda summarises their
relationship:
Wliat I can be to him, or he to me, may not at all depend on his persuasion about 
the way we came togetlier. To me the way seems made up of plainly discernible 
links. If I had not found Mirah, it is probable that I should not have begun to be 
specially interested in the Jews, and certainly I should not have gone on that 
loitering search after an Ezra Cohen which made me pause at Ram’s book-shop 
[...]. Mordecai, on his side, had his visions of a disciple, and he saw me by their 
light; I coiTesponded well enough with the image his longing had created. He 
took me for one of his race. Suppose tliat his impression -  the elderly Jew at 
Frankfort seemed to have something like it -  suppose, in spite of all 
presumptions to the contrary, that his impression should somehow be proved
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true, and that I should come actually to share any of the ideas he is devoted to? 
(chapter 40, 478)
Deronda’s growing affection for Mirah is one reason why he does not mind if it is 
revealed to him that he is a Jew.
In chapter 43 Deronda realises that Mordecai is Mirah’s brother, and that their 
mother is dead. He decides to get separate accommodation for Mordecai, away from the 
Cohens, so that Mirah can tend him. Deronda is also yearning “after the obligation of 
avowed filial and social ties” (chapter 43, 506). He communicates this news of Mirah to 
Mordecai in chapter 46, and they meet for the first time in chapter 47. In chapter 49 
Deronda learns that Sir Hugo is not his father, and in 50 he reads the letter from his 
mother. The quality of Ms relationsMp with Mirah and Mordecai create in him the 
willingness to embrace a Jewish identity; this willingness is confimied when the 
revelation that he is a Jew comes from his motlier.
Deronda’s mother wishes to see him because she is ill and dying, and feels the 
need to confess to him. In tlieir first meeting, in chapter 51, she reveals to Deronda that 
he is a Jew, and confesses that she hid this knowledge from him. He is angry that she hid 
this knowledge fiom Mm because it has such an effect on him. The reason that he has 
not known precisely what he ought to do stems from the fact that she Md the knowledge 
of identity fi'om him. He has not been able to embrace the responsibilities that flow fiom 
his uniqueness because he did not know Ms position was. His mother had chosen not to 
reveal his identity before, but now she is ill she wishes to make amends. In Eliot’s moral 
universe, Leonora Charisi is morally culpable in Mding the knowledge of his birth firom 
Deronda. She has caused Deronda gmat anguish by claiiMng an alibi for her maternal 
relations to him, and attempting to claim an alibi on his behalf for his Jewish identity.
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Deronda declaies his intention to embrace his Jewish identity: “I consider it my duty -
it is the impulse of my feeling -  to identify myself, as far as possible, with my hereditaiy
people, and if I can see any work to be done for them that I can give my soul and hand
to, I shall choose to do it” (chapter 53, 616).
Following this revelation of Deronda’s Jewish identity we read: “He beheld the
world changed for him by the certitude of ties that altered the poise of hopes and fears,
and gave him a new sense of fellowship” (chapter 55, 636). We have seen how the motif
of revelation played a pai't in Gwendolen’s moral growth, when she learned of
Deronda’s separate existence from her. In Deronda’s case too, the motif of revelation is
vital to Iris learning of his true identity, and Iris ability to embrace it. hr chapter 60 he
visits his grandfather’s friend, Kaloirymos, in order to pick up his grandfather’s papers.
He informs Kalonynros:
“I shall call myself a Jew,” said Deronda, deliberately, becomingly slightly paler 
uirder the piercing eyes of his questioirer. “But I will not say that I shall profess 
to believe exactly as my fatlrers have believed. Our fathers themselves changed 
the horizon of their belief and learned of other races. But I think I can maiirtain 
irry grandfather’s irotion of separateness with communication. I hold that my first 
duty is to my own people, and if there is anytliing to be done towards restoring 
or perfecting their common life, I shall make that my vocation.” (chapter 60, 
673)
For the first time in his life Deronda has a clear idea of what his vocation should be, and
he willingly embraces it. He is answerable, in Bakhtin’s tenns, to his relationship to his
grandfather and to his people. We read:
It happened to Deronda at that moment, as it has often happened to others, that 
the need for speech made an epoch in resolve. His respect for the questioner 
would not let him decline to answer, and by the necessity to answer he found out 
the truth for himself, (chapter 60, 673-4)
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In his conversation with Kalonynios Deronda discovers his vocation. It is significant 
that Deronda has to “answer” for his identity, and he does so willing. This conversation, 
and his willingness to answer Ms grandfather’s friend, is a synecdoche for his larger 
willingness to be ethically responsible for Ms unique position in time and space.
In chapter 63 Deronda infoiins Mordecai and Mirah that he is a Jew. The 
naiTator tells us:
He had set out for Genoa in total uncertainty how far the actual bent of his 
wishes and affections would be encouraged -  how fai* tlie claims revealed to him 
might draw Mm into new paths, fai' away fr om the tracks Ms thoughts had lately 
been pursuing with a consent of desire which imcertainty made dangerous. He 
came back with something like a discovered charter warranting the inherited 
right that his ambition had begun to yearn for: he came back with what was 
better than freedom -  with a duteous bond which Ms experience had been 
preparing Mm to accept gladly [...]. (chapter 63, 692)
It is his relationsMp with both Mirah and Mordecai that makes Mm glad to be a Jew. He
is glad that he has a “duteous bond” with both of them. The revelation that he is a Jew
allows Mm to many Mirah, thus fulfilling his emotional need for the other. Siimlarly,
the revelation that he is a Jew enables Mm to take on a role m society. We read:
It was as if he had found an added soul in finding Ms ancestry -  his judgment no 
longer wandering in the mazes of impartial sympathy, but choosing, with that 
noble partiality which is man’s best strength, the closer fellowship that makes 
sympathy practical -  exchanging that bird’s-eye reasonableness which soars to 
avoid preference and loses all sense of quality, for the generous reasonableness 
of drawing shoulder to shoulder with men of lilce inheritance, (chapter 63, 693)
Earlier we saw that Deronda’s sympathy needed to be given direction, and the discovery
of Ms Jewish identity enables him to find that necessary direction. Gone is the maze-like
wandering; Deronda now has a specific duty. Deronda aclmowledges to Mordecai that
their relation has been instr umental in making Mm glad that he is a Jew:
“It is quite true that you and Mirah have been my teachers,” said Deronda. “If 
this revelation had been made to me before I knew you both, I think my mind
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would have rebelled against it. Perhaps I should have felt tlien -  Tf I could have 
chosen, I would not have been a Jew.’ What I feel now is -  that my whole being 
is a consent to the fact. But it has been the gradual accord between yoin mind 
and mine which has brought about that full consent.” (chapter 63, 697)
It is Deronda’s relationship with Mordecai and Mirah, his willingness to treat them
ethically, and to embrace the fact that he is answerable to this relationsMp, that makes
Deronda the moral lodestar" of tliis novel.
Conclusion
In tJris novel we see clearly that the self has a need of the other. Both Gwendolen and 
Deronda express their need of the other. Gwendolen needs the other to shake her out of 
her egoism, and Deronda needs the other to know what his vocation is. In Gwendolen’s 
relationship witli Deronda, Ms outsideness m relation to her allows Mm to see things that 
she cannot see for herself. Because of his incarnation in time and space he enjoys an 
excess of seeing in relation to her that he employs for her benefit. Deronda similarly 
needs Mordecai and Mir air in order to work out what his vocation and duties will be. 
The religious motifs of incarnation, revelation, and transcendence are a key par*t of 
Eliot’s ethics of ail in Daniel Deronda, and we have seen that Bakhtin’s concepts of 
non-alibi in being, excess of seeing, and self other relations help us express them.
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Pauline Nestor writes in George Eliot:
[Eliot’s] fiction and thought were shaped by her conviction that the most 
important sign of spiritual life was the ability ‘to be able always to 
reconsider one’s conclusions and go well over the process by which they 
are airived at’ (V, 58)/
In this conclusion, I will briefly ‘go over’ the process of my research on the 
ethics of Eliot’s ait. In so doing, I am conscious -  along with the naiTator of 
Middlemarch -  that “every limit is a begimiing as well as an ending” (Finale, 
818). hi this conclusion, I write not only to sum up what I have argued in this 
thesis but also to suggest new directions which this Idnd of work might take in 
the future. Like Eliot, Balditin expressed ambivalence about the possibility of 
saying the last word. I hope not to have said the last word on Eliot’s ethics of art 
but to have contributed to the dialogue about Eliot’s ethics, and to the dialogue 
about the study of literature and theology.
Briefly stated, I have discussed Eliot’s ethics of art, i.e., her desire to 
extend her reader’s sympathies. The presupposition underlying Eliot’s aesthetic 
aim in this respect is that each human being is an egoist who has a flawed 
perception of his or her relation to the world and to the other. Bakhtin and Eliot 
share an understanding of the human being as incarnated in time and space, and 
both are interested in the intersection between ethics and aesthetics. However, 
due to the different gem*es in which they chose to write, this understanding of the 
human being works itself out somewhat differently. Eliot, who did not adhere to
* Pauline Nestor, George Eliot, 9.
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any fomial Christian belief actually presents her characters as flawed, fallen, and 
sinful in their failure or inability to respond to the other. It is this tendency not to 
respond ethically to the other that her ethics of art aims to address and to counter. 
Balditin, on the other hand, concentrates philosophically on those who aie 
willing to embrace both their imiqueness and their responsibilities. His 
understanding of the ethically responsible person, who does not separate his or 
her uniqueness from his or her responsibilities, is based on his understanding of 
the Chalcedon doctrine of Chiisf s human and divine natures existing in one 
person. And, as we have seen BaMitin’s understanding of the human being is the 
model to which Eliot’s ethics of aif points us. Eliot’s ethics of art is not 
prescriptive, and does not tell the reader what to do on every occasion. However, 
in her presentation of mixed, eiiing human creatures Eliot holds up as a model 
Dorothea and Deronda, who accept their uniqueness and their responsibility. 
Eliot’s ethics of art have an effect on the reader when the reader is prepared to 
accept his or her answerability for his or her reading of Middlemarch and Daniel 
Deronda.
In light of all this, I propose that there are three ways in which future 
research of kind might proceed. The first way of proceeding would be to offer a 
Bakhtinian analysis of Eliot’s other novels. So far, I have limited my exploration 
of Eliot’s etliics of art to her last two novels. This has been largely due to the 
confines of space but this does not mean that a Baklitinian analysis is relevant 
only to Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda. I have shown that Eliot’s aesthetics is 
consistent throughout her literai-y career and that all her novels are concerned 
with questions of egoism, sympathy, moral responsibility, and how to lead a 
good life. The model of analysis that I have used in this thesis could be employed
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profitably in a reading of Eliof s other novels. In chapter four I showed briefly 
how the Bakhtinian concept of non-alibi in being could be applied to Romola, 
and the same model could be applied to Adam Bede, The Mill on the Floss, and 
Felix Holt.
The second way of proceeding would be to offer a Balditinian analysis of 
literary works by other authors, including the novels of Hem*y James or 
Richardson’s Clarissa.
The third way would be to extend this kind of research elsewhere in the 
area of literature and theology. In this thesis I have brought into dialogue literary 
theory, literary criticism, and theology in order to read Eliot’s etliics of ail. As a 
graduate student I have been based in a theology depailment whilst working on 
literary texts and literary theory, although with a view to engaging in a 
theologically responsible manner with Eliot’s novels. I have attempted to be 
responsible to this intellectual engagement with these two disciplines, and can 
only suggest that tliere are many further ways in which this could be done in 
future work. In earlier chapters of this thesis I discussed the nature of the 
interdisciplinary relationship between literature and theology, what David Jasper 
and Terry Wright refer to as a creative tension. Literature and theology ai*e two 
separate academic disciplines with their own tensions, problems, and area of 
concern. But both disciplines have something to leant and something to impart 
when they are brought into dialogue. By engaging with theological discourse, I 
have suggested that a literary theorist can gain a clearer sense of the theological 
concerns of literary artists, and the subtlety and complexity with which these 
concerns are treated in literary texts. This is no slight thing given the many ways 
in which literature and literary theory engage with Christian thinking. I have also
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suggested that theologians can learn ways of inteipreting literary texts that allow 
these texts to retain their distinctiveness. It would be possible for theologians to 
use insights gained from literary theory to engage with biblical studies and 
biblical theology.
Eugene Ionesco’s play Non (1934) contains the following lines: “If  God 
exists, why write literature? / And if he doesn’t, why write literature?” These 
lines pose a question that offers a challenge to any one working in the 
intersection of literature and theology. The lines could possibly suggest that if 
God exists then there is no need for the comfoils that fiction offers, or just no 
need for fiction at all. Alternatively, they could suggest that if God does not exist 
then there is no point in anything at all, and therefore no point in creating literary 
texts, hi other words, these lines could imply that one could write literature in 
praise of God’s existence. Whichever way in which they aie inteipreted, this 
quotation is important to both disciplines because it suggests that the questions of 
God’s existence and the question of why we write literature are somehow 
connected. It does not provide us with the answer of how these two issues aie 
related, but it gives us something about which both literary critics and 
theologians can think and write.
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